

Jivarāja Jaina Granthamālā, No. 20

GENERAL EDITORS:

Dr. A. N. UPADHYE & Dr. H. L. JAIN

JAINA VIEW OF LIFE

By

T. G. KALGHATGI, M.A., Ph.D.

Reader in Philosophy, Karnatak University,
and Principal, Karnatak Arts College, Dharwar.

लेखक

डा. जी. कलघटगी

Published by

LALCHAND HIRACHAND DOSHI

Jaina Sanskriti Samrakṣaka Sangha, Sholapur.

1969

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Price: Rs. 6.00 Only

First Edition : 1000 Copies

Copies of this book can be had direct from Jaina Sanskriti
Samrakṣaka Sangha, Santosh Bhavan, Phaltan Galli, Sholapur
(India)

Price Rs. 6/- Per copy, exclusive of Postage

जीवराज जैन ग्रन्थमाला का परिचय

शोलापुर निवासी ब्रह्मचारी जीवराज गौतमचंदजी दोशी कई वर्षोंसे संसार से उदासीन होकर धर्मकार्य में अपनी वृत्ति लगा रहे थे। सन् १९४० में उनकी यह प्रबल इच्छा हो उठी कि अपनी न्यायोपार्जित संपत्ति का उपयोग विशेष रूप से धर्म और समाज की उत्थिति के कार्य में करें। तदनुसार उन्होंने समस्त देश का परिभ्रमण कर जैन विद्वानों से साक्षात् और लिखित सम्मतियों इस बात की संग्रह की कि कौनसे कार्य में संपत्ति का उपयोग किया जाय। स्फुट मतसंचय कर लेनेके पश्चात् सन् १९४१ के ग्रीष्म काल में ब्रह्मचारीजी ने तीर्थ क्षेत्र गजपंथा (नासिक) के शीतल वातावरण में विद्वानों का समाज एकत्र की और ऊहापोहपूर्वक निर्णय के लिए उक्त विषय प्रस्तुत किया। विद्वत्सम्मेलन के फलस्वरूप ब्रह्मचारीजी ने जैन संस्कृति तथा साहित्य के समस्त अंगों के संरक्षण, उद्धार और प्रचार के हेतु से 'जैन संस्कृति संरक्षक संघ' की स्थापना की और उसके लिए ३०,०००) तीस हजार के दान की घोषणा कर दी। उनकी परिग्रहनिवृत्ति बढ़ती गई, और सन् १९४४ में उन्होंने लगभग २,००,०००) दो लाख की अपनी संपूर्ण संपत्ति संघ की ट्रस्ट रूप से अर्पण कर दी। इस तरह आपने अपने सर्वस्व का त्याग कर दि. १२-१-१९५० को अत्यन्त सावधानी और समाधान से समाधिभरण की आराधना की। इसी संघ के अन्तर्गत 'जीवराज जैन ग्रन्थमाला' का संचालन हो रहा है। प्रस्तुत ग्रंथ इसी ग्रन्थमाला का बीसवाँ पुण्य है।

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
लालचंद हिराचंद दोशी,
जैन संस्कृति संरक्षक संघ,
शोलापुर.

मुद्रक :

एस. आर. सरदेसाई, बी.ए., एलएल.बी.,
वेद-विद्या मुद्रणालय,
४१, बुधवार पेठ, पुणे.

नं० १५६८
श्री गुरुदेव कृपा-... दिगम्बर जैन

JAINA VIEW OF LIFE लोपासन (विरी) राज



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संस्थापक, जैन संस्कृति संरक्षक संघ, शोलापूर

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GENERAL EDITORIAL

In this brochure are presented eight essays on different aspects of Jainism. The Anekānta attitude is really the saviour of philosophical positions which are being pushed to the brink of extinction by extremists. Syādvāda and Nayavāda, the two wings of Anekānta, are the effective instruments for bringing out the secrets of reality by reconciling extreme alternatives. Jainism accepts both Spirit and Matter as real. The spirit or Ātman has been subjected to deeper analysis in the three-fold distinction of *bahir-*, *antar-* and *parama-ātman*. It is an embodiment of knowledge, the fivefold classification (*mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manuḥparyāya* and *kevala*) of which is of special interest for an epistemologist. The concept of Kevala-jñāna envisages an ideal type of knowledge for the functioning of which there are no temporal and spatial limits. Karma, as conceived in Jainism, is a subtle variety of matter which is in association with spirit from beginningless time. It has evolved itself into an automatically functioning Law and shapes the destiny of the spirit. It is by the termination of the Karmic association through austere life and self-concentration that the Ātman passes through various stages of spiritual progress (*guṇasthāna*) and attains its innate nature, the fullest effulgence of knowledge. This course of progress is the veritable path of religion, full of rigorous discipline in thought, word and act : this constitutes the ethical code of Jainism, based on Ahimsā which is the highest criterion for judging the mutual relations in the realm of living beings. It is by correctly understanding reality and by leading the life of self-discipline, according to the

usage to which one belongs, that one realizes the highest spiritual status, *summum bonum*.

Thus it will be seen how these essays, though independent in themselves, have an inherent connection between them. They give us in brief the Jain View of Life and should enable readers to appreciate an important undercurrent of India's philosophical heritage.

Dr. T. G. KALGHATAGI is a keen investigator in philosophy. It is extremely good of him to have brought his equipment in the philosophical study to bear upon Jainism in its various aspects. We are thankful to him for giving this volume for publication to the Jivarāja Jaina Granthamālā.

Within a short time after the death of our earlier President, Shriman GULABCHAND HIRACHANDAJI (on 22-1-1967), the Sangha suffered an irreparable loss (on 23-6-1968) in the sad demise of Shriman MANIKCHAND VIRACHANDAJI who worked hard for the Sangha from its inception. His zest for life, courage of conviction and firm actions were a strength to the Sangha.

We are grateful to our President, Shriman LALCHAND HIRACHANDAJI for his enlightening guidance in all our deliberations. Heavier responsibilities have devolved on the broad shoulders of Shriman WALCHAND DEVCHANDAJI who is helping us in every way for the progress of the Granthamālā. We are so thankful to him.

Kolhapur,
Jabalpur

A. N. Upadhye
H. L. Jain

PREFACE

Man is 'homo sapiens'. He has built civilizations and destroyed them too. Magnificent empires were built, mighty in their day. It was difficult to doubt their power. But their day is done and their courts 'the lion and the lizard keep'. We have seen the phenomenal advancement of science in our own day. As we gaze at the incredible rapidity of scientific progress we are losing touch with the spiritual side of man. We are on cross-roads of life, between two worlds; 'one dead and the powerless to be born'. We see everywhere social and political chaos. There is distrust and frustration, and for a decade or more we have lived on the brink of another world war more disastrous than the earlier too, which would mean total destruction of human race. Whether it would mean *pralaya* we do not know. But when it comes we can only see the broken bits of civilization, if we are to survive this catastrophe. And all this is due to a wrong approach to the understanding of the problems of life and experience. A new kind of a materialism is being emphasised today wherein we pay exclusive attention to material comforts and ignore the higher values. But to understand life and nature we have to transcend the narrow partial points of view and adopt a synoptic view of life. We have to realize that others' points of view have also to be considered and respected. Dogmatic approach of looking at the problems leads to intolerance and then to violence. Jainas have preached the synoptic view of life in their theory of Anekānta. It emphasises the catholic outlook towards life. Intellectual non-violence, respect for other points of view are the key-note of this doctrine, and that would be a panacea for all the ills of our social and political life today. Jainism is an ancient religion which prevailed even before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the twenty-fourth and Pārśva the twentythird Tirthanikaras. It is a pre-Aryan religion coming from the Śramana current of thought, and Śramana thought was prevailing in India long before the Aryans came to this country. The antiquity of Jainism as reflecting the Pre-Aryan thought of the upper class of North-Eastern India has now been established beyond dispute. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Rṣabha-

the first Tirthaṅkara as the founder of Jainism. Long before the Aryans reached the Ganges or even Sarāsvatī Jainism had been taught by prominent saints or Tirthaṅkaras, prior to the historical twentythird Pārśva of the eighth or ninth century B. C. Many Western scholars like JACOB, VINCENT SMITH, FORLONG and ZIMMER have accepted the Pre-Āryan prevalence of Jainism. RADHAKRISHNAN accepts the view that Jainism prevailed in India even before Pārśva and Vardhamāna, the last two Tirthaṅkaras. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of Keśi and Keśi Rṣabha in the R̥gveda as referring to the first Tirthaṅkara. When Buddhism arose Jainism was already an ancient sect with its stronghold near about Vaiśālī which was visited and admired by Buddha.

The Anekānta outlook of the Jainas pervades their entire philosophy and life. The whole texture of Jaina philosophy and ethics is woven in the Anekānta attitude. We have accordingly analysed in this treatise some of the conceptions in Jaina philosophy and ethics as reflecting the Anekānta outlook. Jīva has been considered from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view it is pure and perfect, and from the phenomenal it is the agent and the enjoyer of fruits of Karma. Our experience can be graded into levels as the sense and the super-sensuous experience. Jīva in its empirical existence is involved in the wheel of Samsāra through the Yoga (activity). This involvement is beginningless, though it has an end. The end is freedom from the wheel of life and the attainment of Mokṣa. For this we have to remove the Karma that has accrued to the soul. The Jainas have worked out an elaborate theory of Karma almost making it a science. The Anekānta view pervades the analysis of Karma. Karma is a substantive force. It is material in nature. It consists of fine particles of matter which are glued to the soul as soot to the surface of the mirror. The influx of Karma leads to bondage of Jīva to the wheel of life. This bondage of soul to Karma is determined by the i) nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāgha*) and quantity (*pradeśa*) of Karma. Karma has its psychological aspect also in the Bhāva-karma.

Mokṣa is to be achieved through the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. The belief in the Tattvas is the right faith, knowledge of the real is right knowledge and freedom from attachment and aversion is right conduct. The

path of virtue is the path which leads to self-realization. The five Vratas are fundamental for the Jains. However, the practice of the Vratas and the ethical life have been graded in two levels as duty of a *muni* (ascetic) and the life of *śrāvaka* (lay follower). The purpose is to realize the highest gradually and with ease. In this analysis of ethical concepts we find the application of the spirit of Anekānta. The same can be found in their interpretation of Ahimsā as an ethical principle. The Jaina attitude to the conception of God expresses the spirit of Anekānta. The Jains are against the Theistic conception of God. But each soul in its pure and perfect form, is divine. Still the Tīrthaṅkaras are worshipped not because they are gods but because they are human, yet divine—to be kept before us as ideals for emulation. Apart from the worship of the Tīrthaṅkaras, we find a pantheon of gods as a social survival and a psychological necessity.

Life is to be considered as a struggle for perfection. We do not get ready-made views. We have to look at life through manycoloured glasses and as a “vale of soul making”. This is the picture of Jaina outlook on life as presented in this book. It may, perhaps, give a discrete picture. The purpose has been to see some of the problems in the light of synoptic point of view as expressed in the Anekānta.

The metaphysical elements of Jainism have not been discussed in detail as the main object of this work has been to present the Jaina view of life. However, principle of *āśrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara* and *nirjarā* have been incidentally woven in the texture of the scheme while describing the entanglement of the soul in *saṃsāra* and the efforts to attain Mokṣa. Jīva and Mokṣa are the prius and the end of the noumenal world. We have studied them at length.

This problem has been engaging my attention for some time past, and it has developed in the form of this book at the inspiration and guidance of Dr. A. N. Upadhye of Kolhapur. I gave a synopsis of this work in my talk at the Jaina Boarding at Kolhapur during the Paryūṣaṇa festival in 1963. I have made use of two chapters from my earlier book—*Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*. I am grateful to the Registrar, Karnatak University, Dharwar for permitting me to use this material from my previous book. I have incorporated in this book some of my articles already pub-

ished in different philosophical Journals by retouching them here and there to form a part of this book.

I am grateful to the Editors and Publishers of these Journals for their permission to use my articles in the book. I must express my gratitude to the late Professor Charles A. Moore, of the University of Hawaii, Honolulu (U. S. A.) for permitting me to use my article *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy* published in *Philosophy East and West*, a Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, Volume XI, Numbers 3 and 4 July, October-1965. I have intended, in this book, to weave out some of my papers published earlier so as to bring out a coherent picture of the Jaina view of life as expressing the Anekānta outlook. I must express my sense of profound gratitude to Dr. A. N. Upadhye for all the encouragement and guidance he has given me. I thank the authorities of the Jaina Saṃskṛti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha, Sholapur, for publishing this work. I thank my colleague Shri S. R. Gunjal, M.A., M-Lib. Sc. for assisting me in going through the proofs.

Dharwar,
31-3-69.

T. G. KALGHATGI

JAINA VIEW OF LIFE

CHAPTER I

SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY

1. Plato and Aristotle have traced the beginnings of Philosophy to the feeling of wonder which arises in the mind of man when he contemplates on the nature of things in the world.¹ But wonder at the level of primitive men is in the instinctive stage and does not give rise to higher speculation. It is only at a higher level when man has gained command over nature does philosophy begin. It is the fruit of society's maturer age. As Hegel said, philosophy makes its first expression when experience and thought have fully matured in their process. The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall.

Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to comprehend the ultimate reality. We may say it is a synoptic view of life. It is, in the lines of Mathew Arnold, to see life steadily and to see it whole. In a narrower sense it is an academic pursuit of the solutions of the ultimate problems of life.

Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate effort to think consistently, not a construction of a super-structure of thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato and Bradley philosophy was the knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logical Positivists the function of philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Philosophy, however, would not be complete except as a synoptic view of life, as a world view. In this sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.

In India, philosophy was and has been well grounded in life. It has permeated the lives of the people. It has never been a mere academic pursuit nor a luxury of the mind. It was intimately connected with life. It is to be lived. *Mundaka Upaniṣad* speaks of 'Brahma Vidyā' as the basis of all knowledge.² Kauṭilya makes philosophy the lamp of

1. Aristotle: *Metaphysics*, i, 2...

2. *sarva-vidyā-pratīṣṭhā*.

all sciences. Philosophy has been called *darśana* in the sense of the spiritual perception and vision of the seers, and the highest triumphs of philosophy are possible only to those who have achieved in themselves a purity of the soul.¹

Realization of the Ātman is the highest end in Philosophy², there is no other way. In this sense, philosophy is *darśana* and intimately connected with life.

2. Philosophic enquiry has proceeded in two directions :

- i) The first uses *a priori* and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the rationalists.
- ii) The second adopts inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought, philosophic speculation relied on Śruti and Smṛti.

The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upaniṣads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing the one way or the other have reached either the summits of speculation removed from human experience, or have ultimately faced the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.

i) We may first consider the *a priori* approach to the study of philosophy. In Western thought, deductive and *a priori* methods were first used by Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, who made, for the first time, a distinction between sense and reason. The philosophic speculations of Plato were largely based on *a priori* methods. He abstracted sense from reason and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the Middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From *cogito ergo sum* he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the world into two substances distinct from each other and

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 45.

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, IV-5 *ātmā vāre dṛṣṭavyah*.

postulated a God separate from each of them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none returns. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these philosophers lived. Thus the *a priori* speculative method led us far from the madding crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute'.

In India, we were saved from the separation of the speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially spiritual: it takes its origin in life and enters back into life." ¹ In Śaṅkara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel ourselves strangers here, as we are not cut off from the ideals of life. "Śaṅkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom." ²

ii) Empiricism uses *a posteriori* and inductive methods. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists, sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.

In ancient Indian thought the Cārvākas led us to a similar conclusion. For them, Lokāyata is the only Śāstra, and perceptual evidence the only authority.³ This would logically lead to scepticism and nihilism; but they did not go to the whole length, because their immediate aim was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual. The Buddhist

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (1945) p. 25.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, (1947) p. 447.

3. *Prabodhacandrodaya*, Act II.

empiricism was to have gone the way of Gorgias in the Mādhyamika School, but for the predominance of the ethical ideal and the goal of *nirvāṇa*. Nāgārjuna's philosophy is 'now nearer to scepticism and now the mysticism'.¹ The rigour of logic would have led him to nihilism, but for his spiritual fervour and thirst for *nirvāṇa*.

English empiricism repeats this logical movement but does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but themselves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them."² Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go on further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

But the Humean tendency has been recently revived, by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, there one must be silent'. 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things'. There must be simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be names because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense except in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as 'pictures of facts'. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies, and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognising categories. Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 644.

2. REID: *Works*, p. 109.

like the composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy.¹ Russell writes that the influence of the *Tractatus* on him "was not wholly good", and that the philosophy of the *Philosophical Investigations* remains to him completely unintelligible.²

Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement emanating from 'The Vienna Circle'. It was a thoroughgoing empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science.³ Ayer's Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume's empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes : i) *a priori* propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain ; and ii) propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.⁴ A metaphysician talks nonsense, because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists claim that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy.⁵ Philosophy, to them, is only logical analysis ; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, Logical clarification of concepts, propositions and theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with logical syntax,

1. STENIUS (Eric) : *Tractatus—A critical exposition of its main lines of thought* (1960) p. 226.

2. RUSSELL (B) : *My Philosophical Development* (1959) pp. 216-217.

3. *Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*. Edited by URMON (J. C.) (1960).

4. AYER, (J. A.) : *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 35.

5. AYER, (J. A.) : *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 48.

the higher-level discussion of language, and the perennial problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are, accordingly, converted into super-grammar classes.

However, Logical Positivism has ceased to become a fashionable philosophy today, because i) its attack on metaphysics has damped the vigour and chastened the style of its remaining adherents, and ii) its approach to language is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying through the programme of phenomenalism¹ and uneasy about the verification principle.²

Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has reached is unfortunate, because :

i) The doctrines of Logical Positivism have led to dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical questions are dismissed as unworthy of attention of sensible men.³ Theories like the verification principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers except Hume.⁴

ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the Sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be communicated. The more radical among them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer to behaviourism in psychology.

iii) For logical Positivists, as for other empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion of knowledge. Modern Psychological Research, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory experiences. In addition, there are certain other experiences, like the speculation, moral and æsthetic.

The problem of supersensuous experience is not new to us in India. All schools of Indian philosophy, except the

1. AYER, J. A. : *Philosophical Essays* (1954) No. 142.

2. AYER, (J. A.) : *Language, Truth and Logic* (1946), Preface to second edition.

3. JOAD (C. E. M.) : *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, p. 149.

4. JOAD (C. E. M.) : *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, p. 29.

Cārvākas and Mīmāṃsakas, believe in it. Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of time, space and causality: "Our sense organs are narrowly specialised to serve biological and practical ends, and our normal consciousness is also largely specialised." In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and fanatical to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only criteria of knowledge. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in *The Republic*, the empiricists refuse to see beyond what they would like to affirm.

iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists the verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But the principle of verification is not a self-evident statement, nor is it capable of verification by sense-experience. The logic of the analytic philosophy is itself based on a metaphysic, certain presuppositions about the universe.²

v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious. It has engendered a negative climate of opinion, and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious spheres with nothing else to fill the gap except analysis of propositions. It has produced a 'waste land' of mind, of which T. S. Eliot's poem is at once a description and, by implication, a denunciation.³

3. A survey of the course of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The *a priori* deductive method took us to the lion's den. At the height of its speculation, it built super-structures of philosophy and was cut off from common sense. The empiricists were led to solipsism and to the feverish denial of metaphysics.

To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realise that reality is complex and life is a many-

1. TYRRELL (G. N. N.): *The Personality of Men* (Pelican) p. 265.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.): *The International Institute of Philosophy and Indian Philosophical Congress. Entretiens* edited by N. A. NILE.

3. JOAD (C. E. M.): *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, p. 149.

coloured dome. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees.¹ These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the only ways, nor were the approaches absolute. This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and see it whole. Broad says, "If we do not look at the world synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it". He thinks that a purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.²

The Jaina view of *anekānta* comes nearer to this approach. Anekānta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the symbolisation of the fundamental non-violent attitude. It emphasizes the many-sidedness of truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles.

Whitehead's fundamental attitude in philosophy is essentially the same as the *anekānta* view of life. Whitehead defined speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.³

We have to note that the function of philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life. Philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end, philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe.⁴ The consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us yearn for the Beyond, in the spirit of the Upaniṣads, from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, and from death to eternal life.⁵

1. BROAD (C. D.): *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. MUIRHEAD (J. H.) Vol. I (1924), Critical and Speculative Philosophy.

2. PASSMORE (JOHN): *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, (1957) p. 350.

3. *Process and Reality* (1929) Part I, Chapter I, p. 4 and *Adventures of Ideas* (1933) p. 285.

4. JOAD (C. E. M.): *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, (1950) p. 29.

5. *asato mā sad gamaya; tamaso mā jyotiḥ gamaya; mṛtyor mā amṛtaṁ gamaya.*

For this, we have to look to the spiritual experience of the great seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative philosophy must take into most serious consideration and that is the religious and mystical experiences of mankind.¹ It is they who are in constant touch with the innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such 'enlightened ones' or 'sages' are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.²

CHAPTER II

APPROACH TO REALITY

I. Jainism is realistic and pluralistic. Its philosophy is based on logic and experience. Mokṣa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.³ Right knowledge is possible by the right approach to the problems of life. Anekānta, the Jains believe, gives us the right approach to looking at the various problems of life. Anekānta is the symbolization of the fundamental non-violent attitude of the Jains. It is the expression of intellectual non-violence.

In surveying the field of Indian philosophy, Dr. PADMARAJIAH mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are:

1. Philosophy of Being—Śaṅkara represents this school of thought or identity.
2. Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference)—Buddhism presents this view.

1. *Contemporary British Philosophy*: edited by MUIRHEAD (J. H.) (1924).
Critical and Speculative Philosophy.

2. HUXLEY ALDOUS: *The Perennial Philosophy*, (1959) 10, 11.

3. *Tattvārthsūtra*, 1.

3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity—
i) The Sāṃkhya, ii) Bhedābheda and
iii) Viśiṣṭādvaita hold this attitude.
4. Philosophy subordinating identity to difference—
i) The Vaiśeṣika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvācārya gives
this view.
5. Philosophy co-ordinating both identity and difference—The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.

Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic picture of the whole. It recognises the principle of distinction and develops the comprehensive scheme of Anekānta realism. Anekānta is the 'most consistent form of realism', as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality and knowledge.¹

Anekānta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at that time. It arose out of the confusion of the conflicting views of the philosophers and religious men on the problem of the nature of reality. The Upaniṣad philosophers sought to find the facts of experience. This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to present a fresh and a different approach in the Madhyamā-pratipadā Dṛṣṭi. The Anekānta view presents a coherent picture of the philosophies, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various points of view. The cardinal principle of the Jaina philosophy is its Anekānta which emphasizes that 'there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified.'²

1. PADMARAJAN (Y. J.): *Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge*. (Jaina Sahitya Vikāśa Maṇḍala, Bombay) (1963) p. 274.

2. MOOKERJEE, : *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* (Bhārati Mahāvidyālaya) (1944) p. 70.

II. Although Anekānta was a special feature of the Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought were aware of the view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase *majjhima magga* bears the same significance as Anekānta. Pandit SUKHALALJI SANGHVI, in his introduction to the *Saṃmati Tarka*, says that the doctrine of Anekānta and the *madhyama mārga* have great resemblance in the fundamental idea underlying them.¹ Anātmavāda of Saṃjaya, Vibhajjavāda, *madhyamā pratipadā* which induced the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as expressions of Anekānta attitude. Similarly Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhartṛprapañca is referred to as Anekānta.² Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was silent about these problems. In *Dīgha Nikāya*, Gautama says 'It is not that I was, I was not, it is not that I will be, I will not be ; it is not that I am, I am not.' The Buddha describes his attitude to Mānavaka as Vibhajjavāda.³ This is similar to Anekānta, although it is not so clearly defined and developed. No specific words suggesting the doctrine of Anekānta are found in the philosophic literature of ancient India. It is suggested that the doctrine of evolution as propounded by the Sāṃkhya school implies the Anekānta attitude.⁴ However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine and systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita makes mention of the Anekānta of the Vipramīmāṃsakas, Nigghaṇṭas and Kapila Sāṃkhyas. Among the Jaina exponents, Mahāvīra practised the attitude and is supposed to have expressed it in the Syādvāda.

A clear expression of the Anekānta attitude is seen in Mahāvīra's discussions with his disciples. In the *Bhagavati-*

1. *Saṃmati Tarka* : edited with introduction by Pandit SUKHALALJI SANGHVI and Pandit DOSHI.

2. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra : (Singhi Jaina Granthamālā, 1939) p. F. n. 3.

3. *Dīgha Nikāya* Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, 9 and *Majjhima Nikāya*, Sutta 99.

4. *Syādvāda Māñjarī* edited by Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction.

-sūtra, there is a dialogue between the Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama.

"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?"

"The souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some other respects. They are eternal, O Gautama, from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes."

Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahāvīra as—"The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and not identical with the soul in different respects."¹

The application of the principle of Anekānta can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekānta view-point. Atoms are of the same kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things. Pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.²

Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is incorporeal and formless, yet divisible³ and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyāyika view of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.⁴

1. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, VIII, 7, 495, and *Bhagavati Sūtra* VII, 2, 273. —

2. HIRIYANNA (M.): *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Allen Unwin, 1931) p. 212.

3. *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*: Prabhācandra, ed. 1948, pp. 563 and 642.

4. PADMARAJAH (Y. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 283.

In the Aṅga literature of the Jāinas the doctrine of Anekānta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in Prākṛit it has received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divākara, Mallavādi, Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi and others.

The Anekānta view does imply the principles of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.

In Kantianism as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'coexistence' or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the 'dynamical community' among them.¹ But the Jaina is a thorough-going realist. Anekāntavāda is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavāda and Syādvāda; and they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics.²

III. Anekānta emphasizes that the truth is many-sided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the Anekāntavāda: i) Nayavāda and ii) Syādvāda. Nayavāda is the analytic method investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. Syādvāda is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view-points arrived at by Nayavāda. Nayavāda is 'primarily conceptual' and the Syādvāda is synthetic and mainly verbal,³ although this sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and

1. PADMARAJAN (Y. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 286.

2. Ibid, p. 303.

3. UPADHYE (A. N.): *Pravacanasūtra of Kundhikundācārya*, ed. (Bombay) 1935. Introduction.

the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the verbal has mainly a reference to the fact that points of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point of view.

Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A *naya* is defined as a particular opinion or a view-point of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject.¹ The Jainas give the example of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own way. Similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other view-points are also recognised; and they need to be recognised with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of Pramāṇa.

The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. There was a problem whether the seven Nayas can be reduced in number. There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven Nayas. The second eliminates Naigama Naya and reduces the list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as Samābhīrūḍha and Evāmbhūta Naya have been subsumed under Śabda Naya. Umāsvāti is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara version of the *Tattvārthasūtra* seven ways have been mentioned, but the Śvetāmbara version gives five Nayas as mentioned in the third tradition.² The different points of view are the Nayas. Various Nayas have been mentioned. As shown above Umāsvāti first mentions five Nayas and then adds the subdivisions.³ The

1. *Prameyaka-māla-mārtanḍa* of Prabhācandra, *anivākyatapratiṣakṣa-vastava-saṃgrāhi jñāturabhiprāya nayah* !".

2. PADMARAJAH (Y. J.) *Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge*, pp. 325.

3. *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, 1, 34, 35.

Agamas have mentioned two points of view: i) Saṃgraha Naya, the point of view of the universal, the synthetic point of view and ii) Paryāyika Naya, the view-point of the particular, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Divākara in his *Sanmati Tarka* adopted the two points of view and distributed the Nayas under two heads. He described the six Nayas. But the generally accepted classification of Nayas is sevenfold. Three of them refer to objects and their meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three: i) Saṃgraha Naya, ii) Vyavahāra Naya, and iii) Rjusūtra Naya. Siddhasena Divākara says that Saṃgraha and Vyavahāra are subdivisions of the Dravyārthika Naya.¹ Saṃgraha Naya gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as RADHAKRISHNAN points out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of view. Exaggerated emphasis on the universal would lead to Saṃgrahābhāsa; and Sāṃkhya and Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.² The absolute emphasis on the One and unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the absolutists. The Jains maintain that such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial point of view.

Vyavahāra Naya is the empirical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize their individuality. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the outcome of the view.

Rjusūtra Naya is narrower than the Vyavahāra Naya. It looks at an object at a particular point of time, and does

1. *Sanmati Tarka*, Ch. 1, verse 3, 4. Compare *Vīṣṇuśāstrikā Bhāṣya*, gāthā 75.

2. *Pramāṇa-tattva-lokaśaṅkāra*, Vādideva Sūri. VII, 17 and 18. Also refer to *Syādvādaratnākara* of the same author.

not see the continuity of the thing. The Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of Kṣāṇikavādā is an example of the Rjūsūtra Naya.

Naigama Naya refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity with reference to the end for which it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying water and firewood will say that he is cooking if he is asked what he is doing. Siddhasena Divākara adopts a different point of view. Naigama Naya comprehends both the generic and specific qualities.

Another interpretation of Naigama Naya involves non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object. For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty" the generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our attention. The principle of configuration and the Gestalt suggested by Gestalt School of Psychology holds good in this case.¹

The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if the distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of Naigamābhāsa.

Paryāyārthika Naya is the analytic point of view, referring to the words and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the terms used. It has three subdivisions: i) Śabda Naya, ii) Samabhirūḍha Naya, and iii) Evambhūta Naya. Śabda Naya consists in looking at the functional importance of the terms. The name has a function calling to our mind the object implied by the name. However, we very often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and varies with different contexts. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies. Samabhirūḍha Naya is the application of the Śabda Naya. It refers to the roots of words. For instance, *rājā* as a person who shines, is different from the *nṛpa*, a person who rules over men and protects them. Evambhūta not only sees the difference between words with their different etymologies; but it sees the

1. PADMARAJAH (Y. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 315.

difference between one and the same word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the word. For instance, there is a difference between *rājā* when he is shining and *rājā* when he is not shining. In this, we give a word a fixed meaning, something by usage. For instance, a 'nut' has come to mean in English a showy man.

The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of philosophy in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of Paryāya-Naya to express Śabda-nayābhāsa.

(2) In Evambhūta Naya we restrict the meaning of the word to the very function connoted by the name. It is a specialised form of the Samabhirūḍha. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as it is used for residential purposes. But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to call it a house.

Thus, each Naya or point of view represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. The Nayas remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an *ābhāsa*, or appearance of truth, only. It gives rise to the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Advaita Vedānta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the Nayas; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they present only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the *asatkāryavāda* and the *satkāryavāda*, are one-sided and partial. But an object can be described in different ways. For instance, a gold necklace will be gold if we consider the substance out of which it is made; but if it is looked at from the point of view of the modifications, it may be described differently. Similarly, each Naya has a different extent. Naigama Naya has the greatest, and the Evambhūta Naya the least, extent. Naigama deals with the real and the unreal, Saṃgraha with the real. Vyavahāra deals with part of the real. Rjusūtra refers to the present condition of the real, and Śabda only to the expression of the real. Samabhirūḍha

has a reference to the particular expression. Evambhūta applies to the present activity.

IV. Syādvāda is the logical expression of the Nayavāda. The various points of view from which the reality can be looked at gives the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality. Such a view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been possible by means of sevenfold predication. It is called Saptabhaṅgī, because of its sevenfold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well contain contributions without affecting the nature of the real, because the contradictions arise only because we take partial views of reality. According to the Jainas, other Darśanas present only the gleams of the broken light, while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects. Nayavāda and Syādvāda are varieties of Anekāntavāda. Syādvāda is complementary to the Nayavāda. Nayavāda is analytic in character and Syādvāda is synthetic. It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a Naya and integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. DASGUPTA suggests that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the Syādvāda for any and every Naya.¹ In the Syādvāda all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.

Some have raised a controversy as to whether Syādvāda is synonymous of Saptabhaṅgī or of the entire Jaina philosophy. It is true that Syādvāda has an important place in Jaina philosophy, but it cannot be equated with the entire Jaina philosophy. Prabhācandra states that Syādvāda is synonymous with Saptabhaṅgī.² However, this is just a scholastic problem and is needless from the philosophical point of view.³ Syādvāda is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (*bhaṅgāḥ*) affirm (*vidhi*), negate (*niṣedha*)

1. DASGUPTA (S.): *History of Indian Philosophy*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 181.

2. *Nyāyakumudacandra*: (Bom. 1935), No. 655, *syādestityādī saptabhaṅga-māye vādati*.

3. PADMAKAJIAN (V. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge* p. 315.

or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven different ways a certain attribute (*bhāva*) of a thing (*vastu*) without incompatibility (*avirodhena*) in a certain context (*prāśnavasāṭ*).¹ Reality is complex and its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous.² And the 'syāt' would mean 'in a certain sense' or 'from a certain point of view'.³ In this sense Syādvāda warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (*nīrapekṣavāda*) as against the *sāpekṣavāda* expressed in Syādvāda.

It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two. Nāyavāda seems to be earlier, because Umāsvāti in his *Tatvārtha-sūtra* describes the kinds of Nayas, but makes no mention of the Syādvāda and the sevenfold propositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the Niggaṇṭhas but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to Syādvāda. They occur in the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, in which it is expressed in the form of three propositions. Among the other early references, Bhadrabāhu's *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Niryukti* is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in *Pañcāstikāyasāra* of Kundakundācārya and *Aptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divākara, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandī are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.

Syādvāda shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the contradiction involved in the predications of the thing. It is possible to describe a thing in seven ways.

1. *Syādvāddamañjarī*, (ed. DHURVA) 1933, p. 142-43.

2. HERIYANNA (M): *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Ben Unwin) 1931, p. 163.

3. PANDARAJIAN (Y. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 338.

1. *Syād asti* asserts the existence of the thing. The word *syāt* is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes 'perhaps' or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. *syāt* would then mean 'in the context'. From the point of view of the substance, place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance (*dravya*), attribute (*bhāva*), time (*kāla*), and space (*kṣetra*)—from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i.e., it is a house as built up and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.

2. But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication *syād nāsti*. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that it is made of metal. The house is no longer a house if it be used as a godown. The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition between them. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. These predications are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and non-existence. Thus the predications are logically necessary.

The importance of this predication lies in the irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context. 'Non-existence or non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a void'.

It would not be correct to say that one first and the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually complementary and ii) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause '*avirodhena*'.

1. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.): *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, 338.

It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. MUKERJI points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence.¹ The Vedāntist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Sūnyavādin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word *syād* functions as a necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is a realist and believes in the validity of empirical experience.

3. The third predication is *syād asti nāsti* : 'It is, it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. But it is not a house as it is actually used as a godown. It is very often maintained that the predication is a mere summation of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience and say that it gives a separate and necessary predication. It refers to a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the flowers

1. Sethari MUKERJI : *Jaina Philosophy Non-absolutism*, Ch. VI.

enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul and the ultimate reality contradictory predicates have been made.¹

4. The fourth is a new predication. It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is *syād avaktavyam*. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the *svadṛavya*, *svarūpa*, *svakāla* and *svakṣetra* and no existence is predicated in the *para-dṛavya*, *para-rūpa*, *para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla*. Yet its nature may be such that it cannot be easily described.

It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation and negation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth gives the simultaneous presentation of the two. But, as Prof. MUKERJI points out, it is still logically necessary, because it presents the facts of experience, that existence and non-existence are equally possible to be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination of jaggery and *ghāṭakī* flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the elements. It has in itself an identity of its own which cannot be described easily. In metaphysical speculation, the 'unknowable' of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. Prof. BHATTACHARYA² writes, 'The given indefinite'— 'the unspeakable' or *avaktavya* as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence, presents something other than consecutive togetherness: it implies *sahārpaṇa* or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.³

1. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Sutta 99, *Dīgha Nikāya*, Sutta 9.

2. K. C. BHATTACHARYA : *The Jaina Theory of Anekānta Vāda*, p. 13.

3. Satkari MUKERJI : *Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism*, p. 166.

The primary modes of predication are three: *syād asti*, *syād nāsti* and *syād avaktavyam*. The other four are obtained by combining the three.

The third predicate *asti nāsti* offers successive presentation. In the fourth predication 'inexpressible' (*avaktavyam*) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. PADMARAJIAH discusses the four stages through which the concept or 'inexpressible' has developed: i) The naive negative attitude in the *Rgveda* as expressed in the song of creation (Book V, 129). ii) A positive attitude as expressed in '*sadasadvareṇyam*' in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. It conceives with being and non-being as inherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed as the *ubhaya* phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the 'negative tendency' as shown in the expression like *sa eṣa neti neti* (*Br. Up.* IV 5-15). In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be beset with contradictions. The Vedānta conception of *anirvācanīya*, the Buddha's *avyākṛtā* and Nāgārjuna's conception of the ultimate as being *catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta* came under this stage. iv) The last phase in 'the dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the *avaktavya* of the *Syādvāda*. It is a relativistic (*sāpekṣa*) view and not the absolute view as presented in *anirvācanīya*. The Jaina states that *sat* and *asat*, in these combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience.¹ Again the *avaktavya* may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equal prominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectical movement of *Syādvāda*.

K. C. BHATTACHARYA states '..... If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not

1. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.): *The Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge*, 348-55.

the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.¹

5. The fifth predication is formulated as *syād-asti avaktavyam*. From the point of view of its own contexts (*dravya, rūpa, kāla* and *kṣetra*) a thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the co-presence of the two attributes, existence and inexpressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing modes.

6. The sixth proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. It is *syād-nāsti avaktavyam*. In the context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the *para-dravya, para-rūpa, para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla* it is not: it is indescribable.

7. The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads: *syād-asti-nāsti avaktavyam*. In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the *sva-rūpa, sva-dravya, sva-kṣetra* and *sva-kāla* it exists, and with reference to the *para-dravya, para-rūpa, para-kṣetra, para-kāla* non-existence can be predicated. Yet, in its real nature it may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Prof. MUKERJI says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.

Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky-flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in another sense.

1. BHATTACHARYA (K. C.): *The Jaina Theory of Anekāntavāda*, p. 14.

V. The doctrine of Syādvāda has been criticised in various ways :—

1. It is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the present predicating is in doubt. BELVALKAR says that Syādvāda is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this agnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Śaṅkarācārya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says—"As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthamkara (Jīna) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate." Prof. HIRIYANNA makes Syādvāda a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.²

But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible.

2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It

1. "The Undercurrents of Jainism" (an article in the Indian Philosophical Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1947, edited by A. C. WIDGERSY and R. D. RANADE, Bombay), p. 33.

2. HIRIYANNA (M.) *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, (Allen and Unwin) 1948, p. 69.

would be a self-contradiction. In this context we may refer to the criticism of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara's criticism can be analysed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of co-existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives indefinite assertion like *syād asti* and *syād nāsti*. Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.

Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated the entire charge made by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, 'a putting together of several partial truths' without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterised as a sort of compromise philosophy. The half-hearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in Saptabhaṅgī stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.

But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness' of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As RADHAKRISHNAN points out¹ the criticism of the Saptabhaṅgī doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be considered.

Śaṅkara also says that the Saptabhaṅgī doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertions of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (2) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 304.

categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable.¹

The dialectic of Syādvāda is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. "As a mere '*anaiikāntika*' (sic) theory of predication, the Syādvāda must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself."² Prof. RADHAKRISHNAN after mentioning the strong points of Syādvāda, says "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic".³ But in the *Saptabhaṅgī tarāṅgiṇī* we read a counter argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for *saṁsāra* and the attempt to obtain *mokṣa*? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain? RADHAKRISHNAN points out that the Saptabhaṅgī doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a logical corollary of the Anekāntavāda. All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.

Rāmānuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction between *dravya* and *paryāya*, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has permanence; *paryāya* implied change.

But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither

1. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on *Vedānta Sūtra*, ii, 33; Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on *Vedānta Sūtra*, ii, 2, 31.

2. *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, BELVALEKAR's edition (1931) Notes.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Allen and Unwin) 1931, p. 305.

scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonised by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.

With all their criticisms, BELVALKAR makes Syādvāda a most searching characteristic. RADHAKRISHNAN observes "Sāṃkara and Rāmānuja criticise the Saptabhaṅgī view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Rāmānuja he proceeds to say: "The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground."

VI. In Western thought, at the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several approaches to problems were possible. Parmenides had emphasized 'Being'; Heraclitus had talked of change; Empedocles and Anaxagoras had thought that the reality consists of a plurality of substances. The atomists left the infinite atoms floating in the air. Thus there was intellectual confusion. It was difficult to reconcile these conflicting views. Protagoras escaped the problem and said, *Homo-mensure*. The Sophists left the wise to wrangle with them and the quarrel of the universe let be.

But the Jainas did not accept such an escapist attitude. They faced facts squarely and tried to find out what was common between the conflicting views of the philosophers. This was the Anekānta attitude of the Jainas.

The Jainas appeal to experience and say that *a priori* reasoning independent of experience is incompetent to yield

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Allen and Unwin), 1931, p. 304.

insight into the nature of the real. The Jainas steer clear of conflicting views of reality. They make us aware of the fact that intellectual dogmatism is not healthy and a many-sided approach to the problem will develop in us a sense of tolerance and respect for others. Intellectual Ahimsā is most necessary, especially in an age when conflicting ideologies are trying to claim the monopoly of truth for themselves and give rise to intolerance and hatred. We live in a world of fear, distrust. It is time we tried to understand each other in an atmosphere of give and take. We must find out what is common between us rather than emphasize the differences. The Anekānta view is not scepticism, because it is not founded on doubt and distrust; it is not solipsism, because it is based on an objective determination of things; but it presents a catholic approach to the problems of life. Bertrand Russell has mentioned that truth or falsity refers to propositions and this is based on facts. An affirmative proposition corresponds to the objective facts: it is to be true. Similarly, a negative proposition must have a corresponding objective fact if it is to be true. He mentions this as 'negative fact'. Thus we find that contradictory predications are not merely subjective, but they have an objective basis.

Thus we find that Anekāntavāda manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. It has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge. It postulates the multiplicity of the ultimate reals constituting the cosmos. The Anekānta view of reality permeates every aspect of life and experience.

Whitehead's theory of coherence comes nearer to Anekānta attitude of the Jainas. He elucidates his attitude to reality by presenting the complete problem of the metaphysics, of substance and of flux as a 'full expression of the union of two notions'. Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasizes impermanence and change. Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. He interprets the lines:

'Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide'

(The Waste Land, 1920)

by showing that the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way ; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers.¹ Whitehead shows that reality can be best understood by the integral view-point in which the ultimate postulates of permanence and flux are harmoniously blended. Heraclitus emphasized the partial truth of change and flux. Parmenides presented permanence and being as the reality. Reality is to be found in the blending with the two view points into a comprehensive whole.

For Whitehead, coherence would mean that the fundamental ideas presuppose each other. In isolation they are meaningless. It does not mean they are definable in terms of each other, though they are relevant to each other. 'No entity' can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. 'This character is its coherence'.²

He also says : 'The systematisation of knowledge cannot be conducted in watertight compartments. All general truths condition each other ; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities.'³

This is the attitude of the Jainas also. The Jaina emphasis on the material and spiritual as a synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete universal involving unity in diversity. It is comparable to Jasper's 'unfanatical absoluteness'. Jainas in their theory of Anekānta illustrate a 'non-attachment of partial truths ; and they have made creative use of the contradictions by removing the sting out of them. Heidegger presents a similar point of view.⁴

In our political life, Pañcaśīla, as our late Prime Minister has pointed out, is the panacea for the ills of our present-day life. And Pañcaśīla expresses the spirit of Anekānta.

1. WHITEHEAD (A. N.) : *Process and Reality*, Part II, Ch. X, Sect. I.

2. WHITEHEAD (A. N.) : *Process and Reality* (1929) Part I, Ch. I, Sect. I.

3. Ibid. Sect. IV.

4. Marshall Margaret WILEY : *Kisnohharani Quarterly*, Calcutta, Vol. No. XXVIII-2, 1962-63, pp. 116-138.

CHAPTER III

THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL

1. The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. Primitive man had made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the dead with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.

Anthropological evidence shows that the notion of soul and spirit was first formed by primitive man as an explanation of certain features of his experience like dream and sleep. For him soul is an ethereal image of the body. It is ethereal, tenuous or filmy; and it possesses the power of flashing quickly from one place to another. Yet it was not conceived as purely immaterial. In Plato we find the emphatic primacy of the psyche or soul in the dialogues from the *Apology* onwards to the *Laws*.

In the Homeric thought psyche appears as a shadowy double of the body. But Socrates and Plato recognised the soul as man's real self. Socrates said that we should aim at the perfection of our souls. Plato shows that of all the things that man has, next to the gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own.¹ Body in fact is the shadow of the soul. Jowett says that Plato was concerned with emphasizing the priority of the soul to the body, towards the end of his life, as he gave importance to the idea of good in the *Republic* and of beauty in the *Symposium*.² Plato said that the soul is immortal because its very idea and essence is the self-moved and self-moving, that which is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves besides.³

Plato reversed the primitive conception of the soul as a shadowy double of the body and identified the true as the

1. *The Laws*, 959.

2. *Dialogues of Plato*. Vol. v. (2nd Ed.) p. 120.

3. *The Phaedrus*, 245.

soul, but he preserves and accentuates the original animistic dualism. Approaching the question with the scientific spirit, Aristotle started with the living organism and defined the psyche as the principle of life. He distinguished the different levels of psychical functions, from the vegetative to the rational. The soul is the actualisation of the potentiality of life, and, therefore defined as the 'entelechy', 'as the fulfilment of the body'. The idea of the soul is intrinsically independent of the body implies the conception of its substantiality. Conceiving the soul as a simple and indestructible substance, the scholastic metaphysics was argued to demonstrate its immortality.¹ So did Plato emphasize the simple and unitary nature of the soul.

In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come the notion of self or 'the centre of interest.' The word 'soul' is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for mind, sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word *ātman* has undergone various changes. It is little used in the Vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the *Upaniṣads* another word, *prāṇa*, is used for breath, and *ātman* stands for the innermost part of man. Man was *ātmaśarīra*. For the Upaniṣadic seers, the soul was a proposition for all experiences. Indian philosophies, with the exception of Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara and Kṣāṇikavāda of the Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Āryans believed that the essence of man is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi calls it psyche.² This is the development of the primitive notion of life after death lingering in some form. It is

1. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON (A): *The Idea of Immortality* (Oxford) 1922, p. 73.

2. JACOBI (Hermann): *Studies in Jainism—The Place of Jainism in Indian Thought*.

found even to-day in the practice of *śrāddha*. The psyche is frequently spoken of as *puruṣa* and of the size of the thumb (*aṅguṣṭha-mātra*). At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest Upaniṣads the psyche is described as constituted by the *prāṇas*, psycho-physical factors. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.

II. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christian ideal. In the *Apology*, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.

Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and non-souls. In the first verse of the *Dravya-saṃgraha*, we read, "The ancient among the great Jainas have described the dravyas as *jīva* and *ajīva*." *Jīva* is a category, and *jīva* personalised becomes *ātman*. Jainism believes in the plurality of souls. Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they are quite distinct from one another and not connected in any higher unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his school maintained that the soul is a spiritual substance.

Jainism considers the soul from two points of view: the noumenal (*nīścaya naya*) and the phenomenal (*vyavahāra naya*). The *Dravyānuvoga-tarkāṇā* of Bhoja describes the distinction as mentioned in the *Vīṣeṣāvalyabhāṣya* by saying that the *nīścaya* narrates the real things and the *vyavahāra* narrates things in a popular way. In the *Samayasāra*, Kundakundācārya points out that the practical standpoint is essential for the exposition of the inner reality of things, as a non-Āryan is never capable of understanding without the non-Āryan tongue.¹

1. JAINI (J. L.) : Ed. *Samayasāra*, 38.

The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jain philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs, we can say that all the *pramāṇas* can establish the existence of the soul. "Oh Gautama, the soul is *pratyakṣa*", said Mahāvīra, "for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul". What is *pratyakṣa* need not be proved like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is *pratyakṣa* owing to the *aham-pratyakṣa*, the realization of the I, which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses.¹ William James and James Ward present self-consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the 'internal perception' or self-consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of subject and object is an indispensable condition of all actual experience however simple. It is, therefore, first in order of existence. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or self.² William James says, "For, this central part of the self is felt. It is something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is present, as in the whole life time of such moments."³ Thus, one who ignores the self-evidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the behaviour of others. Similarly, the soul exists because, "it is my word, O Gautama"⁴

The *jīva* is described from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical or mental qualities. Mahāvīra points out to the third Gaṇadhara that the soul is different from the body and its sense; just as Devadatta recollects an object perceived through the five windows of the palace, which is different from the palace and the five windows, so also a person recollecting an object

1. *Gaṇadhara-vāda*, 6.

2. Ward (James): *Psychological Principles*, p. 370 (1918).

3. JAMES (William): *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Ch. X, p. 298.

4. *Gaṇadhara-vāda*, 34.

perceived through the five senses of the body is different from the senses and the body.¹

The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhists had said that there was no self except the *khandas*. Kundakundācārya points out that from the noumenal point of view the soul and the body are not one, although in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called beautiful and fair like the beautiful body of the living Arhat.² In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, in the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Janaka, the idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not a physical entity nor a dream-state,

From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is one and not composite. In the *Sthānāṅga* we get a description of the soul as one (*ege attā*). The commentator describes it as *ekavidhoḥ ātmanah*.³ In *Samayasāra*, Kundakundācārya describes the absolute oneness of the soul "on the strength of my self-realisation".⁴ This does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. It only emphasizes the essential identity of souls. Jīvas in all their individual characteristics are essentially the same. If the souls were one, then, "O Gautama, there would not be *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *bandha*, *mokṣa* etc." Individual souls are different like the *kumbhas*.⁵

The nature of jīva has been well described by Nemi-candra in his *Dravyasaṃgraha*. He describes the soul both from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. He says that jīva is characterised by *upayoga*, is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. It exists in *saṃsāra*. It is *siddha* and has a characteristic of upward motion.⁶ We get a similar description in the *Pañcāstikāyasāra* of Kundakundācārya,

1. *Gaṇadharavāda*, 109, and *Sūtrākṛtāṅga*, 33.

2. *Samayasāra*, 39, 41.

3. As quoted in *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. II, 'attā'.

4. *Samayasāra*, 3.

5. *Gaṇadharavāda*, 31.

6. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 2.

Jīva is formless. It is characterised by *upayoga*. It is attached to *karma*. It is the Lord, the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. It pervades bodies large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end of *loka*, being freed from the impurities of Karma.¹ The *Tattvārthasūtra* describes the nature of the soul as possessing *upayoga* as its essential characteristic.

Every Jīva possesses an infinite number of qualities. Glasenapp, in his *Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*, mentions eight important characteristics :

1. The faculty of omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*)
2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated cognition (*kevala-darśana*).
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth (*śamyaktva*), and irreproachable moral conduct (*cāritrā*)
5. Possession of eternal life (*akṣayasthiti*).
6. Complete formlessness (*amūrtatva*)
7. Unrestricted energy (*vīryatva*).
8. Complete equality in rank with other *jīvas*.

The first characteristic of the soul is *upayoga*. The word *upayoga* is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive, conative and affective aspects spring from it. It is differentia of the living organism. Umāsvatī says that *upayoga* is the essential characteristic of the soul.² *Upayoga* has conative prominence. *Upayoga* is that by which a function is served : *upayujyate anena iti upayogaḥ*. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped.³ In the *Gommaṣāra* : Jīvakaṇḍa, *Upayoga* is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of objects.⁴ It is the source of the psychological aspect of experience. It gives rise to the experience of objects, and the experience expresses itself in forms of *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Upayoga* is of two-

1. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 27-28.

2. *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, Ch. 11, 8.

3. *Prajñā*, 27, *Vīṣṇuśaṣṭyakābhāṣya*.

4. *Gommaṣāra* : Jīvakaṇḍa, Ch. XX, Verse 672 *vathupimittam bhāvo jādo jīvasa jo du upajogo*.

types : *anākāra*, formless, and *sākāra*, possessed of form. *Anākāra Upayoga* is formless, indeterminate cognition. *Sākāra Upayoga* is determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that *upayoga* is not the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate *upayoga*. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be likened to the 'horme' of the modern psychologists. It may be called horme in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a vital impulse or urge to action. Nunn has stated that horme is the basis of activity that differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer's 'will to live', and Bergson's 'elan vital'. *Jñāna* and *darsana* are manifestations of *upayoga*.

The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show that all animals are centres of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it 'conation' or the conative process. But this drive may not always be conscious.

There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. "To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals we propose to give a single name.....horme".¹ This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various other names, like 'the will to live', 'elan vital', the life urge and the libido. Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw. McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of

1. NUNN (Percy) : *Education : Its Data and First Principles*, pp. 28-29, 3rd Ed.

psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.

The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behaviour of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We circulate our blood, we breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all levels both in the individual and the racial sense.¹ But the horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and analysed in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of Upayoga was purely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* as two forms of *upayoga*.

Citta or *cetanā* as a characteristic of the soul is important in Indian philosophy. In the *Dravyasaṃgraha*, *jīva* is described as possessing *cetanā* from the noumenal point of view. *Cetanā* is a sort of inclination which arises from *upayoga*. This inclination branches in two directions—*jñāna* and *darśana*. *Darśana* may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. *Jñāna* is cognition defined. The *jīva* has infinite *jñāna* and *darśana*. But certain classes of *Karman*, like *jñānāvaraṇīya* and *Darśanāvaraṇīya* tend to obscure and confuse the essential nature of the *jīva*. From the phenomenal point of view, *darśana* and *jñāna* tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of *jñāna* and four kinds of *darśana*.

The possession of Upayoga raises the question whether the *Jīva* possesses *upayoga* and is yet different from it, or whether it is identical with it. The Nyāya theory does not

1. Ross (James S.) *Groundwork of Educational Psychology*, p. 47.

recognise the identity of quality and its possessor. Jainism asserts that only from the phenomenal point of view they are separable. In *Pañcāstikāyasāra* we read "Only in common parlance do we distinguish *darśana* and *jñāna*. But in reality there is no separation."¹ The soul is inseparable from Upayogā. Horme is an essential characteristic of the living organisms. It is manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an end.² Animal life is not merely permeated by physical and chemical processes; it is more than that. Even the simplest animal is autonomous.

The soul is simple and without parts. It is formless. As the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has been mentioned in other systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as a cluster of *khandas*. Buddhists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called *khandas*. In modern Western thought, Hume says, "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble upon some perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,"³ Höffding stated that the ego has been looked for in vain as something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of sensation, ideas and feelings. But Herbert maintains that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but also without qualitative multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasized substantiality, simplicity, persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes has said, "I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who doubts, who affirms,.....who loves, who hates and feels.....," He designates this thing as substance.⁴

1. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 41.

2. McDOUGALL (William): *An Outline of Psychology*, Ch. 3.

3. HUME (David): *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I, Pt. IV, 6.

4. DESCARTES: *Meditations* II.

Hamilton advocated the four characteristics with the greatest explicitness. Other prominent names are those of Porter, Calkins, Angell and Aveling.¹

From the phenomenal point of view, *jīva* is also described as possessing four *prāṇas*. They are sense (*indriya*), energy (*bala*), life (*āyus*) and respiration (*āna*). The *Pañcāstikāyasāra* gives the same description. The idea of *prāṇa* is found in Indian and Western thought. In the Old Testament (Genesis Book I) we read, "The Lord God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man became a living soul." In the primitive minds we find the conception that the wind gave men life. When it ceases to blow, men die. In the Navaho legend there is a description of the life force according to which we see the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers. *Prāṇas* refer to psycho-physical factors of the organism. The *jīva* assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four *prāṇas* lives and is *jīva*.² The four *Prāṇas* are manifest in ten forms. The *Indriya* expresses itself in five senses. *Bala* may refer to the mind, the body and speech. *Āyus* and *Āna* are one each. These *prāṇas* in all their details need not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten *prāṇas* and the lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the psycho-physical development of the various animal species at the lower level, the chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of taste and smell. Experimental investigations carried by Riley and Forel point out that the chemical sense is used by insects like moths even for mating. Forel has given a topo-chemical theory for explaining the behaviour of bees. As we go higher in the scale of life, the

1. SPERMAN (C.), *Psychology Down the Ages* Vol. I, Ch. XXI, pp. 391-92.

2. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 30.

chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are well developed. In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still, we get the variability of adaptation which may be called intelligence.

In the Brāhmanas and the oldest Upaniṣads there is a description of the psyche as consisting of five *prāṇas*. They are regarded as factors of the physico-psychological life. Occasionally, more than five *prāṇas* are mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself. In the third Adhyāya of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* Yājñavalkya was asked to explain what happened to a person after the body has been dissolved, and the parts of the psyche has been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that Karma remains after death.¹ This was a step forward towards the formation of the permanent self. *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. *Vijñāna* and *retah* are mentioned. This *vijñānamayapurusa* comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is not emphasized. In Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing *prāṇas* must have developed on the same lines.

From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord (*prabhu*), the doer (*kartā*), enjoyer (*bhoktā*) limited to his body (*dehamātra*), still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with Karma. As a potter considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so, from the practical point of view, the mundane soul is said to be the doer of things like constructing house and the enjoyer of sense objects.² As the soul produces impure thought-activities and as a consequence, the material Karmas, it also enjoys thoughts with the help of the material Karmas. Thus, Jīva enjoys its thought-created activity. However, from the noumenal point of view, Jīva is the doer of *śuddha bhāvas* or pure thought, (*karmas*);

1. RANADE (R. D.): *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 181, (1926).

2. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 27 and *Sāmayasāra*, 124.

and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of *puṅgala karmas* or Karmic matter.¹ The distinction between the formal cause (*nimitta*), and material cause *upādāna*, has been introduced for the description of the soul. The Jains say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material Karmas. The Jīva possesses consciousness, and consciousness manifests itself in the form of various mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities which produce material Karmas. It is, therefore, asserted that Jīva is the agent of thought-karmas, indirectly of the Karmic matter. The *Pañcāstikāyasāra* describes the *ātman* as the agent of its own *bhāvas*. But it is not the agent of *puṅgala karmas*.² Jainism emphasizes the activity of the Jīva as against the Sāṃkhya view of the passive *udāsīna puruṣa*. As a consequence of activity, the Jīva experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point of view. From the noumenal point of view, Jīva has consciousness and it enjoys eternal bliss. In the *Dravyasaṃgraha* we read, "*niccayanayado cedana-bhāvaṃ kṣu ādussa*". The joys and sorrows that Jīva experiences are the fruits of *dravya-karman*. But Buddhism believes that the agent never enjoys the fruits of Karma. James Ward giving the general characterization of the "varied contents of the empirical self, says that the self has first of all a) a unique interest and b) a certain inwardness, further it is c) an individual that d) persists, e) is active, and finally it knows itself.³

But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is beginningless. The soul gets entangled in the *saṃsāra* and embodied through the operation of karmas. It assumes various forms due to the materially caused conditions (*upādhi*), and is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forces of Karmas which express themselves, first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye and the ordinary instruments of science. When the soul

1. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 8, 9.

2. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 6, 28.

3. JAMES (Ward) : *Psychological Principles*, Ch. XV, p. 368, (1918).

is embodied, it is affected by the environment—physical, social and spiritual, in different ways. Thus we get the various types of soul existence. The soul embodies itself and identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment. Willaim James distinguishes between the self as known or the me, the empirical ego—as it is sometimes called, and the self as knower or the I, pure ego. The constituents of the me may be divided into three classes: the material me, the social me and the spiritual me. The body is the innermost part of the material me. Then come the clothes, our home and property. They become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man's social me is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has as many selves as there are individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual me also belongs to the empirical me. It consists of the "entire collection of consciousness, my psyche faculties and disposition taken concretely." But the pure self, the self as the knower, is very different from the empirical self. It is the thinker, that which thinks. This is permanent, what the philosophers call the soul or the transcendental ego.¹ James Ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego, and the pure self. For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex. It is the presented self. The earliest element is the presented self, the bodily or the somatic consciousness. But they never have the same inwardness as "the sense of embodiment." We also find a certain measure of individual permanence and inwardness that belongs to the self. We may call this 'the sensitive and the appetitive self.' With the development of ideation there arises what we call the inner zone, having still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of intellection, we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character and history and his aim in life through social interaction. This gives conscience, a social product as Adam Smith has said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed.

1. JAMES (William) : *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, p. 292.

This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage, even the inner ideation and desire become outer, no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is the last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure ego or self.¹

The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as *bahirātman*, *antarātman* and *paramātman*. *Bahirātman* consists in the identification of the self with body and external belongings. It is the bodily self. In this we say, "I am the body, I am lean etc." This identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the *karmāvasthā* and is characterized by *juddha caitanya* and bliss. It is free from all sense of otherness. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is *antarātman* in the *samyagdṛṣṭi guṇasthāna*. The pure and perfect self which is free from the impurities of Karma is the *paramātman*. It is characterized by perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed and is a Siddha. This *Paramātman* is *jñānamaya* and is pure consciousness. It cannot be known by the sense. It has no *indriyas* and no *manas*. From the noumenal point of view, these are the attributes of the soul.² The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical. It contains elements of psychological investigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. Modern psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped at psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to the stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psychology. William James has said that states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. 'Metaphysics or theology may prove the existence of the soul; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous.'³

1. JAMES (Ward): *Psychological Principles*, Ch. II.

2. *Paramātmoprahāṣa*, 31.

3. JAMES (William): *Briefer Course*, p. 203.

Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although souls are not of any definite size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. The soul is capable of adjusting its size to the physical body, as the lamp placed in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the room. Nemicandra describes it as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul. From the noumenal point of view it is said to exist in innumerable *pradeśas*.¹ In respect of the elasticity of the soul, Jainism differs from the other schools of Indian thought. As Jacobi says, the Jainas have a tenet of the size of the soul which is not shared by other philosophers.²

Some philosophers like the Vaiśeṣikas, Democritus and the atomists, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacobi says that the original Vaiśeṣika was not clear on this point. Some Sāṃkhya writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small, while Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and later writers characterized it as all-pervading.³ The spatial view of the habitation of the soul had occupied the minds of the Upaniṣadic philosophers.

Upaniṣadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian in localizing the soul in the heart. It was later thought that it was in the brain. Yogic and Tāntric books recognized the cerebro-chemical processes, and consciousness was traced to the brain. In the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (1. 6. 1. 2) we read that the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where the hair are made to part. The soul in the heart is called *manomaya*. In the *Kausītaki Upaniṣad* the soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The sense depends on the soul as 'relatives on the rich'. The self is immanent in the whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view, like the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other accounts are given in the Upaniṣads. In the *Bṛhadā-*

1. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 10.


2. JACOBI (Hermann): Ed. by JINA VIJAYA MUKI; *Studies in Jainism*, p. 83.

3. *Ibid.* p. 84.

raṇyaka the self is described as small as a grain of rice or barley. In the *Kāthopanishad* we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb.¹ It dwells in the centre of the heart. In the *Chāndogya*, it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the chin. William James traces the feeling of self to the cephalic movements. He says that the self of selves when carefully examined is found to consist mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart.² Descartes maintains that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland. Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle. Lotze says that the soul must be located somewhere in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is something material which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, even the infinite *pradeśas*; and if it is immaterial, it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties of expressing the immaterial in terms of the material. This has been the perennial problem of philosophy, because the immaterial has no vocabulary of its own. The Greeks had the same difficulty. Plato had to resort to allegories and myths for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism, although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an attempt to come nearest to immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non-spiritual, and again as corporeal and non-corporeal substance like Dharma and Adharma; and there is the corporeal which is called Pudgala. From the phenomenal point of view, *jīva* comes under the spiritual but corporeal. The corporeal need not necessarily be material. The classification is as follows :—

1. RANADE (R. D.): *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 138, (1926).

2. JAMES (William): *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 301.



If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction. Again, when size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the sphere or extent of the influence that is intended. In the *Pañcāstikāyasāra* we read that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk, the soul imparts its lustre to the whole body.¹


Jīva is characterized by upward motion. Nemicaṇḍra describes the pure soul as possessing *ūrdhvagati*. In the *Pañcāstikāyasāra* it is said, when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upwards to the end of Loka.² For Plato, the soul was, above all, the source of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates says in his second speech, "The soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal." The self never ceases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves. The movement of the soul in *saṃsāra* is due to its association with Karmaṇ; but by nature it has the upward motion which it adopts beyond which no movement is possible in pure space which is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jaina conception of the soul as possessing *ūrdhvagati* appears to be more an ethical expediency than a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.

All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen if the Jīvas are pure and free. However, most of the Jīvas are not pure and free. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil their

1. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 33.

2. *Ibid*, 39.

TABLE No. 1



purity and perfection. The foreign element is Karman, very fine matter, imperceptible to the senses, and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of *samsāra*. They become *samsārins*.

III The *samsāri jīvas* are classified on the basis of various principles, like the status and the number of sense organs possessed by them. They are the *sthāvāra jīvas*, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sir J. C. BOSE has pointed out that the vegetable world has capacity for experience. They are one-sensed organisms. Earth, water, fire and plants are such *jīvas*. They possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. *Trasa jīvas*, (moving souls) have two to five senses. Worms, oysters, conchs etc., possess taste and touch. Ants, bugs and lice have three senses—taste, touch and smell. Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four senses—taste, touch, smell and sight. And birds, beasts and men have all the five senses. Again, five sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called *samanaska*. They may be bereft of mind (*amanaska*).

Plato talked of a determined number of souls. 'The souls that exist must always be the same. They cannot become fewer, nor yet can they become more numerous'.¹ In the *Timaeus* he said that the number of souls is equal to the number of the stars.²

In *Gommaṣasāra*, Jivakāṇḍa, we get a detailed classification of *samsāri jīvas*. This classification is shown in Table I.

Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa, are possessed of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates. Positive, negative and food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale, we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions. Even the other senses get discriminated and developed as we proceed in the development of animal

1. *The Republic* : 611.

2. *Timaeus* : 41.

life. Similarly, the distinction between the *jīvas*, as *paryāpta* and *aparyāpta*, has great psychological significance. *Gommaṣāsāra* thus illustrates the *paryāpta* developed, "as the things like the room, jars, and clothes are full or empty, so the *jīvas* should be understood to be complete or incomplete.¹ Jīva becomes *paryāpta* with the absorption of Karmic matter for building up its body, sense, respiration and *manas*. One-sensed organisms become complete with the possession of food, drink, body, sense and respiration. The possession of these attributes makes the first four-sensed organisms *paryāpta* or complete. For five-sensed organisms all the six are necessary. In the absence of these the Jīvas are incomplete. Comparative psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss Washburn points out that ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make varied reaction movements.² On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses, like the chemical sense, hearing and sight, have been mentioned. The chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As sensory discrimination becomes more complex, the mental life of the animal becomes more developed and pronounced.

IV These characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view. Defilement of the soul takes place when the Karma pours into the soul. This is called *āśrava*. The soul then begins to experience mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The Karma which comes into contact is retained. The soul is eternally infected with matter. Every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things, it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of *saṁsāra* is possible by voluntary means. By the process of *saṁvara* the soul can stop the influx of Karma; by *nirjarā* it can eliminate the Karma already glued to the soul. Then all obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from

1. *Gommaṣāsāra*, p. 118.

2. WASHBURN (Miss): *The Animal Mind*, Ch. V, (1936).

the wheel of *saṃsāra*. Being free, with its upward motion the *jīva* attains the liberation or *mokṣa*. In the last lines of the *Goṃmatasāra*: *Jīvakāṇḍa*, it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and free.

Pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedāntin would emphasize. In the eighth Khaṇḍa of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, it is said that when a man departs his speech is merged in mind, his mind in breath, his breath in fire, which in the highest being is *sat*. Now, that which is the subtle essence has its self. It is the self, "and thou, Oh śvetaketu, art that." In the eleventh Khaṇḍa also, we read that when the body withers and dies and the living self leaves it, the living self dies not.¹ Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It differs from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a permanent personality, for in *mukṣi* the *jīva* is merged in Brahman and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, McTaggart's analogy of the 'college of selves' would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is in Mokṣa, Jainism cannot say. McTaggart seeks of the unity of the absolute as that of a society. All the selves are perfect, and "if an opponent should remind me", he writes, "of the notorious imperfections of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal."² Sub specie eternitatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The never-ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which "something is eternally gained for the universe by the success". The Jaina outlook is mellioristic.

1. *na jīvo mriyate.*

2. PRINGLE-PATTISON (A. Seth): *Idea of God*, 2nd Ed., Ch. XX, p. 391.

CHAPTER IV

CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

I. The Jainā attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upaniṣadic philosophers found the immutable reality behind the world of experience. Gautama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahāvīra stood on commonsense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jainā philosophy is based on logic and experience. Mokṣa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.¹ Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jainā philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jainā theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jainā thought. The Jainā epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in response to the demand of time.

The problem of mind eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists because it can be analyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically, it refers to mind as the principle of the universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual's system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. Philosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem.

The Indian thinkers were groping to grasp the intangible, the ineffable and the immaterial. The distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upaniṣadic thought, the principle of *Rta* became the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynamic force at the basis of the universe. "Even the Gods cannot transgress it." We see in the conception of *Rta* the development from the physical to the divine.² It is

1. *Tattvārthasāra*, 1.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 79.

by the force of *Ṛta* that human brains function''. Man knows by the divine force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and river to flow.' The interpretation of the famous *Ṛgvedic* hymn of creation. "*nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt tadānīm*" and again of "*kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi manaso retah prathamam yad āsīt. Sato bandhumasatī niravindahṛdi pratiṣyā kavayo manīṣā*"² gives a description that for the first time there arose *kāma* which had the primeval germ of *manas* within it. Similarly the word *kṛtu* is shown to be the antecedent of the word *manas* or *prajñā*. In *Śat. Brā.* 4.1.4.1. there is a statement that when a man wishes, "may I do that, may I have that," that is *Kṛtu*, when he attains it, that is *Dakṣa*. The same term later changed its meaning to *manas* and *prajñā*.³

The analysis of the Jain theory of mind shows that there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominantly a realistic approach. The mind and its states are analysed on the empirical level. The Jain ideal is *Mokṣa*, freedom of the soul from the impurities of *Karma*. The purity and the divinity of the soul are the basic concepts of the Jain philosophy, and mind had to be linked with the soul and interpreted in the metaphysical terms.

The function of mind, which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. *Sthānāṅga* described it as *saṅkalpa vyāpāravatī*. *Ānuyamīka* gives the *citta vijñāna* as equivalent of the *manas*: "*Citta manovijñānam iti paryāyah*." The *Vīṣṇavaśyakabhāṣya* defines *manas* in terms of mental processes.⁴ It is taken in the substantive sense. The *Nyāya-kośa* defines *manas* in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions.

It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psycho-

1. SAKSENA (S. K.): *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy*, p. 16.

2. Ibid., p. 17.

3. Ibid., p. 17.

4. *Vīṣṇavaśyakabhāṣya* 3525. *Manavānī vā mānaye vā anena manov*. Also *Ābhidhānarājendra*, Vol. VI, *manā*, p. 75.

logists of the present day find it difficult to give a definition of mind without reference to the mental processes. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that "something"; and "I do not think", he writes, "that we can find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind."¹ McDougall defines mind as an organized system of mental and purposive forces. Wundt says that mind is a pre-scientific concept. It covers the whole field of internal experience.²

The Jainas did not merely postulate the existence of mind without any evidence. They found the evidence in the experiences of the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the relevant experiences because there is the absence of *manas*. Something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind. Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its nature. "Just as speech signifies the function of speaking, fire expresses the function of burning and the light shows the light."³

Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an internal sense organ. In the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organs is not sufficient. We must posit the existence of a *manas*, some additional condition which brings them together. For instance, a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-occupied, when the mind is elsewhere, as we read in the Upaniṣads. There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memory and of experiences like pleasure and pain.⁴ As mind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the

1. McDUGALL (W) : *Outlines of Psychology*, 12th Ed., p. 35.

2. WUNDT : *Physiological Psychology*—Introduction, p. 3.

3. *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. VI, p. 82.

4. BRADURI (S.) : *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Conception of Mind*—as appearing in B. C. LAW, Vol. II, p. 38.

structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behaviour, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of mental activities and the facts of mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the functions of the mechanical toy; and one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machinery within it, can only watch its movement under various conditions.¹

Mind is characterised by mental processes like doubting, imagining, dreaming and expecting. It is also characterised by pleasure and pain and desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind.² The *Nandīsūtra* describes mind as that which grasps everything *sarvārtha-grahanaṃ manas*.³ In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, we are told that cognition of what is stated on authority, as in scriptures is the object of mind, *śrutam anindriyasya*.⁴ In *Maitrī Upaniṣad* mind is described in its reflective aspect as source of all mental modifications. He sees by mind, by mind he hears, and by mind too, he experiences all that we call desire, will and belief, resolution, irresolution. All this is but mind itself.⁵ In modern psychology also, Wundt says that mind will be the subject "to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal experience." Mind, in the popular thought, is not simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real being, and the various activities of the mind are its expressions or notions. But this involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of internal experience.⁶ The *Abhidhānarājendra* mentions that the word *manas* has a functional significance, because it describes the functions of the mind like thinking, imagining

1. McDougall (W.); *Outline of Psychology*, 12th Ed., p. 36.

2. *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. VI, p. 83.

3. *Nandīsūtra*, p. 24.

4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, Ch. II, Sūtra, 21.

5. *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, Ch. VI, p. 30, as quoted by R. D. Ranade in *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 118, (1926).

6. Wundt: *Physiological Psychology*, tr. by Titchner, Introduction, p. 3.

and expecting.¹ And from this functional significance of the mind the structure of the mind is inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of the mind *dravya manas* and *bhāva manas* (*manah dvividham dravya-manah bhāva-manas ca*). In the *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, we get a description of the two phases of the *manas*. The material mind, which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of matter meant for the function of mind—*dravyataḥ dravyamanah*. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the *yoga* arising out of the contact of the *jīva* with the body.² In the *Gommaṭasāra*: *Jīva-kāṇḍa* also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight petals.³

Such a description of mind as *dravya manas* and *bhāva manas*, the structural and the psychological aspect, can be compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers. C. D. Broad, in his *Mind and its Place in Nature* presents a similar view. It is a modification of the instrumental theory according to which mind is a substance that is existentially independent of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of two factors neither of which is and for itself has the property of mind, but which when combined exhibits mental properties. The factors are the bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound like NaCl and H₂O in which the individual components lose their individual identity when composed of living body possessed of i) the nervous system and something else and ii) the psychic factor, which possesses some feeling like mental.⁴ The bodily factor is described as "the living

1. *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. VI, p. 74.

2. *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 3525; A. Mā.; and *Abhidhānarājendra* Vol. VI, p. 4, Commentary: *tad yogyair mananayogyair manovarganābhyo grhitair anantaḥ pudglaḥ nirvartitam tad dravyamano bhavatyate*.

3. *Gommaṭasāra*: *Jīva-kāṇḍa*. Verse 443.

4. BROAD (C. D.), *Mind and its Place in Nature*, Ch. XIII, and XIV Section E.

brain and the nervous system". About the psychic factor, Broad seems to be vague.' Neither mental characteristics nor mental events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However, the psychic factor must be capable of persisting for a period at least after the death of the body; and it must be capable, when separated from the body, of carrying 'traces' of experience which happen to the mind of which it was formerly a constituent. In other words, it must comprise the 'mnemic mass'. Broad's view comes nearer to the Buddhist *viññāṇa* rather to the Jaina view of *bhāva manas*. Of all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view, *viññāṇa* has a more permanent nature. In the *Dīgha-Nikāya* it is mentioned that after death the body is dissolved, mind ceases, but *viññāṇa*, the coefficient of the desire to enjoy, clings to produce its effects in some other embryo waking elsewhere.² With this difference of the psychic factor, the Jaina distinction between the *dravya manas* and the *bhāva manas* corresponds with Broad's theory of the composition of mind. In speaking of the mental structure, McDougall has likened it to the structure of a machine. However, McDougall also warns us that it should not be taken in the sense of material structure or arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the composition of a poem of music. "The structure of the mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the data of the two orders, facts of behaviour and the facts of introspection."³ The same can be said of the composition of the *manas*.

Each Jīva has its own mind, although the general nature of mind is one: *mano lakṣaṇatvena sarvamanasām ekatvāt*", because the essential nature of mind is the expression of the mental states. In the *Sthānāṅga* we read, *egge jīvāṇaṃ mape*."⁴ In this way and according to the situation, the Gods, men and

1. Also *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1926. Symposium: Is mind a compound substance? Views of Dr. HUXLEY quoted.

2. RIVER DAVIDS (Mrs.): *Buddhist Psychology*. Ch. Mind, p. 21.

3. McDUGALL (W.): *Outline of Psychology*, 12th Ed., p. 42.

4. *Abhidhāna-jendra*, Vol. VI, p. 82 and *Sthānāṅga* I, 6. *egge deṇā-sura-maṇussāṇaṃ tathā samayaṇāṃ*.

Asuras have each his own mind. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the classification of the souls, five sensed organisms with minds, is mentioned; *sañjñīṇaḥ samanaskāḥ*.¹ In the five-sensed organisms only some possess minds. Comparative psychologists like Kohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in the developed form is possible in the case of higher animals having insight. Naiyāyikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to cognize the objects and to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with past Karman. Each self has one mind, because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can function only inside the organism with which the self is connected.² If there was one common mind for all, there would be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument was presented by the Jaina thinkers in favour of the Jiva being *bhāvamanorūpa*. If the Jiva was *sarvagata*, there would be cognition of everything by everyone.³ Their arguments were metaphysical and epistemological than psychological. But modern psychology has analysed the same problem from the psychological point of view. McDougall writes, "It seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman beings, whether in the new-born infant, the fool or the wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual;" not only is it different in the various species of animals (if they have minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of one man is different from that of every other man; and, in any one man at each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage.⁴

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, Ch. II, Sūtra 11.

2. BRADURI (S.): *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Conception of Mind*, as appearing in B. C. Law Volume.

3. *Abhidhānarājendra*, VI, p. 75: *Sarvagrahana-pratīyagataḥ api tat-atomatam*.

4. McDUGALL (W.): *Outline of Psychology*, 12th Ed., pp. 35-36.

The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with problems concerning the instrumental nature of the mind. It was generally believed that, like other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and the instrument of the soul. In the *Upaniṣads* we find references to the mind as one of the organs along with the other sense and motor organs (*jānēndriyas* and *karmēndriyas*).¹ *Praśna Upaniṣad* mentions *manas* as a central organ. Reference to the *monas* as the driver of the ten organs in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas* together to constitute the internal organ *antaḥkaraṇa*. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarly, Vidyānāndi maintains that *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in the list of the sense organs. Kaṇāda is also silent. Vātsyāyana includes *manas* under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we apprehend the inner states by the instrument of the *manas*. Vātsyāyana believes that mind is as good a sense organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain differences. But the Jainas believed that the mind is a *no-indriya* in the sense that it is different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely identical with those of *indriyas*. The prefix *no* here does not mean not, but is at times rendered as *iṣad*. It is a quasi sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental function of the mind. In the *Gommaṣasāra*: Jīvakāṇḍa, we get a description of mind as the *no-indriya*. It is through the mind that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestation as in the case of the other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.² The *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the *vytti* of the same it is said, "*mano'nindriyam iti no*

1. DEUSSEN: *Philosophy of the Upaniṣad*, 58, *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, 2-6.

2. *Gommaṣasāra* 444, *no-indriyatti sannā tassa have setaindriyāṇaṃ vā vattattābhāvādo*.

indriyam iti ca ucyate".¹ In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the function of mind, which is *anindriya*, is described as the *śruta* cognition. The second function is the *mati* and its modifications.² It is called the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature (*karayatva*) of the mind. But it is said that the *karana* is of two types—*bāhya karana* and *antaḥkarana*, and even the *dravya-manas* is described as the *antaḥkarana*, the internal organ. Being the internal organ, it is different from the other sense organs.³ However, such a description of mind need not be interpreted in the sense that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in fact, it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like that of the other sense organs. It is *sarvārthagrahaṇam*, as it is stated in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*.

II. In the *Dravyasaṃgraha*, Nemicaṇḍra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of consciousness. Brahma-deva, in his commentary, writes that from the ultimate point of view, Jiva is distinguished by its quality of consciousness.⁴ It is the most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.

Consciousness has been the most important of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, an effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, the *ātman* is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, *citta* is seen; in man, there is gradual development of *ātman*, for he is now endowed with *prajñā*.⁵ Similarly, in the *Chāṇḍo-*

1. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 24 and *Vṛtti*.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra* II, 21 and *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā-vṛtti*—*śrutamiti-hi viśa-
yinaḥ viśayaśca nirdeśaḥ*.

3. *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. VI, Manus p. 76: *karayattāno kimtu
karanaṃ dvaidhā bhavati-śarīragatam antaḥkaranaṃ tadbahirbhūtaṃ bāhya-
karanaṃ ca tatredam dravya-manantaḥkaranaṃ evātmanah*.

4. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, Verse 3, *viśaya-ṇayado du cedapā jassa*.

5. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, 2.3.2.

gyopaniṣad, Prajāpati describes the progressive identification of *ātman* with body consciousness. The psycho-physiological method is adopted in the *Taittiriya*.¹ Finally, the *ātman* as *jñānamaya* and *ānandamaya* is emphasized. The Jaina classification of the Jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on a scientific basis. Jivas have been classified into one, two, three, four and five-sensed, according to the number of the sense organs possessed by them. Jivas possessing the five senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of life, from physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and consciousness.

Cetanā as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. This empirical consciousness arises from the contact of the sense organs with the objects. Cetanā in its pure form gets embodied with the Ātman and comes into contact with the empirical life, with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Jñāna* and *Darśana* are, therefore, aspects of *cetanā* and *cetanā* is the spring-board from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects, *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Cetanā*, therefore, is the light of consciousness that the soul possesses and through this light the cognition of objects arises.

The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important problem for philosophers as well as the psychologists. Consciousness has three aspects—the cognitive, the affective and the conative. They are modes of consciousness. In perceiving, believing or otherwise apprehending that such and such a thing exists and has characteristics, one's attitude is cognitive. In the affective attitude one is either pleased

1. As quoted by SASSENA (S. R.) in *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy*, p. 24.

or displeased about it. But one is also active about it, tries to know more about it, and tries to alter it in some respect. This attitude is conative.¹ But Stout says that though these three modes of consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in a concrete psychosis, they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other. Mind is an organic unity and its activities have the closest degree of organic inter-action. However, in every psychosis one of the aspects may be predominant. In the pleasure of pursuit, feeling presupposes conation. Sometimes, feeling is dependent on certain conative attitudes involved in the perceptual process. Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cognition.

Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of states in consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They make a distinction between consciousness as knowing, as feeling and as experiencing the fruits of Karma (*karma-phala-cetanā*), and willing.² Conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, next conation and then knowledge.³ McDougall has emphasized that feeling is the core of all instinctive activity. In fact, in all experience there is a core of feeling, while the cognitive and conative aspects are varying factors. In the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* there is mention of different modes of experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are different modes of intellection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms of experience. The seers of Upaniṣads give a classification of seven mental functions.⁴ At the basis is intellection. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognized such a distinction. We have perception and conception, feeling and affection, and conation or will. In the Buddhist theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience,

1. STOUT (G. F.) : *Manual of Psychology*, 4th Ed., p. 106.

2. *Pañcātīkāyātara*, 38.

3. *Op.* cit. 29.

4. RANADE (R. D.) : *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*—Chapter on Psychology.

the basal element of human life. RADHAKRISHNAN in his *Indian Philosophy* suggests that *viññāna*, *vedanā* and *saṃskāra* roughly correspond to knowledge, feeling and will.¹ Childers in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under *saṃskāra*. Mrs. Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear distinction between conation in the psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the Pīṭakas there is consistent discrimination between psychological importance and ethical implication.² Professor Stout has given up old tripartite classification of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective and conative elements together under the name of interest. RADHAKRISHNAN says that, if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of conation, we get to the Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of mental life.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory also there is a description of the manifestation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire and volition. We have to know a thing before we feel the want of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act. Thus, as HIRIYANNA says, feeling mediates between cognition and conation. Thus, the modes of consciousness have been the problem of philosophers and psychologists. There is a general agreement regarding the division of consciousness into three modes, although different philosophers have emphasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized conation. In the Upaniṣads all the aspects have received their due prominence. The primacy of the intellect is emphasized in the *Chāndogya* and *Maitrī Upaniṣads*.³ In the *Chāndogya*, again, we get a description of the primacy of the will. But this has reference to the cosmic will rather than to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation between conation and feeling. The Nyāya theory describes the function of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.) *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 400.

2. REYS DAVIDS (Mrs.) *The Birth of Indian Philosophy*, p. 6 (1936).

3. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VII, 5-1; *Maitrīya Upaniṣad* VI, 39.

III. Self-Consciousness : The term self-consciousness is very ambiguous. It may mean consciousness of the self as an object given in introspection. In this sense, the self, the empirical ego, becomes both an aspect of experience and also an object of experience. Self-consciousness may mean transcendental and pure self-consciousness. It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is changing.¹ Some of the earlier philosophers have not made a clear distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological sense of consciousness. In the Upaniṣads, the *ātman* is described as the basis and the ultimate presupposition in all knowledge. It is the absolute knower, and how can the knower itself be known?² It cannot be comprehended by intellect. It is the seer and the knower.³ Yet, the *ātman* can be known by higher intuition. It is knowable as the *pratyagātmānam*, apprehended by *ādhyātmayoga*.⁴ The Buddhists recognize the distinction between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental self. Their view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James. Yogācāras believe that self is a series of cognition or ideas. There is no self apart from cognition. They reveal neither the self nor the non-self.

Some Nyāya philosophers, specially the Neo-naiyāyikas, believed that the self is an object of internal perception *mānasapratyakṣa*. The Vaiśeṣikas also maintain that, although the self is not an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by Yogic intuition. The Sāṃkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of self. It is self-intuition. Self is inferred through its reflection in *buddhi*. But Patañjali accepts the supernormal intuition of

1. ŚAKSENA (S. K.): *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy*, Ch. V.

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, 2.4.14.

3. *Prañcipoṇiṣad*, 6, 5.

4. *Kaṭhopoṇiṣad*, 2, 12.

the self through the power of concentration. The self can know itself through its reflection in its pure *sattva* and also when mixed with *rajas* and *tamas* by supernormal intuition (*pratibhā-jñāna*). So, the pure self can know the empirical self, but the empirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self being both subject and object and the reflection theory does not much improve the situation. Vācaspati tries to avoid the contradiction by saying that transcendental self is the subject, and the empirical self the object, of self-apprehension.

According to Prabhākara, self is necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. It not only manifests itself, but also supports the *āman*, much as the flame and the wick. Neither the self nor the object is self-luminous. There can be consciousness of an object without the consciousness of the self. In every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate apprehension of the self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is only to be known as a subject. It is revealed by *trīpuṭa samvit*.

The Jaina holds with Prabhākara that cognition is always apprehended by the self. Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object. Every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. But the Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous. He regards self as non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal perception. When I feel that I am happy I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal perception, just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without form. "Oh Gautama", said Mahāvira, "the self is *pratyakṣa* even to you. The soul is cognizable even to you".¹ Again, unlike the view of Prabhākara, the Jāinas hold that it is the object of perception, and it is manifested by external and internal perception. To the question 'how can the subject be an object of perception?', the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is an object of perception.

William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and the transcendental self, the I. The self is partly the

1. *Gaṇadharavāda*, Ch. I.

known and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as known, the pure ego is the knower. "It is that which at any moment is conscious." Whereas the me is only one of the things which it is conscious of. But this thinker is not a passing state. It is something deeper and less mutable.¹ Prof. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent in experience, in the sense that experience, without the experient will be unintelligible. It is also transcendental, in the sense that it can never be the object of our experience.² The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore, they said, it is due to internal perception.

Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure consciousness which is foundational and without limitation. That is the *cetanā* which is the essential quality of the soul. But when we descend to the practical level, the realm of *vyavahāra*, we find the distinction between subject and object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct experience like the internal perception of the Jainas, or by the immediate intuition, (*pratibhā jñāna*) of the Vedāntins, is raised as a consequence of this distinction. In all this, the question is answered from the empirical point of view. On this basis, we may say that there are two aspects of consciousness: a) pure and transcendental consciousness, and b) empirical consciousness. *Ātman* is pure consciousness. *Jīva* is consciousness limited by the organism. *Ātman* is the subject of consciousness. It is also the object of internal perception, but only in the sense that it is immanent in consciousness though not clearly cognised as object. *Jīva* is both the subject and the object of consciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.

IV. The Āgama theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahāvira period.³ The *jñāna pravāda* formed a part of the Pūrvaśruta which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his *Vīśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, quotes a Pūrva Gāthā on *jñāna*.⁴ There seems to have been no differ-

1. JAMES (William) : *Principles of Psychology*, Chap. X.

2. WARD (James) : *Psychological Principles*, p. 380 (1920).

3. TATIA (N.) : *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 27.

4. *Vīśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 121.

ence of opinion between the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The Āgamas have also presented the five divisions of knowledge.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity of attitude arising out of the veil of Karman, we may get wrong knowledge, *ajñāna*. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of Karman is totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of Karma is removed. That is *pratyakṣa-jñāna*. But empirical knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called *parokṣa jñāna*. *Matijñāna* (sense experience), and *Śrutajñāna* (knowledge due to verbal communication), are *parokṣa-jñāna*; while *Avadhī* (extra sensory perception) *Manahparyāya* (telepathy), and *Kevala-jñāna* (omniscience), were called *pratyakṣa*.¹ But later, in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of Indian thought, they modified their conception of *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa Jñāna*. In the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, we find a change in terminology. *Mati* and *Śruta* began to be called *pratyakṣa* as they were possible through the operation of the sense organs. *Jinabhadra* calls the two *samīyavahāra pratyakṣa*.² Alongside of *Jñāna*, we have direct intuition of the object. It is *Darśana*. *Darśana* has similar subdivisions. The general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities, is shown in Table I. The subsidence and destruction of the veil of Karman is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterised as *samśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (perversity), and *anadhya-vasāya* (wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the lack of discrimination between the real and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things according to its own whims. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes *ajñāna*.³

1. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, II, 1, 7.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, I, 9-12. *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, p. 194. *Nandīsūtra* 4

3. *Ibid.* 32; *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 47.

TABLE I (A)





TABLE I (B)



NOTE—This is based on the analysis given by S. C. GUPTA in his edition of the *Draṣṭavyavagata*.

Pratyakṣa : We may now consider sense perception or *pratyakṣa jñāna*, as the *Nandisūtra* 4-5 calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the *manas*. Hemacandra describes in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* that *pratyakṣa* is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various definitions of *pratyakṣa* of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyāyika definition of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the sense object contact is not adequate. How can the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this definition is irrational since it has no bearing on practical activity. It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt; and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Sāṅkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid of consciousness, therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.¹ In Plato's dialogue, *Theaetetus*, Socrates said that, 'if knowledge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that would be a monstrous conclusion.'² In the *Nandisūtra* a distinction is made between *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *anindriya-pratyakṣa*. *Indriya-pratyakṣa* is cognition which is immediate and direct and arises out of the operation of the five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types of sense perception—the visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The ex-

1. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 29, and its commentary.

2. *Theaetetus*, 164 B.

perience that does not need the sense organs and is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception. It is also *pratyakṣa*, because it is immediate and direct. It is of three types *avadhi*, *manah-paryāya* and *kevala-pratyakṣa*. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five senses as well as the *manas* may be called *matijñāna*. But in *indriya-pratyakṣa* they included knowledge born of the five sense organs, as the mind is not for them exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sense organ. Uṇāsvāti defines *matijñāna* as knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense, *no-indriya*.¹ The commentator Siddhasenagunin mentions three types of *mati*: (i) knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind.² However, from the Bhāṣya of the *Tattvārthasūtra* we find that *Matijñāna* can be distinguished into different types, as (i) knowledge due to sense organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only, like *cintā*; (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in *Matijñāna*. Sense perception (*indriya-pratyakṣa*), as a species of *Matijñāna* is of five types based on the nature and function of the five sense organs.³ The five senses possess the capacity of sense experience because the cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great psychological significance, although perception was a logical and metaphysical problem for the Jains as for other Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the West, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science may have realized that perception is more a problem for psychology. Bertrand Russell says that, 'the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early date. My own belief is that the problem is scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical'.⁴

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 14.

2. *Tattvārtha-Ṭīkā*, 1. 14.

3. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 21 and commentary.

4. *What is Mind?* Article by B. Russell in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LV, No. 1.

The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiyāyikas,¹ although, according to the Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual experience. Hemacandra said that objects and light are not conditions of experience, because of lack of concomitance between the two.² But it is not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space, which subserve the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge-obscuring Karmas. They are indirectly useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. Perception of a particular object is, in fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge-obscuring Karmas, Jñānavaraṇiya Karma. This implies a psychological factor. An appropriate physical condition in the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring Karma is a necessary factor in the perceptual experience. It also depends on the competency of the appropriate psychical factor. The psychic factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring Karma.³ Such a psychic factor may be described as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptual experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception has been mentioned in the Upaniṣads also. In Western thought Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possible merely through the sense organs.⁴ For him, perception consists in being moved and affected. Sense perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs of sense perception are potentially and not actually. Locke writes that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made in the outward part, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain; and there the sense of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception.⁵ In modern psychology, Prof. Woodworth gives a

1. *Nyāya Sūtra*, III. 1. 68-69. *indriyārtha-saṁnikarṣaṁ*.

2. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I, 25 *nārthālokaṁ jñānosya nimittam anyatirekāt*.

3. *Ibid.* and commentary.

4. *Aristotle's Psychology*.

5. LOCKE (John): *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*
Ch. IX Perception.

formula 'W-S-O-R-W' for explaining the fascinating problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At any given moment a man is set for the present situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sound can be, he is more likely to perceive it as the hum of an aeroplane.¹

According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into four stages as (i) *avagraha*,² (ii) *īhā*, (iii) *avāya*, and (iv) *dhāraṇā*. These stages of sense experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. The earlier forms like *Avagraha*, develop into the subsequent forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature.³ *Avagraha* refers to the first simple and primitive stage of experience. This may be said to be merely the stage of sensation. Next comes *īhā*. In this stage there is a mental element, and it refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. This is *Avāya*. It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. *Dhāraṇā* is retention of what is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact, it is not actually a stage of perceptual experience although it is included in perceptual experience.

Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the sense-datum. It consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations. It is 'knowledge about' and not merely 'knowledge of acquaintance', as William James said. Perception involves certain psychological factors like association, discrimination, integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also involves inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a table, we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object. As Angell said, perception is a synthetic process, and the combination of the new and the old is an essential part of the synthesis. This process of combining was often called, by early psychologists, 'apperception'. This problem will be referred to later. Structural psychologists like Wundt and Titchner

1. WOODWORTH (R. S.): *Psychology: A Study of Mental Life*, p. 403.

2. *Tattvadrthasūtra*, 15.

3. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I, 1. 20 and commentary.

analysed perception into sensations. They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as in the process of forming H_2O . It is not merely a sum of sensations. It gives a new psychological product, a creative synthesis, like the mental chemistry of J. S. MILL. Later, the Gestalt psychologists gave a new turn to the psychology of perception. They hold that every perceptual experience is an unanalysed whole; it has a quality of its own. The Jainas were concerned with giving a logical and epistemological analysis of the perceptual experience. Therefore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of knowledge. Their analysis was more on the basis of logic, of common sense and on insight; and yet, the stages of perception mentioned by the Jaina philosophers very much correspond to the analysis of perception given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist school.

AVAGRAHA-SENSATION: Avagraha is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said to be analogous to sensation. It is the level of sensation in which perceptual experience can be analysed. Umāsvāti defines *avagraha* as implicit awareness of the object of sense. He says that *grahana* (grasping), *ālocanā* (holding), and *avadhāraṇā* (prehending), are synonyms of *avagraha*.¹ It is indeterminate. The object presented through sense stimulation is cognized in an undefined and indeterminate way. In this stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any association, without cognizing the specific features, and in fact without even being aware of its association and name.² In the *Avaiyaka-Niryukti*, Avagraha has been defined as awareness of the sense data.³ Jinabhadra insists that Avagraha is indeterminate in its character. He is not prepared to consider that it has reference to any specific features of the object, because even relative reference is enough to promote the experience to the stage of Avāya.

Sensations, as William James said, are the first things in consciousness. This does not mean that all our experience is only fusing and compounding of sensations. Our experience can be analysed into sensations and these form the elements of our

1. *Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya*, I. 15.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Avaiyaka-Niryukti*, 3.

sensory experience. As Stout says, sensations are of the nature of immediate experience, like the experience of cold and warm, a specific tinge of pain or a touch located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term sensation is also extended to cover the visual data, sound, taste, and smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented objects but also in accordance with the state of the individual.¹ During the period of two hundred years between the publication of Locke's Essay and of James's Principles, two further characteristics, now largely of antiquarian interest, were gradually attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple elements of which complex ideas are formed, as well as the matter or crude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the organized and meaningful world of everyday experience.²

Avagraha has been further distinguished into two stages: i) *vyañjanāvagraha* and ii) *arthāvagraha*.³ *Vyañjanāvagraha* is the earlier stage. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation of the immediate experience. In the *Vīṣeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* we get a description of *Vyañjanāvagraha*. There it is said that what reveals an object, as a lamp reveals a jar, is *Vyañjanāvagraha*. It is only the relation of the sense organ and the object in the form of sense stimulation such as sound.⁴ In the *Nandīsūtra*, we get an example of the earthen pot and drops of water, *mallaka-dṛṣṭānta*. It gives a description of the stage of *Vyañjanāvagraha*. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning, when a person pours out one drop of water, it is absorbed and there is no sign of existence of water. He goes on pouring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop of water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. We may call this stage when the water becomes visible the 'threshold of saturation'. The drops of water below the threshold are all absorbed. Similarly, a person who is asleep receives sound stimulation successively for some time. The sound atoms reach the ears. Innumerable instances have to

1. STOUT (G. F.) : *Manual of Psychology*, p. 123.

2. Sense datum theory and observational fact. Some contributions of Psychology to Epistemology : *Journal of Philosophy*, Jan. 1958.

3. *Tattvārthasūtra*, I, 17-18. *arthavya vyañjanāvagrahaḥ*.

4. *Vīṣeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, 191, 193.

occur before the ears become full of sound atoms. At a particular stage, the person becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in. We may call this stage of first awareness 'the threshold of awareness'. The sensation of sound starts the moment the threshold is crossed and we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experience of sound, *arthāvagraha*. So far there was no awareness of the sound although the conditions of stimulation for such awareness were operating below the threshold.¹ The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible up to a particular stage. Such a preparatory stage of sensation presents physiological and stimulus conditions for the sensational stage. It is indeterminate and undefined. *Vyañjanāvagraha* has been just described as implicit awareness, the physiological and stimulus condition of awareness. It gradually develops into awareness and gives the sensation. It is very often described as 'contact awareness'. However, it would not be appropriate to call this 'awareness' although there is the stimulation flowing in. Awareness gradually emerges later, through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of awareness, or implicit awareness.

As soon as a person becomes conscious, the stage of *vyañjanāvagraha* is over, and it transforms itself into *arthāvagraha*. This may be called the stage of sensation proper. It is awareness of the object. In the *Nandīsūtra* there is a statement that, in this stage, we are aware of the sound as 'this is sound' or 'colour' or 'touch', but not exactly cognize the nature of the sound, colour or touch.² But in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, this kind of determinate awareness, as 'this is sound' is denied in the stage of sensation. It is merely awareness of the occurrence of the cognition because it lasts only for one moment.³ It is, therefore, indeterminate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cognition of specific content.

On the basis of such a distinction regarding the two stages of *Avagraha*, it is stated that *Vyañjanāvagraha* lasts for indefinite moments, gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness.⁴

1. *Nandīsūtra*, 34, *mallaka-dṛṣṭānta*.

2. *Nandīsūtra*, 35.

3. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 253.

4. *Nandīsūtra*, 35.

The physiological and stimulus conditions of awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate for a number of moments till the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness in the form of sensation is reached, it lasts only for an instant, which is an indivisible point of time and is infinitesimal.

Western psychologists, like Stout, describe sensations as something of the nature of immediately experienced warm or cold, a specific tinge of pain, touch located in or at the surface of the body, rather than anything outside. Psychologists have extended the term to cover the visual data, the sounds and the smells that may enter into immediate experience. Stout further says that all recognition of sensation as of a certain kind, and all apprehension of it as continuing to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different moments, involves a reference beyond this experience. For, sensation is immediate experience and nothing more. At any one moment there is no other immediate experience except just the experience itself at the moment.¹ Sensations are genuine and factual, while mental constructs are spurious and artificial. Sensations are new, uncontaminated and untouched by those mental processes which render ideas suspect. They are not structured by perception, dimmed and blurred through detention, abridged through forgetting or artificially arranged as a result of fortuitous associations. From Hume to Russell, modern empiricism has tended to regard the inchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as more authentic than the cognitive refinement which recent enquiry provides.²

ĪHĀ : Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not complete with the mere awareness at the sensational stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. As Stout says, we have hardly any pure sensations, sensations absolutely devoid of meaning, either original or acquired, except perhaps in the case of children. Sensations transcend the immediate experience because they are inseparably connected with thought. They have a reference to external objects. They mean something beyond themselves.

1. STOUT (G. F.) : *Manual of Psychology*, p. 124.

2. WALLRAFF (Charles F.) article in the *Journal of Philosophy*, January 1951, p. 23.

In this sense, our empirical experience will not be complete with *avagraha*. *Avagraha* is not self-subsistent. It involves meaning and it has reference to object. It brings in '*ihā*', a factor involving meaning. The next stage in the experience, then, is '*ihā*'. In *avagraha* a person simply hears a sound. In *ihā* he cognises the nature of the sound also.¹ Jinabhadra says that *ihā* is enquiry for the distinctive features of the object.² Akalaṅka defines *ihā* similarly.³ Hemacandra defines it as striving for the cognition of the specific details of the object apprehended by sensation.⁴ It would be apter to use 'associative integration' as standing for *ihā*. And *ihā* is the stage in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative integration of sensory elements experienced in the stage of sensation.

AVĀYA: From the stage of associative integration, *ihā*, we come to the stage of interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression of something the meaning of which is not cognised. Perception is the interpretation of the sensation in which the meaning is known. *Avāya* follows in the wake of *ihā*. In this stage we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception of the object. The *Āvaśyaśāstrī* defines *avāya* as determinate cognition.⁵ In the *Sārvārthasiddhi* we get the description of *avāya* as the cognition of the true nature of the object due to the cognition of the particular characteristics.⁶ *Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya* describes *avāya* as the stage of ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong.⁷ *Avāya* may be compared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is a complex experience. The older psychologists analysed perception as involving apperception. Apperception is assimilating new experience to old experience.

DHĀRAṆĀ: Retention *dhāraṇā*, is the next stage in perceptual experience. The *Nandisūtra* defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for a number of instants or

1. *Nandisūtra*, 35.

3. *Tattvārtharājavārttika* 1, 15. 2.

5. *Viśeṣāvalāyaka Bhāṣya*, 179.

7. *Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya*, 115.

2. *Viśeṣāvalāyaka Bhāṣya*, 180.

4. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 127.

6. *Sārvārthasiddhi*, 115.

innumerable instants. According to Umāsvāti retention develops through three stages as i) the nature of the object is finally cognised, ii) the cognition so formed is retained, and iii) the object is recognised on future occasions. 'The *Avaiśyakaniryukti* defines *dhāraṇā* as retention.' Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umāsvāti he also mentions three stages of retention as i) the absence of the lapse of perceptual judgement, ii) the formation of the mental traces and iii) the recollection of the cognition on the future occasions. In this description the absence of the lapse, *avicyuti*, mental trace, *vāsanā*, and recollection *smṛti* are three stages included in the conception of *dhāraṇā*.

Thus, some logicians make *dhāraṇā* a mere retention of perceptual experience; while some others would make it also a condition of recall of that experience at a future time. Hemacandra recalls his view of retention as the condition of recall with the view as the absence of retention of the lapse mentioned in the *Viśeṣāvaiśyaka Bhāṣya*. He says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is included in the perceptual judgement *avāya*. That is why it has not been separately mentioned by him. *Avāya* when it continues for some length of time may be called retention as the absence of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absence of the lapse is also a condition of recall in the sense in which he defines *Dhāraṇā*. Mere perception without the absence of the lapse gives rise to recollection. Perceptual judgements which are not attended by reflective mental stage are almost on the level of unattended perception, like the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion. And such perceptions are not capable of giving rise to recollection.²

Hemacandra's description of *Avāya* and his analysis of *Dhāraṇā* comes nearer to the psychological analysis or perception especially of the structuralist school. Perception is a concrete experience in which sensations are organised and interpreted. Meaning is assigned to sensations. Without the factor of meaning interpretation of the sense impressions perception would be impossible.

1. *Viśeṣāvaiśyaka Bhāṣya*. 179. *Dhāraṇam punardhāraṇam*.

2. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 29 and commentary.

The Jainas have given an exhaustive description of the four stages of Avagraha, perceptual experience, so far discussed. Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the five sense organs and due to mind. Again, Vyañjanāvagraha is of four types only. Thus there would be twentyeight forms of perceptual cognition. Each of the twentyeight forms again is of twelve types according to the nature of the object they can have. Therefore the Jainas have mentioned that there are three hundred and thirtysix types of sense experience, namely Matijñāna or Abhinibodhikajñāna. This elaborate classification has no psychological significance, although it has logical and mathematical interest. The Jaina logicians were fond of presenting elaborate mathematical calculations. This is found in their elaborate classification of Karma as given in the *Gommatā Sāra: Karma Kāṇḍa*. Glasenapp in his '*Doctrine of Karma in Jainism*' has given a detailed analysis of this division. The same tendency must have inspired the Jaina logicians to give such an elaborate classification of Avagraha.

V. SUPER-SENSE EXPERIENCE: The problem of super-sensible experience is not new in Indian Psychology. In the process of self-realization, man acquires certain experiences and powers which are not possible for the common man with the normal function of the sense organs. All systems of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvākas and the Mīmāṃsakas, accept the possibility of such experiences. Śrīdhara argues that by the force of constant meditation on the self, *ākāśa* and other supersensible objects, we acquire knowledge of them, because the varying grades of consciousness must reach the limit beyond which it cannot go. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa showed that we can develop different degrees of perception leading to Yogic perception which sees all objects past, future, remote etc. He gives instances of cats which can see in darkness and the vultures from long distances. Yogis can see all objects, including the supersensible like *dharmā*. Such is the nature of divine perception also with the difference that the divine perception is eternal, while the Yogic perception is acquired through the practice of meditation.

1. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, I, 27, *rūpiṇa āśadheḥ* also *Apārityeka Nirvyakṣa*, 45 and *Nandī-Sūtra*, 46.

Prāśastapāda divides Yogic perception into i) *yukta* in ecstatic condition; and ii) *viyukta*, of those who have fallen from the ecstatic state. In the state of ecstasy one can see one's own self, other selves, *ākāśa*, time and atoms. Those who are not in ecstasy can see the supersensible and hidden objects through a peculiar contact of the self, *manas*, sense organs and the objects. Neo-Naiyyāyikas divide Yogic perception into: i) perception of those who have attained the union with the supreme Being; and ii) those who acquire it with some Yogic efforts. The former have constant perception. Ārśajnāna as intuition of sages has also been recognised.

Vijñānabhikṣu states that the Yogis can come into contact with distant objects by virtue of a power acquired through meditation. This peculiar power of the mind consists in its all pervasiveness. Through such powers under the influence of Dharma, the Yogis can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of the mind with *prakṛti*.

In the Pātañjala Yoga, mind is described as a continuous stream of functions flowing into five stages: i) *kṣipta*, ii) *mūḍha*, iii) *vikṣipta*, occasionally steady iv) *ekāgra* concentrated, and v) *nirūḍha*, withdrawn. In the fourth and the fifth stages mind is withdrawn from the objects and concentrated on one of the objects. In the fourth the mind gets the conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta-samādhi*) and in the last there is the supra-conscious state of ecstasy (*asamprajñāta-samādhi*). The concentration proceeds from the gross objects to the subtler. In the different stages of *samprajñāta samādhi*, the Yogi acquires miraculous powers (*siddhis*) like clairvoyance, telepathy, understanding the language of animals, memory of past lives and a host of other powers. The Vedāntins generally recognise two kinds of *samādhi*: *samprajñāta* and *asamprajñāta* while different distinctions have been made by the Yoga psychologists.

Among the Buddhists, Anuruddha divides consciousness into two levels: i) subliminal consciousness and ii) supraliminal consciousness, which is supernormal consciousness. The Yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliminal consciousness: I) *rūpacitta*, where he sees visible and material forms. Clairvoy-

ance may be included in this form of experience. ii) *arūpacitta*. In this stage the Yogi sees things which are invisible and formless. iii) In the final stage of *lokottaracitta* he reaches the stage of transcendental consciousness which is above the three worlds. This may be compared to omniscience, the *bodhi*. A monk has to go through the severe physical and mental discipline in order to pass through the different levels of consciousness. Concentration of mind has to proceed through that of gross objects to highest level of concentration of the four noble truths in graded way.

According to the Jainas there are two levels of experience: *pratyakṣa* which is pure experience of the soul without the help of the sense organs. Then, on the lower level, we have the empirical experience which is possible through the sense organs. It is not really direct experience of the soul. It is *parokṣa* indirect experience, as the sense organs are impediments in the direct experience of the pure soul. It is also called *saṃvṛtyavahāra pratyakṣa*, empirical experience. When the veil of Karma is removed, the soul in its pure form gets direct experience without the help of sense-organs. These experiences are supersensuous experiences. They have been classified into: i) *avadhi* which is analogous to clairvoyance, ii) *manahparyāya*, telepathy, and iii) *kevala*, omniscience.

AVADHI: Avadhi is a form of supersensible perception. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs. However, we perceive things in Avadhi which have form and shape. Things without form like the soul and *dharma* can not be perceived by Avadhi. This can be compared with clairvoyance. Due to the varying degrees of the destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil, the individual can perceive supersensible objects in different degrees. The highest type of Avadhi can perceive all objects having form. The Jainas interpret the capacity of perception in Avadhi in terms of space and time. They have developed a technique of mathematical calculation of the subtleties of time and space. Regarding space Avadhi can extend over a space occupied by innumerable *pradeśas* of the size of the universe. With reference to time, it can perceive through innumerable points of time both past and future. Avadhi can

perceive all the modes of the things according to the degree of intensity of perception. The lowest type of Avadhi can perceive an object occupying a very small fraction of space like the *aṅgula* or finger-breadth. Regarding the capacity in terms of time, the lowest type of Avadhi can last for only a short time like a second. It cannot extend beyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of the objects. It can only cognise a part of the modes.¹ Thus Avadhi, which may be compared to clairvoyance, differs with different individuals according to the capacity of the persons perceiving. The capacity is, in turn, determined by the relative merits acquired by the persons.

Modern psychical research has carried perception beyond opaque wall. Precognition and fore-knowledge have been of great interest to para-psychology.² Even Kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairvoyance by Swedenborg with reference to queen Lovisa in 1761 and the clairvoyant cognition of the Stockholm fire.³ In Indian society we get many instances of such forms of perception and dreams. A scientific study of such forms of perception is necessary.

The Jainas do not make Avadhi a form of super-normal perception, because, beings living in hell, and even the lower animals, are capable of possessing Avadhi. Heavenly beings and beings in hell possess Avadhi naturally from birth. They are endowed with it from birth. It is *bhava-pratyaya* in them. In the case of human beings as well as the five-sensed lower organisms Avadhi is possible due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant veil of Karma.⁴ It is acquired by merit. It is called *guṇa-pratyaya*.⁵ The *Viśeṣāvalyaka-Bhāṣya* gives a detailed description of Avadhi from the fourteen points of view and its varieties with reference to temporal and spatial extension.⁶ The

1. *Nandī-Sūtra*, 16.

2. *New Frontiers of the Mind* by J. B. RHINE (Pelican) p. 41.

3. *Religion Philosophy and Psychical Research* by C. D. BROAD KANT and Psychical Research.

4. *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, 173 and *Bhāṣya—kṣayopasama-nimitta Nandī-Sūtra*, 8. *Sthānāṅga* 71.

5. *Viśeṣāvalyaka Bhāṣya* 572. *Nandī-Sūtra*, 63.

6. *Viśeṣāvalyaka Bhāṣya*, 569.

Pañcāstikāyasāra divides Avadhi into three types with reference to spatial extension: *desāvadhi*, *paramāvadhi* and *sarvāvadhi*. The *Nandī-Sūtra* gives six varieties of Avadhi that are possible in the case of homeless ascetics. It mentions sub-divisions of these.¹

The psychic phenomena called 'French sensitiveness or some times called as 'psychometry' may be included as a form of Avadhi, although in the psychometry mind and the sense organs play their parts. C. D. Broad accepts that clairvoyance is non-sensuous perception. Clairvoyant experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, Price and Broad have accepted that there are cases of such experiences.

MANAHPARYĀYA: Next form of supernormal perception which is *manahparyāya*. It is the direct experience of the modes of mind substance working in other individual mind. The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* gives a brief description of the nature of Manahparyāya knowledge. Manahparyāya cognises the objects of thought by the minds of other people.² The *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* states that a person possessing Manahparyāya directly cognises the mental states of others without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind.³

In Western thought such a form of cognition was called 'thought transferences'. Myers coined the phrase 'Telepathy' for describing such experience. Tyrrel gives many instances of 'Telepathic cognition. He also mentions instances of collective telepathy which he calls 'collective telepathic calculations'.⁴ In the publication called 'apparitions' published by the Society for Psychical Research many interesting examples of telepathic cognition have been mentioned.

Manahparyāya, telepathic experience, is not easy to get and is not common for all. A certain physical and mental discipline is the condition for getting such capacity of intuition. In the *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* we are told that Manahparyāya is possible

1. *Nandī-Sūtra*, 15, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, 1, 23.

2. *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, 76

3. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, 669, 814.

4. *The Personality of Man* (relican) by TYRREL, p. 65.

only for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. Human beings acquire this capacity due to merit and by the practice of mental and moral discipline.¹ The *Nandī Sūtra* gives detailed description of the conditions of the possibility of Manahparyāya in the case of human beings.² The conditions for the possession of Manahparyāya are i) the human beings in the Karma-bhūmi must have fully developed sense organs and a fully developed personality i.e., they must be *paryāpta*. ii) They must possess right attitude, *samyag drṣṭi*. As a consequence they must be free from passion. iii) They must be self-controlled and they must be possessed of *iddhi*, extra-ordinary powers. The discipline and the occult powers attainable by the Yogis mentioned in the *Pātanjala Yoga* is analogous to such a description of the qualifications of the human beings possessing Manahparyāya. Siddhasena Divākara says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to possess Manahparyāya. But the traditional Jain view does not accept the possibility of Manahparyāya in the case of lower animals. Rhine says that it is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case of lower animals especially the higher vertebrates. Several experiments have been carried in this connection and several instances have been quoted.³

The *Sthānāṅga* recognises two varieties of Manahparyāya as *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati*.⁴ Umāsvāti makes a similar distinction.⁵ He says that *Ṛjumati* is less pure and it sometimes falters. *Vipulamati* is purer and more lasting. It lasts upto the rise of omniscience. We also get such a description in the *Pañcāstikāyasāra*.⁶ *Ṛjumati* gives a straight and direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in *Vipulamati* the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular way. Pūjyapāda describes the nature of Manahparyāya as the intuition or objects of the activities of the sense organs of speech, body and

1. *Āvaśyaka Nirvṛtti*, 76.

2. *Nandī Sūtra*, 39-40.

3. *Extra Sensory Perception* by J. B. RHINE, p. 177.

4. *Sthānāṅga* 72.

5. *Tattvārtha Sūtra* I, 25 and its commentary.

6. *Pañcāstikāyasāra* 45.

mind.¹ He says that Vipulamati knows less number of objects than Rjumati, but whatever it knows it knows perfectly and vividly. Vipulamati is more penetrating and it is more lucid than Rjumati. Rjumati falters. One who is at the upward stage of spiritual development has acquired Vipulamati while one who is sure to descend in the spiritual development gets the Rjumati Manahparyāya.²

In the West the phenomena of extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance, telepathy, precognition and mediumship have been accepted as facts. Even psychologists like McDougall are inclined to believe that extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance, telepathy and fore-knowledge seems in a fair way established.³ Prof. H. H. Price says that evidence for clairvoyance and telepathy is 'abundant and good'.⁴ Prof. Richet admits that telepathic experiences certainly exist.⁵ Dr. Rhine has done good work in extra-sensory perception. He says that extra-sensory perception in the form of clairvoyance and telepathy is an actual and demonstrable occurrence. It is not a sensory phenomenon.⁶

KEVALA : According to the Jāinas the soul, in its pure form is pure consciousness and knowledge. It is omniscient. But it is obscured by the karmas as the moon or the sun is liable to be obscured by the veil of dust, fog or a patch of cloud.⁷ When such a veil of karma is removed omniscience dawns. That is *kevala jñāna*. That is a stage of perfect knowledge and a stage of *kaivalya*.

Omniscience intuits all substances with all their modes.⁸ Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. It is knowledge of all substances and modes of the past, present and the future, all in one. It is lasting and eternal. It is transcendental and pure. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and the real nature of the soul.

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi on Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 25.

2. *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* by Nathmal TATIA, p. 68.

3. *Riddle of Life* by William McDUGALL, p. 235.

4. *Philosophy*, October 1950.

5. *Thirty Years of Psychical Research* by RICHT, pp. 23-24.

6. *Extra-sensory Perception* by RHINE, p. 222.

7. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*, 1, 15 and commentary.

8. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, 130, with Essays also *Āvalyaka Niryukti*, 77.

when the obstructive veils of *Karima* are removed.¹ This omniscience is coexistent with the supreme state 'of absolute clarity of life monad'. This is precisely the release.² No longer is the monad dimmed with the beclouding passions but open and free and unlimited by the particularising qualities that constitute individuality'. The moment the limitation that makes particular experience possible is eliminated perfect intuition of every thing is attained. The need of the experience is dissolved in infinite—this is the positive meaning of *kaivalya*.³ Zimmer says that one is reminded of the protest of the modern French poet and philosopher Paul Valery in his novel *Monsieur Teste*. 'There are people', he writes, 'who feel that the organs of sense are cutting them off from reality and essence ... knowledge, a cloud obscuring the essence of being; the shining moon, like darkness or a cataract on the eye! Take it all away so that modern theory of knowledge from which it arises, is remarkably close to the old idea which Jainism holds: that of the limiting force of our various faculties of human understanding.

Mīmāṃsakas are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence. The Mīmāṃsakas raised a series of logical objections to the possibility of omniscience. According to the Mīmāṃsakas omniscience cannot mean the knowledge of all the objects of the world either at the same time or successively. Nor can omniscience be knowledge of archetypal forms and not of particular things. There can be no omniscience because knowledge of the past, the present and the future can never be exhausted. Moreover, if all objects were known in omniscience at one moment, then the next moment it would be unconscience and blank. The omniscient gain would be tainted by the desire and aversions of others in knowing them.

But Jainas refute the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the problem of the occurrence of omniscience. In the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* we get the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā arguments against the occurrence of omniscience. Similarly Mīmāṃsakas have been

1. *Philosophies of India*, ZIMMER, p. 251

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* I 1, 15 and commentary.

replied by Prabhācandra in *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*. The Jains say that it is not correct to deny the occurrence as the Mīmāṃsakas do. Omniscience is the single intuition of the whole world because it does not depend upon the sense organs and the mind. The pure intuition of the omniscient self knows all the objects simultaneously by a single stroke of intuition since it transcends the limits of time and space. Prabhācandra says that the Mīmāṃsaka objection that the omniscient soul would be unconscious the next moment of the occurrence of omniscience is not correct, because it is a single unending intuition. For the omniscient, cognition and the world are not destroyed the moment the omniscience is possible. Similarly, the Jains contend, as against the Mīmāṃsakas, that the omniscient soul knows the past as existing in the past and future as existing in the future.¹ The omniscient self is absolutely free from the bondage of physical existence as past, present and future. In fact, the Mīmāṃsakas also admit that in recognition we apprehend the past as well the present in one cognition, and a flash of intuition called *pratibhā jñāna* in empirical life can apprehend future as future. It is therefore possible for the omniscient soul who is entirely free from the fetters of Karma to have a super-sensuous vision of the whole world, past, present and future by a single unending flash of intuition. In the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience is logically proved by the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge.² There are degrees of excellence in knowledge and the knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere. That is the stage of omniscience when the obscuring Karmas are totally annihilated.

The *Nandī Sūtra* mentions two types: i) Bhavastha, omniscience of the liberated who still live in this world as for instance the omniscience of the Tirthankaras. ii) Omniscience of the one who is totally liberated which may be called Siddha. The Bhava-

1. *Philosophers of India* by ZIMMER, Edited by Joseph CAMPBELL. Part III, p. 261.

2. *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa* p. 67.

3. *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa* p. 67.

4. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* I, IXVI and commentary.

stha omniscience is again of two types as i) Sayogi and ii) Ayogi. There are sub-divisions in both these. Similarly Siddha omniscience is of two types as i) Anantara-kevala and ii) Paramparā-kevala, each having its sub-divisions.¹

The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyāya view of the divine knowledge,² and the Yoga theory of divine perception.³ Divine knowledge is all-embracing intuition. It is perceptual in character as it is direct and as it is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the past, the present and the future in one eternal 'now'. The soul, according to the Jaina, is itself divine and perfect and there is no other transcendental being than the individual soul. Each soul is a God by itself although it is obscured by the Karmic veil in its empirical state. The Kaivalya state of the individual soul may be compared to the divine omniscience. However, the Naiyāyikas and Pratañjali accept that man has sometimes the flash of the intuition of the future, and he can attain omniscience by constant meditation and the practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that the removal of obscuring karmas by meditation, three-fold path and self-control, the individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of Kaivalya. That is the finality and the end. But others like the Naiyāyikas posit a divine omniscience which is higher, natural and eternal.

It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigation which psychology and empirical science follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists especially with the introduction of Psychical Research for analysing extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all-embracing intuition.

1. *Nandi Sūtra Gāthā* XIX, 19-23 and discussion.

2. *Nyāya Mañjarī*, p. 200.

3. *Yoga-Sūtra* I, 24.

THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

I. "O Gautama, just as a sprout has a seed for its *hetu*, as there is a *hetu* for happiness and misery; since it is a *kārya*. That *hetu* is the *karman*." We find in this life persons, having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. Misery comes in unequal ways. This difference cannot be without any *hetu* which is not seen. This very unseen *hetu* is *karman*.² Misery, in this life, is too much of a fact to be ignored. It is also true that there is abundant inequality in the status and experiences of individual men, which is inexplicable by our empirical methods of enquiry. Good men suffer and the evil prosper like the green banyan trees. It is necessary to explain this provident inequality in the status and development of individuals.

Attempts have been made to refer this inequality to man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree. Others have denied the existence of evil and the consequent inequality; still others would like us to think of this world as training ground for perfection. But life is not a pleasure garden and God a sort of a Santa Claus whose main duty is to please his creatures. It is necessary to find a solution on the basis of autonomous nature of man and his responsibility to shape his own destiny. The Indian thought has found it in the doctrine of Karma.

II. The doctrine of Karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced the life and thought of the people in India. It has become the 'logical prius of all Indian thought.'³ It is the basal presupposition of Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism (of course with minor differences). As man sows, so does he reap: our actions have their effects. These effects cannot be destroyed. They have to be experienced and exhausted. If we cannot exhaust the effects of our actions in this life, we have to complete the cycle of births and deaths to earn

1. *Vijñānavaiyakabhāṣya : Gaṇadharavāda* 1611-42 and commentary.

2. *Ibid.*

3. CARR (Sidney): *Living Religions of the East*, p. 31.

the fruit for all that we have done. No man inherits the good or evil of another man. The doctrine of Karma is, thus, closely associated with the transmigration of souls. Every evil deed must be expiated, and every good deed must receive its reward. If it is not possible to reap the fruits in one single empirical existence, it must be experienced on earth in a fresh incarnation. Plato has made a reference to this theory in the *Latos*, perhaps under the influence of orphic mysticism, and refers to 'the tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received from those who are learned in the mysteries.' In Indian thought, the Jains have developed the doctrine of Karma on scientific basis.

Karma etymologically means whatever is done, any activity. It got associated with the after-effects of actions, both physical and psychical. Every Jiva (living being) is constantly active, expressing the activity in the three-fold functions of body, speech and mind. It leaves behind traces of after-effects in the physical and psychic forms. Every action, word or thought produces, besides its visible, invisible and transcendent effects. It produces under certain conditions certain potential energies which forge the visible effects in the form of reward or punishment. As in the case of a bond which continues to operate until, but loses its validity on, the repayment of the capital sum; so does the invisible effect of an action remain in potential form after the visible effect has disappeared. Actions performed in this life would be the causes of future life, and the present life is the result of actions performed in the previous life. So is the chain of life connected in the series of actions and their effects realised. The Karma doctrine involves the idea of an eternal metempsychosis.¹ Kerl Potter in his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* has tried to interpret Karma as a form of habit. Human being faces challenges from many sides which have to be met by birth, social action and by the application of scientific techniques in order to be free from the bondage in life. But the more subtle challenges lie underneath the surface, and 'arise from habits themselves, which continues after the conditions that engender them have been re-

1. *The Laws*, 870.

2. GLASENAPP (Von. H.) *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*; (1942) Preface to the German Edition.

moved, and which engender new habits which in turn must be removed somehow. This round of habits breeding habits is a part of what is called in Sanskrit *samsāra*, the wheel of birth, which is governed by Karma, the habits themselves.¹ Karma is described in the Jaina philosophy as a kind of dirt which accretes to the otherwise pure Jiva by virtue of one's actions. In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the dirt is described as of three kinds. "one may think of these as types of habits"² I have not been able to understand how Potter interprets Karma as a type of habit. One must be steeped in the Indian tradition in order to understand the nature and significance of Karma.

C. J. Jung, while distinguishing, personal and the collective unconscious, hints at the possibility of comparing the archetypes of the collective Unconscious to the Karma in Indian thought. The collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche. The personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residue of ancestral life. The force of Karma works implicitly and determines the nature and development of personality. The Karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the nature of an archetype.³ Although it is possible to say that Karma has essentially a reference to individual differences and hence a personal acquisition, yet each individual has a common heritage which he shares with the community and which shapes his being. The archetypes refer to the common heritage. To this extent they refer to the Karma aspect.

However, Jung was primarily concerned with and interpretations of dreams and fantasies in presenting his theory of the collective unconscious. 'Had he developed the archetypes of the collective unconscious, he would have reached the doctrine of Karma, the store-house of the physical and psychical effects of the past.'⁴

1. *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Prentice Hall) 1963.

2. *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Prentice Hall) 1963; p. 11, p. 13.

3. JUNG (J. C.) : *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* : Personal and collective (or transcendental unconscious) p. 76. Footnote.

4. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. (1941) ; pp. 109, 110.

It is difficult to say when and where the Karma doctrine originated in India. Some have traced the origin of Karma in the principle of Rta. Rta is the cosmic principle. It prevades the whole world, and gods and man must obey it. It is the anticipation of the law of Karma. In the *Rgvedic* hymns the doctrine of Karma is yet in its infancy as Rta. The doctrine does not appear in the old hymns of the *Rgveda*. The Vedic seers were mainly interested in the good of this life, and when death came they went the way of their fathers to the world where Yama, the first to die, ruled. The doctrine must have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time as the determinant factor of creation. Others believed in nature (*svabhāva*) as the prominent factor. There were other theories as well. The Jainas rejected these doctrines and said that even time and *svabhāva* are determined by Karman.¹ Concept of Karma must have existed at least a thousand years before the beginning of the Christian era, and has since become the basis and centre of religious thought.² It is probable that Karma and rebirth must have been pre-Aryan doctrines which were important in the Sramana culture later assimilated in the Brāhmaṇa thought by the time the Upaniṣads were clearly formulated. The Indian view of Karma was doubtless of non-Aryan provenance, and it was a kind of a natural law.³ Transmigration of the soul was perhaps one of the oldest forms in which the belief in the after-life was held. Karma was closely linked with this doctrine. With the gradual emphasis of asceticism under the influence of the Sramana culture, came the awareness of one's responsibility to shape one's personality here and here-after. However, the doctrine has been widely accepted in ancient Indian thought, except for the Cārvāka. In the *Saṁnyāsa Upaniṣad* we are told that the Jīvas are bound by Karma.⁴ A man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad

1. TATIA (N.): *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* (1951) p. 220.

2. GLASENAPP VON. (H.): *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy* Preface to the German Edition.

3. NINISM SMART: *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, (Allen and Unwin) (1964) : p. 163.

4. *Saṁnyāsa Upaniṣad* : II 28 : *Karmanā badhyate jantuḥ*.

5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iii, 2, 13.

deeds;¹ and while thus we live, we fetter ourselves with the effect of our deeds. In the *Mahābhārata*, the emphasis is on the force of Karma. Of the three kinds of Karma, *prārabdha*, *saṃcita* and *āgāmi* mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā*, *āgāmi* and *saṃcita* can be overcome by knowledge. In Buddhism, as there is no substance as soul, what transmigrates is not a person but his Karma. When the series of mental states which constitutes the self resulting from a chain of acts ends, there would still be some acts and their effects which continue; and the *viññāna* projects into the future due to the force of the effects of Karma. The Buddhists distinguish acts accompanied by *āsrava* (impure acts) from pure acts which are not accompanied by *āsrava*. Saṃsāra is the effect of Karma. Our present happiness and misery are the fruit of what we have ourselves done in the past. Operation of Karma can be considered as a principle of moral life, as force limiting and particularising personality and as a principle of conservation of energy in the physical world.¹ But Buddhism maintains that involuntary actions, whether of body, speech and mind, do not constitute Karma, and therefore cannot bring about the results accruing to Karma. It only means that unwilled actions do not modify character.² Karma theory has been expressed in a variety of ways 'from the most extreme realism which regards Karma as a complexity of material particles infecting the soul to the most extreme idealism' where it is a species of newly produced invisible force, in its highest unreal. The Jains give a realistic view of Karma. It has existed from the pre-Buddhistic time. The idea of the pollution of the soul due to Karma has been largely allegorical in other religious philosophies in India, while the Jains 'have adopted it in the real sense of the word' and have worked out into an original system.³ The Jaina conception of Karma must have been completely developed after a thousand years of Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*. The *Sthānāṅga*, *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* and the *Bhagavatisūtra* contain general outline of the

1. YAMAKAMI SOZEN: *Systems of Buddhist Philosophy* (1912) pp. 50-66.

2. *The Aryan Path*: April 1961: *The Buddhist Doctrine of Karma* by Bhaddanta BHIKSHU SANGHAKAKSHITA: p. 152.

3. GLASENAPP, Von, H.: *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy* p. 15.

doctrine, and the details have been worked out in the *Karmagranthas*, *Pañcasanṅgraha* and the *Karmaprakṛti*. In working out the details, there have been two schools of thought: i) Āgamikas and ii) Karmagranthikas.

Jainism is, in a sense, dualistic. The universe is constituted of the two fundamental categories: *jīva* (living) and *ajīva* (non-living). Soul (*jīva*) has been described from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the pure and ultimate point of view, *jīva* is pure and perfect. It is characterised by *upayoga* the harmonic energy. It is simple and without parts. It is immaterial and formless.¹ It is characterised by *cetanā*. It is pure consciousness. From the phenomenal point of view *jīva* is described as possessing four *prāṇas*. It is the lord (*prabhu*), limited to his body (*dehamātra*), still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with Karma.² The *jīva* comes in contact with the external world, *Ajīva*. The *jīva* is active, and the activity is expressed in threefold forms—the bodily, in speech and mental. This is called *yoga*. Yoga brings its after-effects in the form of Karmic particles which veil the pure nature of the soul. The souls are contaminated by the Karma which is a foreign element, and are involved in the wheel of *saṃsāra*. This contamination is beginningless, though it has an end. It is difficult to say how and when souls got involved in the wheel of *saṃsāra*. Caught in the wheel of *saṃsāra* the soul forgets its real nature and the efforts to search for the truth are obscured by the passions. The inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization is also obstructed by the veil of Karma.³ It is subjected to the forces of Karma which express themselves first through feelings and emotions, and secondly, in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter invisible to the eye and the instruments of science. It is then embodied and is affected by the environment, physical and social and spiritual. We, thus, get various types of soul existence.

Karma, according to the Jainas, is material nature. It is matter in a subtle form and it is a substantive force. It is

1. *Dravyasāṅgraha*, 2

2. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, 6. 1.

3. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, 6. 1.

constituted of finer particles of matter. The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills the universe. It has the special property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. By its activity due to the contact with the physical world, the soul becomes penetrated with the particles of Karmic body (*karma śarīra*) which is constantly attached to the soul till it succeeds to be free from it. 'Nowhere has the physical nature of Karma been asserted with such stress as in Jainism.'¹ A moral fact produces a psycho-physical quality, a real and not merely a symbolic mark, affecting the soul in its physical nature. This point of view has been worked in detail in the form of mathematical calculations, in the *Karmagrantha*.

The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects : i) the physical aspect (*dravya-karman*) and ii) the psychic aspect (*bhāva-karman*). The physical aspect comprises the particles of Karma (*karma-pudgala*) accruing into the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states and events arising out of the activity of mind, body and speech. They are like the mental traces of the actions, as we experience the mnemonic traces long after the conscious states experienced vanish. The physical and the psychic Karma are mutually related to each other as cause and effect.² The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of Karma is psychologically significant, as it presents the interaction of the bodily and the mental due to the incessant activity of the soul.

This bondage of the soul to *karman* is of four types, according to nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga* or *rasa*) and quantity (*pradeśa*).³

Karma can be distinguished into eight types : 1) *Jñānāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures right knowledge; 2) *darśanāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures right intuition; 3) *vedanīya*, arousing affective states like feelings and emotions; 4) *mohanīya*, that which deludes right faith; 5) *āyur-karman*, determining the age of the

1. GLÄSENAPP, Von, (H): *The doctrine of karma in Jaina philosophy*. Foreword by ZIMMERMAN.

2. *Aṣṭasahasrī* (N. S. Press, Bombay 1915) : p. 51, *anyonyakāryakāraṇabhāvajñāpanāśritatvāt*.

3. *Karma grantha*, 3.2.

individual; 6) *nāma-karman*, which produces various circumstances collectively making up an individual existence, like the body and other special qualities of individuality; 7) *gotra-karman*, which determines the family, social standing, etc. of the individual; and 8) *antarāya-karman* which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and prevents the doing of good actions.

Each kind of Karma has its limits in time within which it must exhaust itself. The accumulated Karma brings a transcendental hue or halo to the soul which is called *leśyā*. There are six *Leśyās*. These *Leśyās* have predominantly a moral resultant.

Karma is substantive force. It has the property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The Karmic particles build up a special body which is called *karma-śarīra* which does not leave the soul till its emancipation. Karma has its psychic effects also. *Bhāva-karma* is immediate to the Jīvas, while *Dravya-karman* belongs to the body. Five classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. On account of the rise (*udaya*), suppression (*upaśama*), annihilation (*kṣaya*), suppression and annihilation (*kṣayopaśama*) and psychological effect (*paripāma*), the soul has five conditions of thought and existence.¹ In the usual course of things, Karma takes effect and produces results. The soul is said to be in *audayika* state. Karma may be prevented from its operation for sometime. In this state it is still present, like fire covered by ashes. The soul is in the *upaśāmi* state. When Karma is annihilated, it is in a *kṣayika* state. The fourth state is the mixed state. The last, unconditioned, state leads to *mokṣa*.

The aim is to seek freedom from the miseries of this life, to seek deliverance. But the path to *Mokṣa* is long and endless. We have to free ourselves from the Karma that has already been accumulated and to see that no new Karma is added. The soul gets bound by the constant flow of Karma. This is called *bandha*. Mental states, like passion, attachment and aversion, which prepare the ground for the binding of the soul by Karma are called psychic bondage (*bhāva-bandha*); and the actual binding by the particles of Karma is called *dravya-bandha*. When passions overcome us, the particles get glued to our souls and bind them, just

1. *Pañcāśikāśāstra*, 62.

as a heated iron ball when immersed in water, absorbs water. But the first step to the realization of the self is to see that all channels through which Karma has been flowing have been stopped so that no additional Karma can accumulate. This is *saṁvara*. There are two kinds of *Saṁvara* : *bhāva-saṁvara* which is concerned with mental life, and *dravya-saṁvara* which refers to the removal of Karmic particles. This is possible by self-control and freedom from attachment. The practice of vows (*vrata*), carefulness (*saṁiti*), self-control (*guṇti*), observance of ten kinds of *dharma*, reflection (*anupreksā*) and removing the various obstacles like hunger and thirst and passion, will stop the inflow of Karma and protect us from the impurities of fresh Karma. Here, right conduct (*cāritra*) is of help.

The next important task is to remove the Karma that has already accumulated. The destruction of Karma is called *nirjarā*. *Nirjarā* is of two types : *bhāva-nirjarā* and *dravya-nirjarā*. The Karma may exhaust itself in its natural course when the fruits of Karma are completely exhausted. This is called *avipāka* or *akāma nirjarā*, where no efforts would be required on one's part. The remaining Karma has to be removed by means of penance. This is *vipāka-nirjarā*. The soul is like a mirror which looks dim when the dust of Karma is deposited on its surface. When the Karma is removed by *Nirjarā*, the soul shines in its pure and transcendent form. It then attains the goal of Mokṣa. The Ghāti Karmas are first removed. Still, the Aghāti Karmas, like *āyus*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *vedanīya* have to disappear. Last of all is the final *ayogi* state of *kevala*.

The influx of Karma affects the soul and brings bondage. The soul's activity (*yoga*) is due to its inherent energy (*vīrya*). The infinite energy of the soul gets imperfect expression by which Karma accumulates and affects the soul; and this imperfect expression of energy is responsible for the various processes of the Karmic matter.

Karmic matter undergoes various processes due to the different types of activity. The *Pañcasanigraha* describes eight processes of expression of energy (*karma*) in its limited form. These processes lead to corresponding Karmic processes. The soul activates

Karmic matter at every moment of its worldly existence and assimilates it with different types of Karma which express themselves in due course and bring the disabilities and defilement of the soul.

The influx of Karma (*āśrava*) into the soul and the consequent bondage involve certain processes like i) transformation (*saṁkramaṇa*) of one type of Karma into that of another, ii) endurance of Karma for a certain time (*sattā*), iii) endurance without producing the effect (*abādhā*) and iv) coming into effect (*udaya*). Transformation is a process by which the soul transforms the nature, duration, intensity and extensity of Karma into those of another.¹ This transformation is generally restricted to the change of one sub-type of Karma to another sub-type of the same kind. For instance, in the Vedanīya Karma, soul can transform the Karma producing pain (*asātā vedanīya*) into that producing pleasure (*sātāvedanīya*). In the Jñānāvareṇīya Karma it can transform *cakṣu-darśana* into *acakṣu-darśana*. A person having right intuition (*śamyag-darśana*) can either transform the karma leading to perversity (*mithyātva*) to that leading to partially right and wrong intuition (*śamyagmīthyātva*).² But we are told any Karma cannot be transformed into any other. One cannot transform Karma obscuring intuitive experience (*darśana moha*) with the Karma obstructing conduct (*cāritra-moha*) into that of any Karma (determining life duration). This explanation is scientifically plausible and logically acceptable. We find that electrical energy can be transformed into heat or light energy. Transformation of one Karma into another requires energy and this energy is determined by the degree of the purity of the soul. A person having perversity of attitude (*mīthyātva*) cannot convert, cannot change the *mīthyātva-karman* into the mixed or *śamyaktva*, because the person with wrong belief is not pure and not capable of such transformation. Conversely, a person with right belief (*śamyaktva*) cannot easily transform the Karma to any of the pure forms.

1. *Karma Prakṛti : Bondhanākaraṇa*. — *Saṁkramyante 'nyakarmarūpatayā vyavasthitāḥ prakṛti-śhīty-anubhāga-pradeśā anyakarmarūpatayā vyavasthitāpyante yena tat saṁkramaṇam*.

2. *Ibid.*

Transformation of Karma may also affect increase (*udvarāṇa*), decrease (*apavartana*), duration (*sthiti*) and intensity of the function (*anubhāga*) of Karma.¹ The Jainas have worked out a scientific and detailed analysis of these processes with a view to explaining the process of the operation of Karma.

Karma may be made to express its effect prematurely. By this process the souls attract back the Karmic particles which are to fructify later. Karma is made to realize its effect prematurely. Through gradual subsidence and destruction of Karma, the soul reaches the state of perfection wherein all the Karmas are removed and no additional Karma accumulates. The inherent energy of the soul gets perfect expression. It is possible that one who is free from energy-obstructing Karma may still continue to act in this world. The enlightened one is perfect. He may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But his is a purely detached activity and therefore free from any contamination leading to the colouration of the soul (*leśyā*).

III. The analysis of Karma and the involvement of Jiva in the wheel of Samsāra due to the impact of Karma on it raises a more fundamental question as to how the soul which is immaterial and simple is affected by the material Karma. Some seem to think that such a contact between contradictory entities is logically difficult to accept. But souls are imperfect because the particles of Karma which are foreign to the nature of the soul enter into the soul and cause great changes in it. The Karmic matter produces in the soul certain conditions even as a medical pill given to an individual produces manifold physical and psychic effects.² In the state of bondage the soul is infected with a kind of susceptibility to come into contact with matter. This susceptibility finds expression in the affective states. Through the Yoga (*kāya-vān-manah-karma yogaḥ*) the soul puts into motion the material substrata of its activity, and fine particles of matter are drawn to unite themselves to become Karma, and enter into union with the Jiva. This mixing up is more intimate than milk and water, than between fire and iron

1. *Karmaprajñā : Bandhanakarṇa* :— Cf. *Saṅkramagān, vādbhedav-
-voddhārtanāpavartane, te ca karmapāṇi sthityanubhāgāśraye.*

2. *Karmagrantha* : II.-68 b.; *Tattvārthasūtra* : VIII.25.

ball.¹ The matter once entered into the soul separates itself into a greater number of particles, *karma-prakṛti*, with varying effects. Their number and character are determined by the conduct of Jīva. If the activity is good, Jīva assimilates good Karma; if it is bad, there is bondage of Karma.

The soul's embodiment in the wheel of Samsāra is an empirical fact; and beginningless nature of this bondage is also a fact, a presupposition as some would like to say. The problem as to how the immaterial soul gets mixed with Karma and is involved in the empirical life has been considered from different points of view. Schools of philosophy have analysed it on the basis of their metaphysical views. For the Buddhist, soul is *nāmarūpa*, psycho-physical in nature. Nescience (*avidyā*) is the seed of worldly existence; and nescience is formless like consciousness, for, according to the Buddhists, the formless can alone affect the formless. The material *rūpa* cannot affect the formless *nāma*. But the Jaina contends that emancipation would not be possible, as the seed for the emancipation would then be within consciousness itself. The Yogācāra school avoids the difficulty by making the physical world unreal. But the Jaina is a realist, and he asserts the reality of the material world. He says that it would be consistent to believe that the material would affect the mental, as consciousness would be affected by intoxicating drugs.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that conditions of bondage belong to the soul, and the unseen potency expressing in merit and demerit belongs to the soul. Passions like anger and greed condition the bondage of the soul. But the Jaina points out that as passions according to them are qualities of the soul, conditioning its bondage, they must be rooted in something material, for conditions of the passions must be distinct from the qualities of the soul.² There is no bondage without the interaction between spirit and matter; and there is no interaction without bondage. According to Jaina, the worldly existence is possible in the relation of identity-cum-difference between the spiritual and the material. The Nyāya

1. GLASENAPP, Von. (H) : *Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*—Introduction.

2. *Prameyakevalamārtanda* of Prabhācandra (1941 Edn p. 243 .

Vaiśeṣika regards merit and demerit as arising out of the activity of the body and mind, though it does accept any form of identity between spirit and matter. The Jaina does not understand this situation. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga presents a duality between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The conscious principle is involved in the evil of the world, though it does not belong to it. The Puruṣa is not really affected by the changes in the world. The spiritual is ever kept aloof from the material, and conditions of worldly existence lie in the nature of Prakṛti. But the Jaina finds this position difficult to accept as the worldly existence is a state of bondage and as such presupposes a fall of the principle of consciousness. For the Vedāntin the world is only empirically true, and Karma belongs to the empirical existence and as such an illusion.

The Jaina philosopher bases his stand on experience and avoids absolute conceptions of soul and Karma. He admits concrete relation between the soul and Karma. Soul is affected by the influx of Karma. The change effected in the soul is determined by the nature of the Karmic matter, and the nature of Karma is in turn determined by the passions. Similarly, the nature of passions is determined by the nature of Karma. This is a reciprocal relation affecting the soul and matter. In this conception, the distinction between the material Karma (*dravya-karman*) and psychic Karma (*bhāva-karman*) is very significant. The former is associated with *āvarana*; the latter is associated *doṣa* (defect).¹ Every act brings with it the after-effects in physical and psychic aspects. The physical aspects of the traces is Dravya-Karma; while the psychic traces are the Bhāva Karma. The material Karma and the psychic counterpart are related as cause and effect.² In a passage in the *Karmagrantha*, a question regarding the cause of the Karmic influx has been raised. How is it possible that particular particles of Karmic matter entering the soul can transform themselves into various forms of Karma? And we are told that this is possible through the mysterious power of the soul and through the peculiar quality of matter itself. We find matter of one form is

1. *Aṣṭasahasri* (N. S. Press, Bombay 1915) : pp. 50-51.

2. *Tattvārtha-kāśhī-nārtikā* : (N. S. Press Bombay 1918), p. 447.

transformed into another; water is transformed into clouds and rain again. Why, then, cannot matter of Karma besmearing the Jiva be transformed into different types of Karma? We are then told that all further discussions would not be necessary.¹

The discarding of rational argument, in this connection, is justified, because Jainism does not pretend to have attained this doctrine by human rational means.² It is not through the limited comprehension of an average man that the view has been presented but by revelation or on the authority of a Kevalin.

IV. Karma theory has been found by some to be an inadequate explanation for the prevalent inequalities in life. It is suggested that the theory suffers from serious defects.

1. Karma leads to the damping of the spirit and men suffer the ills of life with helpless equanimity of attitude simply because they get the awareness that it is beyond their power to change the course of their life as it is determined by Karma. Karma leads to fatalism. It does not give any incentive to social service. The general apathy of an Indian towards the natural, social and political evils is mentioned as an example of the impact of Karma on our life. The famous temple of Somnātha was destroyed; and there was no visible resistance because the common man in India was overpowered by the belief that everything that happens is the result of Karma.

But this is more an over-statement of a fact, if not a mis-statement. It is not true to say that the Karma theory does not give any incentive to social service. The *Upaniṣads* enjoin social service. The Jaina ethics is based on service and sacrifice, although on the highest level one has to transcend social morality. The five vows to be observed by an ascetic and the layman (*śrāvaka*) imply the recognition of dignity and equality of life. Schweitzer maintains that the attitude in the ancient Indian thought was that of world and life negation. Still the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact, it was the supreme ethic. The deliverance from reincarnation is possible

1. *Karmāgrantha* : II.78,9.

2. GLASSENAPP, Von. (H) : *Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*. Introduction.

through the purity of conduct, 'and the soul cleanses itself from the besmirching it has suffered and altogether frees itself from it. What is new then, in Jainism is the importance attained by ethics.'—an event full of significance for the thought of India!² And Karma is not a mechanical principle, but a spiritual necessity.³ It is the counterpart in the moral world of the physical law of uniformity.³ Unfortunately the theory of Karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his work.⁴ Still the importance of Karma as after effects of our action and determining the course of life cannot be easily underestimated. Karma has to be looked at as a principle involving explanation of action and reaction. Fatalistic theory of life was presented by Makkhali Gośāla, a contemporary of Mahāvīra. He considered himself a rival of Mahāvīra. He said that happiness and misery are measured to one as it were in bushels. The duration of life and the transmigration of souls have their fixed forms. No human effort can change them. Mahāvīra and the Buddha opposed Gośāla most vigorously.

2. It is also said that the Karma theory is inconsistent with individual freedom of the will. It does not guarantee true freedom to the individual which is essential to his moral progress.⁵ Karma works as the inexorable law of causation, in its essentially mechanical way. And in the background of caste system, the boon of individual inequality becomes a curse; 'if Karma had not to work with caste, a *varṇāśrama-dharma*, a wrong idea of the self and transmigration, we might reconcile Karma with freedom. But as it is, it is not possible. The theory in entirety cannot escape the charge of 'determinism' from the point of view of higher morality.⁶ Older Buddhism and Jainism were much concerned to defend self-regulative character of Karma; salvation was essentially through self-reliance: and there was fear of the antinomian

1. SCHWEITZER : *Indian Thought and its Development*, pp. 82-83.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Hindu View of Life*, p. 73.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 224.

4. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Hindu View of Life*, p. 76.

5. PAUL (C. S.) *The Suffering God* (1932), p. 60.

6. PAUL (C. S.) : *The Suffering God*, (1932) p. 60.

tendencies of the notion of reliance on others (e.g. the Lord).¹ The answer to the charge of fatalism was that by our own efforts we can annihilate the existing Karma and neutralise its effects.

But it is difficult to determine the nature of this objection. We are told that from the point of view of higher morality Karma theory cannot escape the charge of determinism. Yet, the objection is determined by and based on the individual's status in a particular caste. It is more a sting against caste system than a criticism of Karma theory. The objector appears to confuse the essential from the accidental. It is a fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi. Caste system is a sociological problem, and it is not essential for understanding the nature and operation of Karma. In fact determinism is, here, interpreted in a narrow sense as a mechanical operation of Karma to produce its effects, as does the law of gravitation. The present condition and nature of an individual is determined by the past Karma, yet the individual is free to act in such a way as to mould his own future by reducing or destroying the existing Karma. The present is determined, but 'the future is only conditioned'.² In general, the principle of Karma reckons with the material in the context in which each individual is born.³ But the spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his own nature.⁴ There is room for the lowliest of men even of animals to rise higher and purify his self. Attempts were made to reconcile the law of Karma with freedom of man. Karma is compared to a fire which we can, by our effort, fan into a flame or modify it. Human effort can modify Karma. For the Jaina, such a saving of the soul is possible by one's own efforts. Grace of God has no place in Jaina ethics. Self-effort in the direction of purification of the soul is the one way towards perfection. A thief, for instance, undermines his own character and being every time he commits theft. No amount of prayer and worship will erase the effect that has been accumulated, although it may create a mental atmosphere for eliminating such future possibilities. Jainas have, therefore, given a detailed theory of conduct distinguishing it

1. SMART NINIAN : *Doctrines and Argument in Indian Philosophy* p 164.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Hindu View of Life*, 75.

3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

into two grades as that of the *muni*, an ascetic, and of a *śrāvaka*, a householder.

3. It has been objected that the Karma theory connects actions and its consequences in a rather mechanical way. In its mechanical aspect, it mistakes the means for the end. In this, it is presumed that repentance is the end and paying the due penalty is only a means. It is said that Karma theory overemphasises the retributive aspect of punishment.

But, here again, we find a confusion between ends and means. Repentance has its place in life, but it is not the end to be achieved. Repentance does purify the mind and has the effect of a catharsis. This would be a means for the future development of an individual. Even as a means it is not all. The Jaina theory of Karma emphasises that by individual efforts at moral and spiritual development we can reduce the intensity of Karma, suppress its effects or even annihilate. We have seen that one can, by suitable efforts, transform the energy of one form of Karma into that of another,¹ as we can transform electrical energy into that of heat or light. Repentance is not to be taken as the final end. It only creates an atmosphere for moral efforts towards self-realization. It is at best a powerful psychological means which would help us in the attainment of spiritual perfection. If repentance were sufficient to lead to purification, the after-effects of past action cannot be accounted for, nor can they be explained away, as that would be contrary to the laws of physical and moral nature.

4. Karma doctrine implies that sin is a finite offence that can be made good by private temporary punishment. It presupposes that we can make good our sin which is entirely beyond our power.

It is also said that the dominant impression that one gets of the Karma doctrine is that the individual is in the grip of power, which, heedless of his own wishes, is working out a burden of an immemorial past.²

Pringle-pattison shows that the whole emphasis of the Karma theory is on retribution. There is nothing redemptive in its

1. *Karma Grantha*, II.

2. SIGFRID ESTBORN : *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, (1858) p. 68.

operation, and the process becomes an endless one, leading to no goal of ultimate release. He quotes Deussen and says that expiation involves further action which in turn involves expiation, and thus the process is endless. The clock work of requital, in running down, always winds itself up again, and so in perpetuity.¹ Accumulation of merit may ease a future life, but it would not suffice to effect a release from the wheel of life. Even when a new world follows after the deluge in the cycle of worlds, it does not start with a clean balance-sheet, as the operation of will proceeds from the point where it was suspended.² Karma only perpetuates the curse of existence.³ So, the Karma doctrine 'seems open to the criticism to which the vindictive theory of punishment has been subjected in modern times'.⁴ To conceive this universe as primarily a place for doling out punishment is to degrade it to the level of a glorified police-court.⁵

The dominant note in the objection is that to make good our sin is beyond our power and the emphasis on the retributive element in the doctrine of Karma makes this world frightful and miserable, 'as a glorified police-court'. But this is far from truth. It is not beyond our power, as we said earlier, to improve our states of existence. The Jainas have shown that self-effort can shape the future. The present is with us and the future is in our hands.

Retributive theory is a more consistent theory of action and reaction and not merely of punishment, than Reformatory theory. Man gets what he merits to get, and to withhold it would be injustice to him, unless he makes his own efforts to modify the effects of his actions. Reformatory theory may be full of noble and soft sentiments, it may be comforting to be told that by the grace of God, we would be better. But that destroys the individuality and dignity of an individual and he would become a tool in the hands of a Higher Power or his agent in this world. We refuse to be treated as things. Moreover, it is good to tell men, though it

1. A SETH FRINGLE-PATTISON : *The Idea of Immortality*, (1922) p. 115.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, p. 119.

5. Ibid, p. 120.

is unpleasant to do so, that they are alone responsible for their present state. To put the responsibility on the individual is hard truth. And Radhakrishnan says that Karma is not so much a principle of retribution as one of continuity.¹

5. Some have said that the doctrine of Karma leads to unbridled individualism. It fails to see that we all belong to a community; that there is what is called 'joint Karma', corporate sin or guilt. It allows the fortunate ones to boast of their 'self-merited happiness'.² Explanation for the inequality is referred to the 'vicarious suffering'. The ethical justice is to be found in the crucifixion of Christ; and the Cross is a symbol of taking over the sufferings of men upon oneself so as to lighten the sufferings of men.

But according to the Jainas, as also in other Indian thought, except in the Cārvāka, self-realization is to be attained through a moral effect which is essentially social in its content. We have seen that the Jaina ethics is essentially social in its significance. Mokṣa is to be attained through the practice of goodness, charity, compassion and humility, although the Mokṣa is attained by one who practises the virtues and the three-fold noble path. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that Karma theory awakens a man to his responsibilities to himself and to others, and does not make him isolated and self-centred.

We may also add that Karma does not imply a hedonistic outlook on life. Reward for pleasure is not a life of pleasure nor is the punishment for sin, pain. The theory is not to be confused with hedonistic or a judicial theory of rewards and punishments.³ Pleasure and pain are determinants of animal experience, but for human life the end to be attained is nothing short of perfection. His efforts are to be directed to the attainment of this highest end. The universe is, in the words of Tennyson, 'a vale of soul-making' and not a pleasure garden.

V. Therefore, the Karma theory is an explanation of the moral justice in the universe. It is the conception of an all

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Idealist View of Life*, (1961) p. 218.

2. SIGFRID ESTHÖRN, : *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, (1958), p. 70.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Idealist View of Life*, p. 219.

controlling law of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul. It 'satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of unmerited suffering.'¹ For the modern European varieties of Karma theory, 'It is not the mechanical idea of an identical soul-substance passing from body to body, but the mystical idea of suffering with and for others', that forms the real attraction of the doctrine. And perhaps that may be the true explanation of its ascendancy in the East as well.²

Judged by the historic standards, the Karma theory did much to raise man's status and to wean him from coaxing gods through sacrifice and prayer. It insisted on individual expiation, and emphasised the moral continuity of life here and hereafter.³

Karma is in fact a striking answer to the 'fathomless injustice to the nature of things' and it appeals 'to the overpowering sense of the necessity of justice.' 'The conception of an all controlling law of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul, both satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of seemingly unmerited suffering.'⁴

Having discussed the arguments and counter arguments of the logical justification of the doctrine of Karma, we may say that, from the real point of view (*niscaya-naya*) logical justification of the doctrine is not possible nor necessary. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers. We must accept it as authority. When the ascetic, named Kāladevala, saw the newborn Siddhārtha Gautama he was at once delighted and sad, delighted because he saw the vision of Siddhārtha as one to be the Buddha, and sad because he saw that he would not live to see that glorious day. This need not be taken as mere fable. It has a great significance in presenting the experience of a seer. The story is told of Pythagoras remonstrating with a man who was beating a dog, because in the howling of the animal he recognised the voice of a departed friend. The spice of malice in this anecdote is perhaps misplaced. And, "Oh, Agnibhūti, Karma is *pratyakṣa*

1. A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON : *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 122.

2. PAUL C. S. : *The Suffering God* (1929), p. 67.

3. HOLMES (EDMOND) : *The Quest of an Ideal*, p. 98, as quoted in *The Idea of Immortality* by SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, p. 120.

4. WARREN (H. C.) : *Buddhism in Translations* (1922) p. 48.

to me, the omniscient being, just as your doubt is *pratyakṣa* to me."¹

VI. We may add here a note on the much discussed doctrine of *Leśyā*.

We have seen that the perfect soul may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But he is detached from all activity and is free from any contamination which leads to the coloration of halo for the soul (*leśya*).

1. According to the Jainas, the soul is a substance distinct from matter. Matter and soul influence each other, yet are quite distinct from one another. The soul is a spiritual monad. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is characterised by *upayoga* and is formless. *Upayoga* is the hormic force. But the purity of the soul is defined by the influx of *karma*. It gets entangled in the wheel of *Samśāra* and embodied through the operation of Karma. This entanglement is beginningless, though it has an end. It is subjected to the forces of Karma through feelings, emotions and activity (*yoga*). The soul is associated with Karma and forms a subtle body called the *karma-śarīra* comparable to the *līnga-śarīra* of the Sāṃkhya school. The immediate presence of the Karmic matter in the soul throws a reflection, as it were, on the soul, as a coloured flower does in a mirror or a crystal.² The subtle Karmic matter is invisible to the eye and to the instruments of Science. The influx of Karma effects the soul in various forms and produces certain type of 'aura' or coloration about it. This coloration or halo is the *leśyā*. But this coloration does not affect the soul in its pure nature. The colour of the reflection does not belong to the soul. When the soul becomes free from Karmic matter and reaches the Siddhalood, it becomes free from this foreign element of coloration.

2. *Leśyā* is of two kinds:—*dravya-leśyā* and *bhāva-leśyā*. *Dravya Leśyā* refers to the Karmic material affecting the organism. *Bhāva Leśyā* refers to the psychic conditions affecting the

1. *Vīṣṭāvalyaka Bhāṣya*, Gaṇadhara-vāda, 1611-1612.

2. UPADHYE (A. N.): *Proceedings and Transactions*—7th All India Oriental Conference 1933, pp. 392-395.

organism and thereby radiating the colour, which may be called transcendental coloration. Thus, the effect of Karma in matters affecting the nature of the organism though it cannot be said that *Leśyā* refers to the colour of the body. We are told that the denizens of hell are black in colour. Celestial beings get different colours on the basis of the impact of a different Karma. So is the case with human beings.¹ This distinction may be referred to the racial colours and the innumerable distinctions in the individual shades of colour. *Bhāva Leśyā* refers to the psychic conditions affecting the individual in creating an aura round the organism. The psychic conditions create reflexes, and they, in turn, may give rise, through some form of radiation, to some kinds of coloration round the organism. This may not be ordinarily visible to the eye, but only to persons disciplined in Yoga. Further distinctions are made in *leśyā*. Six types of primary colours are suggested. Three of them refer to evil-minded persons. The remaining are attributed to morally good persons. The six *Leśyās* are : 1) black (*kṛṣṇa*), 2) blue (*nīla*), 3) dove-grey (*kāpota*), 4) yellow (*pīta*), 5) pink (*padma*) and 6) white (*śukla*). For instance, a man who is wicked and cruel gets the black *leśyā*. A man who is affected by anger and envy and who loves pleasure gets the blue *leśyā*. One who is base and dishonest has grey. On the contrary, a well-disciplined man develops the red *leśyā*. One who has subdued the passions has yellow. One who is engrossed in meditation of the Dharma and truth has the white *leśyā*. But the fully liberated souls have no *leśyā* at all.² The ethical or moral significance of this doctrine has been emphasized in this distinction. The *Leśyās* are treated as an index of temperament and character. *Leśyās* have a moral bearing.³ The Jains give the example of six travellers in the forest. They see a tree full of fruits. The man with a black *Leśyā* intends to uproot the tree; that with a blue, to cut the trunk; that with a grey, to cut the branches; that with a yellow, to take the twigs only; the man with the pink *Leśyā*

1. *Gommaṣasāra* : *Jiva Kāṇḍa*, XV, also *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, Chap. XXXIV.

2. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, Lect. XXXIV, SBE Vol. II, Footnote.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. (1941), p. 320, Footnote.

intends to pluck the fruits, while the one who has a pure white Leśyā is content to take whatever fruits have fallen on the ground.¹

There are degrees of expression of Leśyā in terms of time and intensity. We are told that in the case of black Leśyā the duration varies from half a *muhūrta* to thirty-three *sāgaropamas*. The effect of the blue Leśyā varies from half a *Muhūrta* to ten *Sāgaropamas* plus one *Palyopama* and a part of an *asankhyeya*. So is the variation in the duration of other Leśyās.² The Jains have given a fabulous mathematical calculation of the effects and the generation of Leśyā.³ I think they were fond of such arithmetical formulations.

3. There has been a controversy regarding the antiquity and the nature of Leśyā. Leumann found a resemblance between the six Leśyās and Gosāla's division of mankind into six classes.⁴ Jacobi was perplexed by the resemblance and thought it difficult to bring the Leśyā doctrine into harmony 'with the rest of their creed'.⁵

However, as Dr. Upadhye points out, these early scholars on Jainism were misled by their supposition that the Leśyās represent the colours of the soul. Tradition never says that the soul itself has colour.⁶ Colour and sense qualities are associated with Karmic matter flowing into the soul. Karma is a subtle type of matter and the soul has a subtle body known as the *karma-śarīra*.⁷ We have seen that the immediate impact of Karma throws a reflection on the soul, as a coloured flower does on crystal. The colour does not form part of the crystal; so Leśyā is not part of the soul. It may also be noted that the liberated soul is free from Karmic matter and also from any form of Leśyās. Thus, the conception of Leśyā is closely associated with the Karma theory.

1. *Gommaṣasāra . Jivakāṇḍa*, Chap. XV, pp. 507-509.

2. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, Lect. XXXIV.

3. *Gommaṣasāra . Jivakāṇḍa*, XV, and *Karmakāṇḍa* II, 503-505.

4. S. B. E. Vol. XLV, Introduction, pp. XXX.

5. *Ibid.*

6. UPADHYE, (A. N.), *Proceedings and Transactions—7th All India Conference* (1933), pp. 393-397.

7. *Pravacanasāra* (i) 55-56, (ii) 40.

In Buddhism too, Karma is classified according to colours : 1) black, 2) white, 3) black and white, and 4) not black and not white.¹ The same classification was adopted in the Yoga school. But these systems do not accept the material nature of Karma. Therefore, DASGUPTA suggests that the idea of the black and white Karma in the Yoga philosophy was probably suggested by the Jaina view.²

4. The problem of interpreting the *Leśyā* theory in terms of modern psychology, especially of para-psychology, has been engaging my attention for some time past. The *bhāva-leśyā* has a psychological significance. It is an aura created round the soul due to psychic effects and Yoga. It is dependent on the activity of the mind. The six primary colours are effects of the Karmic influx arising out of the mental states and events. Every psychosis brings some after-effects which are both physical and psychic; it is possible to show, by proper analysis and investigation, that such psychic phenomena exist and are detectable. The effects of psychic states are transformed, through some form of radiation into the 'aura' of colour spreading round the organism, like the halo supposed to surround a prophet. We have heard that the gods and the prophets like Jesus, Mahavira and Buddha, had halo round them. The Jainas have said that the enlightened ones still living in this world get a white halo around them. But those who are liberated are without any *Leśyā* or coloration. They are *aleśyi*. Such aura or coloration may not be visible to the eye, nor detectable by the ordinary instruments of science. But men disciplined in the Yoga and those who have developed an extra-sensory capacity may see it. We may perhaps find some methods pertinent to para-psychology by which we may discover the possibility and existence of such phenomena. It would, therefore, be a problem for the para-psychologist's research.

I have recently read an autobiographical note by LAMA MANGALABJONG RAMPA, who states that he could see, owing to the Yogic discipline he had undergone, the 'aura' of colour round an individual. It varied with individual difference in the mental states at the moment. He once saw blue rays of light emanating from a Chinese delegation which had gone to see the Dalai Lama.

1. *Digha Nikāya* (iii) 20.

2. DASGUPTA - *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I p. 74.

He then appealed to the Dalai Lama not to take the delegation at their word, as they were full of fraud.

It would not, therefore, be a presumption to suggest that the Leśyā phenomena should be investigated by the methods of parapsychology.

I may also point out that some have suggested a resemblance between the Leśyā doctrine and the theosophical view of the transcendental colours in the individual.¹ We may refer here to the theosophical writings of Mrs. Besant.² The Jainas say that the soul is immaterial; consciousness and its states are also immaterial and colourless. Colour is in matter; and matter certainly acts and reacts on the soul by the inflow and bondage (*bandha*) of the Karmic matter due to passions and modifications in the mental states.

1. JAINI (J. L.) - *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 45.

2. *Thoughtforms* by Mrs. BESANT and C. W. LEADBSTER 1905.

CHAPTER VI

THE PATHWAY TO PERFECTION

I. Mokṣa is the ideal of life. Supernormal experiences, like the *yogaja-pratyakṣa*, *ārṣa-jñāna*, and *avadhi, monaḥparyāya* are only incidental. Kevala is symptomatic of the realization of the consummate end of life. Mokṣa is to be realized through self-discipline in the affective, the cognitive and conative sense. *Samyāc-cāritra* is as important as *Samyag-darśana* and *-jñāna*. The way to self-realization is primarily ethical. "If deliverance is to be achieved, the lower matter is to be subdued by the higher spirit. When the soul is free from the weight which keeps it down, it rises to the top of the universe where the liberated dwell. The radical conversion of the inner man is the way to freedom."¹

The Jaiṇas were aware that physical and mental discipline are necessary conditions of moral discipline. Knowledge and faith are preliminary steps on the path of self-realization. Ordinary sources of knowledge are not adequate to comprehend the nature of truth. Reason fails here. Kant showed that categories of understanding are fraught with antinomies. One has to transcend reason and seek the truth in the supernormal forms of experience. Implicit faith in the truth to be sought is necessary. It is the starting point of self-realization. Śaṅkara's prescription of the four qualifications of a student of philosophy, as stated in the commentary on the first Sūtra of the *Vedānta Sūtra*, is very pertinent in the case of those who seek the truth. There are different processes which lead us from faith to the realization of the final end. Meditation (*dhyāna*) is an important factor in this process. One cannot grasp the truth unless one meditates on it; and one cannot realize it unless one grasps it. Meditation on the nature of the Self is the highest form of *Dhyāna*. One reaches the stage of meditation on the self when one is free from passions and is self-controlled. self-control is, in turn, possible through the practice of physical and mental discipline. Thus the ancient Indian philosophers developed a science of

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 325.

self-realisation called Yoga. They have been in general agreement regarding the principles and practice of Yoga. The Yoga prescribed by Patañjali regards moral and physical discipline to be indispensable preliminaries to the spiritual progress. The Jāinas are in agreement with the fundamental principles and practice of this system. Among the Jāina authors Haribhadra gives a comparative study of Yoga in his works. The *Jñānārṇava* of Śubhacandra and the *Yogaśāstra* of Hemacandra are valuable contributions to the study of Yoga as a science of spiritual progress.

II. In ancient India, Yoga was a science of self-realization. The word occurs in *Ṛgveda* meaning 'bringing about connection'. In the *Atharva-veda* it is stated that supernatural powers are attained by the ascetic practices¹. Later it was used in the sense of yoking a horse. The senses have been compared to the unbridled horses and Yoga is the means of controlling the horses². In the Jāina literature, Haribhadra defines Yoga as that which leads one to emancipation³, and the terms *dhyāna* and *saṁādhi* were more in vogue than *yoga*. It is only in the *Yogaśāstra* of Patañjali that we find the proper location of Dhyāna in the whole process called Yoga⁴. However, Patañjali probably did not start the Yoga school, but he must have 'collected the different forms of practices and gleaned the diverse ideas which were and could be associated with Yoga'⁵. Yoga, as we see now, is to be considered as a fully developed science of self-realization.

The *Yogatattva Upaniṣad* mentions four types of Yoga : 1) Hathayoga is one in which the primary aim is to control bodily activities. 2) Mantra-yoga aims at healing the diseased by means of *mantra* or incantations of certain esoteric hymns. It is based on the influence of suggestion as psychological factor. 3) Layayoga is based on the physiological analysis of human organism. The aim is to effect concentration on an image through the Mantras and to be absorbed and lost in them. 4) The last is the Rājayoga. It is Pātañ-

1. *Atharvaveda*.

2. *Kaṭha. Up.* III.4. . *Maitr. Up.* 2.

3. Haribhadra : *Yogavimśikā*

4. TATIA (Nathumal) : *Studies in Jaina philosophy*, p. 262, Footnote.

5. DASGUPTA (S) : *History of Indian Philosophy*; Vol. I, p. 229. .

jala Yoga. Its aim is higher; and it consists in achieving spiritual beatitude, though bodily control is a part of Patañjali's Yoga. According to S. Dasgupta, the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the Śaiva and Śākta schools and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga. 'They grew in another direction as Haṭhayoga through constant practices of nervous exercises and produced mystical and magical feats.' The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra was also great. Jaigīśavya in his *Dharmasāstra* mentions different parts of the body like heart, tip of the nose, palate, forehead and the centre of the brain as centres of memory where concentration can be made.²

Moral discipline is a necessary condition for the practice of Yoga leading to spiritual realization. The purpose of moral discipline is to remove the bondage due to Karma. The Jaina theory of morality is centred round the principle of *ahiṃsā*, non-violence. Patañjali also gives prominence to non-violence in moral discipline. The Jainas have distinguished two levels in the practice of morality : i) for the lay follower (*śrāvaka*), and ii) for the ascetic (*muni*). However, some general principles are embodied in their theory of morality. Five Vratas (vows) are to be practised more rigorously by the Muni but with less rigour by the layman. In the former case they are called Mahāvratas and in the latter Anuvratas. The five vows are : i) *ahiṃsā* (non-violence), ii) *satya*, (truth), iii) *asteya* (non-stealing), iv) *brahmacārya* (celibacy) and v) *aparigraha* (abstinence from personal possessions).³ A number of ways have been prescribed for the observation of the vows. For instance, regulation of movement (*śrīyāsamiti*), and control of thought (*manogupti*) are prescribed for the practice of non-violence. What is important is the cultivation of equanimity and indifference to the things of the world. Friendship (*maitrī*) right understanding (*pramoda*) compassion (*kāruṇya*) and indifference towards evil (*mādhyasthya*) are qualities necessary for moral preparation to be developed by one seeking self-realisation.⁴ This, in brief, is the moral practice as a

1. DASGUPTA (S) : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 229.

2. Vātsāyana : *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III, ii.43.

3. *Rātnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvakācāra*, 49.

4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, VIII.6.

background to self-realization. In the *Yoga Sūtra*, *yama* and *niyama* are the ethical preparations for Yoga. Without this moral training, practice of Yoga will not succeed. *Yama* is negative in value; and *Niyama* gives the code of observances. The five vows mentioned by the Jainas are also given by Patañjali.¹ The *Yama* is universal validity regardless of differences of caste and country, age and condition.² *Niyama* is for self-purification. The observances are austerity (*tapas*), contentment (*saṁtoṣa*), purification (*śauca*) and devotion to God (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*). By practising *Yama* and *Niyama* one develops *vairāgya* or detachment and freedom from desires. It may be noted that surrender to God is not an end in itself. It is only to be means to the attainment of the proper conditions for self realization. In this sense, Patañjali's Yoga is a scientific discipline. The idea of God is a useful hypothesis which gives a focus, a pulley ring as it were, on which the weight of consciousness can be lifted.³ Similarly for Haribhadra, Yoga consists of religious activity so far as it leads one to final emancipation, though there is no place for god in Jainism. Haribhadra gives prominence to five types of practices in Yoga : i) *sthāna* (proper posture) ii) *ūrna* (correct utterance or sound), iii) *artha* (proper understanding) and iv) *ālambana* (concentration of abstract attributes of Tīrthakara.⁴ The first two of these are external activities preparatory to the practice of concentration. The last three are inner activity (*jñāna-Yoga*). Those who have reached the fifth stage of Guṇasthāna (spiritual progress), viz., Deśaviratasaṁnyagdr̥ṣṭi, can practise Yoga. *Sthāna* and *Ūrna* are qualifying conditions for practising *Dhyāna* (concentration)⁵. The *Jñānārṇava* describes the conditions of *Āsana*. A self-controlled man may select a suitable place, like the top of mountain, the bank of a river, etc. for the practice of concentration. Some *āsanas* like *paryāṅka*, *vīra*, *śukha* and *kaṁala* are said to be most suitable. The object of an *āsana* is to enable one to be free from physical discomfort and the consequent mental distraction.⁶ Simi-

1. *Yogasūtra* . II.30.

2. *Yogasūtra* . II.31 as interpreted by RADHAKRISHNAN (S) in *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 353.

3. STOCKER (Geraldine) . *Yoga and Western Psychology*, p. 82.

4. *Yogasāstra* of Haribhadra. 1-2; *Śodāśaka Prakaraṇa*, XIII.4.

5. *Yogasāstra*, 4.

6. *Jñānārṇava* of Subhacandra, XXVIII

larly, *prāṇāyāma* is a preparation for the concentration of mind. Subhacandra, like Patañjali realised the importance of *Prāṇāyāma*. Three forms of *Prāṇāyāma* were suggested : i) *Pūraka*, ii) *Kumbhaka* and iii) *Recaka*.¹ *Pratyāhāra* is given an important place in the stages of Yoga. Here the senses are withdrawn from the external object and fixed on the internal function.² However, the ethical preparation, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, and *pratyāhāra* are only accessories to Yoga and not themselves elements of it.³ In the practice of *Dhyāna*, the first stage is concentration on the image of a Tirthakara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practise concentration on the abstract qualities of a Tirthakara. The practice of Yoga is closely connected with the various stages of spiritual realization (*guṇasthāna*). *Dhyāna* is in its primary stage in the seventh *Guṇasthāna* (*aprumatta-samīyata*). The urge to self-realization leads us to the eighth stage of *Guṇasthāna*, called *Apūrva-karaṇa*; greater self-control and a more definite progress on the path of self-realization are possible in this stage. Steadfastness of concentration gradually develops till one reaches the twelfth stage of *Guṇasthāna*, called *kṣīṇa-moha* in which the passions are altogether subdued. In this stage, the transcendental self is possible to be realized.⁴ We have, here, *anālambana-yoga*. This is the state of omniscience. It is often compared to the *asamprajñāta-samādhi* of Patañjali.⁵ Still, there is a higher stage of self realization. In the fourteenth stage of *Guṇasthāna* called *ayoga-kevali*, all activity is stopped; and the soul attains final emancipation. It is analogous to the *dhurmāmegha* of the Patañjali's system, to the *amṛtātman* of another system and to the *para* of still another.⁶

As one goes ascending in the stages of self-realization and the practice of Yoga, one gradually develops the perspective of truth

1. *Jñānārṇava* of Subhacandra, XXIX,

2. *Jñānārṇava* XXX.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S), *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 357.

4. *Śoḍaśaka Prakaraṇa* of Haribhadra, XV.

5. *Yogavimśikā* of Haribhadra, 20.

6. *Yogavimśikā* of Haribhadra, 11.

(*dr̥ṣṭi*). This gradual development has been classified into eight stages : *mitrā*, *tārā*, *balā*, *dīprā*, *sthīrā*, *kāntā*, *prabhā* and *parā*. The eight *dr̥ṣṭis* are compared to the eight fold stages (*aṣṭāṅga*) of Patañjali's Yoga.¹ As we go higher in the stages of *Dr̥ṣṭi* the perspective of truth becomes clearer; and, finally, in the last stage one reaches the *Samādhi*, the consummation of *Dhyāna*.

Practice of Yoga may be actuated by i) love (*prīti*), ii) reverence (*bhakti*), iii) duty prescribed by scriptures (*āgama*) and iv) no consideration (*asaṅga*). When the spiritual activity is done out of love or reverence, it leads to worldly or other-worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*). If it is done as a duty or with no motive whatever, it leads to final emancipation.²

But Haribhadra is aware of some difficulties in the practice of Yoga and the attainment of supernormal experience. He says that we have to overcome some physical and mental inhibition before practising the Yoga exercises. The mind of the common man (*prthagjanucitta*) is vitiated by many defects. Eight defects have been mentioned : i) inertia (*śheda*), ii) anxiety (*udvega*), iii) unsteadiness (*kṣepa*), iv) distraction (*utthāna*), v) loss of memory (*bhrānti*), vi) attraction for what is not desirable (*anya-mud*), vii) mental disturbance (*ruk*) and viii) attachment (*saṅga*).³

In the practice of Yoga one is likely to acquire some physical and mental powers which are beyond the common man. But these are distractions, and would lead us away from the final goal. The Jains were primarily concerned with the purification of the soul and the development of detachment from the things of the world. They were against the use of paranormal powers and miracles. This was the general view of other Indian philosophers as well. Patañjali mentions the acquisition of such powers by the Yogi and warns him against temptations associated with these powers.⁴ The

1. *Yogadr̥ṣṭisamuccaya* of Haribhadra, 3-9.

2. *Sōḍaśaka Prakaraṇa* of Haribhadra, X.9.

3. *Sōḍaśaka Prakaraṇa* of Haribhadra, XIV.2, 3.

4. *Yogamitra* of Patañjali, Ch. III, 45, 46 and 51. *tadaśīrāgyādapī-
deśabijakṣapa kaivalyam.*

Yoga believes that the *citta* of man is like a millstone. If we put wheat under it, it grinds it into flour; if we put nothing under it, it grinds on until it grinds itself away.¹

In the highest stage omniscience (*kevala*) is attained. This is not merely a negative state of knowledge. In this, one gets experience of everything, past, present and future, as if in a moment. In the highest form of *samādhi*, according to Patañjali, all possibility of confusion between the self and the activity of the *citta* ceases.

Concentration of mind (*dhyāna*) is an essential factor as a means to spiritual realization. The lower self sometimes gets the vision of perfection in its purified state and aims at the attainment of this ideal. On the attainment of prominent vision knowledge the self rises to its own pure state (*paramātma*). Dhyāna is the concentration of thought in a particular object,² for a certain length of time. The duration of concentration depends on the bodily constitution. The maximum time of concentration can be for one *antarmuhūrta* (about fortyeight minutes)³ Dhyāna is further inauspicious (*aprasasta*) and auspicious (*prasasta*). Aprasasta Dhyāna leads to the influx of Karma (*āśrava*) and the bondage of the soul to the wheel of life (*bandha*). The auspicious Karma brings about dissociation and destruction of Karma. Ārtadhyāna and Raudradhyāna are the varieties of evil concentration. Ārtadhyāna is painful concentration, as when we experience the pain in the loss of a loved object or in the anguish of an unsatisfied desire. Raudradhyāna is vengeful concentration as when, smarting under the injury of insult we contemplate on taking revenge.⁴ They express the pain of unsatisfied instinctive urges and are rooted in the animal nature of man. The Jaina analysis of the lower types of Dhyāna has a great psychological importance and need to be studied in the light of recent research in depth of psychology. Dharmadhyāna and Śukladhyāna are conditions of spiritual progress. The nature of revelation, the fact of suffering, the operation of

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) . *Jedion Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 362.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra* . IX, 27, Ekāgra-intānīrodhodhyānam.

3. *Dhyānaśataka* . 2.3. sūtermuhūrtam...

4. *Tattvārthasūtra* . IX, 31-35, with commentary.

Karma and the structure of the universe are objects of Dharmadhyāna. Umāsvāti defines Dharmadhyāna as a collection of scattered thoughts (*smṛtisamavāhār*) for the sake of meditation on the objects of concentration. Jñāna (knowledge), Darśana (intuition) Cāritra (good conduct) and Vairāgya (non-attachment) are needed for developing the steadfastness of mind for attaining concentration¹. A beginner has to select a suitable lonely place and convenient time. Several places made holy by the sages create a better atmosphere for Dharmadhyāna². Dharmadhyāna is possible from the fourth to the seventh stage of Guṇasthāna. As one goes higher up in the spiritual development, one would have developed sufficient physical and mental strength to aim at the final emancipation. The Jaina analysis of right concentration (Dharmadhyāna) is intimately woven in the moral texture in this life. One has to practise the four-fold virtues: *maitrī* (friendship), *pramoda* (appreciation or the merits of others), *karuṇā* (compassion) and *mādhya-sthya* (undisturbed equanimity) as the pre-requisites of this type of concentration.³ And in the graded levels of concentration the consummation is reached when the pure and perfect self is the object of concentration. The same type of concentration is to be reached in Śukladhyāna, except for the fact that in the Śukladhyāna we get perfect concentration.

In the Śukladhyāna the range of the objects of concentration is narrowed to the concentration of the atom, just as poison spread over the body is first collected at a point by a Mantra and then removed by a more powerful Mantra.⁴ For this type of concentration one must have good physique and must be at least in the seventh stage of Guṇasthāna. Four types of Śukladhyāna have been mentioned. In the first two types mind concentrates on the minutest entity like the atom. Then it gets pure and perfect enlightenment, the last two stages lead to final emancipation. The self becomes motionless as a rock and is free from any activity of

1. *Tatta-ārthasūtra* . IX, 31-35, with commentary.

2. *Dhyānaśataka* 39-34.

3. *Jñānārṇava* . XXVII, 4-15.

4. *Dhyānaśataka* . 71-72.

mind, body and speech, as in the stage of highest Samādhi.¹ In the practice of Dhyāna first stage is concentration on the image of Tīrthakara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practise concentration on the abstract qualities of a Tīrthakara. The practice of Yoga is clearly connected with the various stages of spiritual realization. Dhyāna, in its primary stage, is in the seventh Guṇasthāna. Steadfastness and concentration gradually develop till one reaches the twelfth stage of Guṇasthāna. In this stage, the transcendental self is possible to be realized.

The analysis of Dhyāna so far given has a psychological and moral significance. Body and mind have to work together. Physical strength is the precondition of mental concentration. The Jainas have not been negative in this respect. The body is not merely meant to be cast away as something unholy. Self-mortification is not an end in itself, but is only to be understood as a means to an end for the attainment of perfection. Moral life has also to be emphasised as an important means to the attainment of the highest ideal of perfection. The problem has been looked at from different points of view. In this sense, the spirit of Anekānta pervades the analysis of the psychological conditions of perfection as expressed in Dhyāna.

III. Having studied the practice of Yoga as the pathway to perfection in the light of the eightfold principles of Patañjali's Yoga we may add a comparative note on Jaina Yoga and Śivayoga as presented by the Viśiṣṭa philosophers. The object of this study is to present a synoptic picture of the pathway to perfection and to see how the spirit of Anekānta pervades the application of this principle.

As civilization advances, there is a gradual change in the manifestation of thought and action. In the early stages of civilization, life was simple and confined itself to interaction between fewer individuals. The environment was smaller, the material facilities

1. *Dhyānasatoka* 71-72.

were comparatively meagre. Self-expression could be narrowed to the withdrawal of the mind from external. Yoga was an instrument to attain peace of mind. But as we advanced in external developments, life became complex, and men were rooted and absorbed in the overt activities of life. It was difficult for most men to practise physical and mental discipline on a scale possible in the early stages of civilisation, when problems were few and life was simple. New ways to self-realisation had to be adopted, conforming to the social structure and suited to the individual living in complex societies. This gave prominence to the devotional method (*bhakti-yoga*) as a means to the realisation of the self. Revival of *bhakti-mārga* as a means of purification and love, may be for absorption in the highest, is an important step in the development of the self. Bhaktiyoga is implied in the Śivayoga which the Vīraśaiva saints preached. The second principle of Śivayoga is Śakti. Some have suggested that Yoga must have its origin in i) Hiraṇyagarbha and ii) Rudra. The former has a predominantly cognitive orientation and the latter is permeated with cognition and will. Hiraṇyagarbha Yoga is presented in the Pātañjala Yoga and the Rudrayoga is shown in the Śaivāgamas. Where the first ends, the second begins.¹

The ultimate end of a Vīraśaiva is liberation from the bonds of the life. Positively, it is union with the Highest, which may be described as *aikya*. The realization of this end lies in self-surrender and emergence of the self in God. It is *Śivatva*. The end to be attained is not merely to discard, nor to transcend, the life of existence, but to divinise the human and to spiritualize the material.² The way to realise this end is through the spiritualization of the human and devotion to the Highest. It is achieved through a special form of Yoga called Śivayoga.

1. *Vīraśaiva : A Quarterly Journal of All India Vīraśaiva Mahā Sabhā*, Dharwar, Vol. II, No. 7. December 1961. Article by Shree KUMARASWAMY of Navakalyāṇamaṭha, Dharwar.

2. Shree KUMARASWAMY, Navakalyāṇamaṭha, Dharwar, *Vīraśaiva Philosophy and Mysticism* p. 52.

Yoga may be identified with Sādhana. According to different traditions of thought different forms have been recognised. Virāṣaiva philosophers recognise different forms of Yoga and their efficacy in their own way. But Śivayoga has distinct features which make it suitable for the way of self-realization followed on the basis of self-surrender (*śaraṇa*) and devotion (*bhakti*) coupled with the necessary energy of self-realisation (*śakti*). It emphasizes a synthesis of discipline and devotion. The *Kaivalyakalpavallari* of Sarpabhūṣana Śivayogi is a poetic presentation of the four types of Yoga, showing their inherent defects.¹

Hathayoga may enable one to control the bodily and mental functions and make it possible for one to get paranormal powers. It does not lead us to the path of spiritual progress. In his advice to Gorakṣa, Allama ṛabhu exhorts him to give up the acrobatics of physical and mental exercises, which may stupefy human beings but will not lead to the path of spiritual progress. Men practising Hathayoga cannot be convinced of their folly, as a blind man cannot see his image in the mirror.²

The same can be said of those practising Mantrayoga. Those who practise Mantrayoga through the incantations of hymns, like *Om, Oṃ namah śivāya* etc., practise suitable Āśanas and at specific times of the day. But it will lead to mechanical development of certain types of mental habit and not to the final spiritual progress.³ In the Layayoga one practises concentration of mind on an image of a God or any object of concentration by the physiological processes, *idā*, *piṅgalā* and *nāḍī*.⁴ This is a lower form of

1. Sri SARPABHUSANA ŚIVAYOGI : *Kaivalyakalpavallari* III *Yogaprasthana*

2. *Prabhulingolile* of Cāmarasa, edited by BASAVANAL, Gorakṣa-gati, 19—stanza 20. (Kannada) "tannanariyada mandamatigaḷi, ginnu pera ranthattavembudu kannakāyada kuruḍa kannadinidida teranante

3. gati 19—stanza 20, *nohadali māyāprapaṃcina dehasiddhiya paḍeda-nimbī gāhiṇidali vajrapindatarira phaliśidoge ūhīṇvada prālayonu tanḍeh-avillade geluveyo suḍa dehasiddhiyanenutalā prabhu khaṇḍeyava biṣṭa,*

4. *Jñānajyoti* - edited by Shri Sāntalingswamy and Prof. B. C. Javali (1963) p. 24. *Yoga and Sivayoga* (Kannada). Also refer to *Sivayoga pradiṭṭike* of Shri Chenna Sadāśiva Yogīndra with commentary Virāṣaiva-grantha-prakāśikā No. 9 (1913) p. 14.

concentration which is analogous to the Ārtz-dhyāna of the Jainas. But such a type of Yoga and concentration is not useful for developing one's way to self-realization. It is not possible to reach Mokṣa by this method.¹ Allama Prabhu exhorts the hermits in the forests not to be fascinated by such practices of self-mortification.²

Patañjali's Yoga has been considered as Rājayoga. In this self-realization is to be attained, not by the objective use of the mind, but by the suppression of the activities of mind. All mental states and events have to be held up so as to remove the impediments in the way of this end. The eightfold path enunciated by the Patañjali's Yoga gives the methods of attaining the highest end of Samādhi, almost developing the steps into a science of mental control. Still, in the Patañjali's Yoga, as also among the Jainas, though physical health is not the end of human life, it is still one of the essential conditions. It is to be treated as only a means to an end. Even surrender to a spiritual power like God is to be considered as a useful step for concentration, and not an end in itself. The idea of God is a useful hypothesis for Patañjali.⁴

Sivayoga is different from the four types of Yoga so far described, although it contains the essential elements of Rājayoga as a method. The cardinal principles of Sivayoga are :

(i) Belief in the existence of the Supreme Being, God, and the ultimate end of the human life as union with the Highest (Līṅgāṅga-aikya).

ii) Devotion and self-surrender to the Highest as a principal way to this end, *bhakti*, and we may mention *śaraṇa* interpreted as self-surrender.

1. *Kaivalya Kalpavallari* of Sarpaśbhūṣaṇa Sivayoga 12. *Yoga-pratipādana-āthala-pallavi*.

2. *Prabhuṭīṅgaṭīle*—Allama Prabhu, *gati* 20-32 adopted in the prose edition by Prof. B. C. JAVALI and MALLABADI (1962). *Suān, japaṭapa, dhyāna vedādhyaṇaṇa enu maḍidaḍenu? Nūḍa teṇḍu kṛḍahokku phalaṭenu? jīvana haṇihariḇaṇṇu tīḷiyadiddare? suḍali nīmṇa karmava.*"

Also refer to *Sivayoga-darpaṇa* (Kannada) sadḍharṇa Granthamālā 14 (1933) 9-12 pp. 3-5.

3. STOCKER (Geraldine) *Yoga and Western Psychology* . p. 82.

4. Refer to *Prabhuṭīṅgaṭīle* ed. S. S. BĀSAVANAL 1956 . II. pp. 131-136 for detailed description.

iii) *Śakti* (or psychic and spiritual energy) leading the devotee to the final goal. *Śivayoga*, as we mentioned earlier, is a synthesis of the devotional and the conative aspects of human efforts to self-realization.

iv) *Aṣṭāṅgayoga* of Patañjali is also made use of to the extent necessary. The final end is the *aikya sthala*. It is to be realised by the devotee. Physical and mental discipline has to be practised to the extent necessary to reach this goal.

The first principle of *Śivayoga* is belief in the existence of God, and the ultimate end is to be united (*aikya*) with God. In the Patañjali's Yoga, the ultimate end is to free the self (*puruṣa*) from the bonds of *prakṛti* (matter). The idea of God was not an integral part of the Sāṃkhya, and consequently of the Yoga philosophy. Devotion and self-surrender to God is an integral element of *Śivayoga*. But self-surrender need not involve self-sacrifice to the deity even at the cost of self-effacement. The earlier forms of self-surrender did sometimes involve sacrifice of one's body, of one's child etc. The story of Bedar Kannappa shows that such forms of self-surrender were present in the early devotional literature. *Śivayoga* does not admit of such expressions. Allama Prabhu shows the way to Goggayya by pointing out that *prasāda* is the right way and *āhuti* is the wrong way.¹ This attitude emphasizes that non-violence is the fundamental principle of the *Vīraśaiva*s also. In self-surrender there is self-effacement and the elimination of the ego-sense. This is evident in the humility Basaveśvara shows to Allama Prabhu.²

In *Śivayoga* the power of will for spiritual progress (*saṃkalpa śakti*) is an important element for the realisation of the highest end. In this, the physical and the mental are not negated, but transmuted and transcended. The bodily and the mental are purified and divinised through the power of the *cit-śakti*. The force of *saṃkalpa-śakti* is expressed through *pīyūṣa-granthī*, the pineal gland. The fuller expression of potential powers in the pineal gland will lead the individual to the acquisition of omniscience and spiritual force leading to the state of union with the Absolute.³ The integral

1. Ibid.

2. *Vīraśaiva Quarterly* (Kannada) Vol. II, No. 7, article by Shree KUMARASWAMI of Navakaivāṇamatha.

Yoga of Shree AUROBINDO also emphasizes the primacy of *saṁkalpa śakti* in the programme of self-realisation. In Śivayoga, as also in integral Yoga, the bodily and the mental are not denied. To this end, we have to use the methods of Aṣṭāṅga of Patañjali for self-purification. It is not necessary to go through the impossible process of the eight stages of Rāja-yoga in all their rigidity. That would distract us from the main path, reaching union with God. What is needed is a simple process of Yoga which is possible for even the common men, women and children. This type of Sādhana is possible through *laṣaṁgāpūjā-karma* and the concentration through *trātaka*.¹

In the *Śivayoga-darpaṇa* we get a description of the characteristics of Śivayoga. Five forms of Śivayoga have been mentioned: 1) *śivajñāna*, 2) *śivādhyāna*, 3) *śivapūjā*, 4) *śivaerata* and 5) *śivācāra*. The attainment of Śivayoga is possible through the practice of *samyaknādanusandhāna* which consists in right worship and concentration. There are five forms of *nāda*. The symbol of 'Om' is significant. Yoga through *śāmbhavī mudrā* is a significant step in Śivayoga. In the eye is the infinite energy of the sun, the moon and the fire. The detailed description of the practice of Śivayoga as given in this book would be beyond the scope of this work.

However, it is stated that the importance of Śivayoga can be known by *Śiva* only and not by others. This process of Yoga would lead us to the supreme experience.² Therefore it is also called Śivānubhava Yoga.

In this sense, we can also say that there is some agreement between Śivayoga and the Yoga preached by Patañjali in that the fundamental stages are accepted in both. But we may say that Śivayoga has democratised Patañjali's Yoga in the sense that it has given men the possibility of reaching the goal. It has emphasized

1. Ibid. Also refer to article by Prof. VEṢABHENDRASWAMI of Karnatak University in Vol. II, No. 6. Prof. VEṢABHENDRASWAMI has suggested a new interpretation of the word 'garagasa' as canalising the breadth through the throat to the centre of the brain.

2. *Prabhulingolīle*, p.200.

the importance of Anubhava as a mystical element in the culmination of this process of Yoga.¹

The analysis so far made shows that the Jaina Yoga and the Śiva Yoga aim at perfection. To be free from the empirical and the contingent and to reach perfection are the negative and the positive elements in the final goal of self-realization.

But the Jaina way is individualistic and rigoristic. The bodily and the mental are empirical adjuncts to be eliminated if possible and also to be used in the process of reaching the highest, as one uses a ferry-boat to cross the river and does not carry the boat along with him after reaching the other side, out of gratitude for the boat. Therefore, it is apter to say that the Jainas do not discard the body and aim at its crucifixion only. For them, as for others, the body and bodily health are as necessary for Yoga as discarding of the mental activity is necessary (*cittavṛtti-nirodha*).

For a Viśiṣṭaīva the final end is unity with the Absolute. Belief in God and surrender to God are cardinal principles in Śivayoga. The Jainas do not believe in a supreme deity, like God. There is no place for divine grace either. We have to depend on our own efforts, as every soul is divine.

The ontological status of the individual soul in the *mokṣa* is different in the two religions. The Viśiṣṭaīva aims at union with the Absolute (*aikya*), while for the Jaina each soul retains its individuality in the highest stage. This has perhaps given the Jainas the need to emphasize the methods of the *aṣṭāṅgayoga* as a discipline and a method.

We can say that the end of human life, according to Indian philosophers, except perhaps the Cārvākas, is liberation from the bonds of empirical existence. Mokṣa, as the ideal, is difficult to attain. Few have attained it; and the attainment of such a trans-empirical end had to be adjusted according to the needs of individuals in the light of the prevailing social structure. Therefore, to compare one type of Yoga as against the other without understanding the background would be a grievous error. We have to look at

1. Śaṅmukha Śivayogi : as quoted in *Jñānajyoti* : 'na bhedaḥ śivayogasya rājayogasya tattvataḥ.'

this problem in the full perspective of life. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the comparative significance of Yoga unless one lives it.¹

IV. The soul has the inherent capacity for self-realization. But self-realization is a long process. In the course of its eternal wanderings in various forms of existence, the soul at some time gets an indistinct vision and feels an impulse to realise it. The soul has to go through the various stages of spiritual development. These stages are called *gunasthāna*, and they are linked up with stages of subsidence and destruction of the Karmic veil. These are fourteen stages of spiritual development. The first stage is characterised by the presence of *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, perversity of attitude. Here we accept wrong belief and are under the false impression that what we believe is right. This is caused by the operation of *mithyātva-karman*. However, we are not entirely bereft of a vision, though indistinct, of the right. Still, due to perversity of attitude we do not relish the truth, just as a man suffering from fever has no taste for sugarcane.²

The next stage is called *sāsvādanā-samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. It is a halting and transitory stage in which one may get the vision of truth but is likely to fall back on falsehood due to the excitement of passions. In the third stage, of *samyag-mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, we have a mixed attitude of right and wrong belief. There is neither a desire to have true beliefs nor a desire to remain in ignorance. It is like mixing curds and treacle.³ This also is a transitional stage. Next comes the stage of right attitude, *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. One gets a glimpse of the truth. Yet one has not the spiritual strength to strive for the attainment of it. In this stage we have attained knowledge, but we lack moral effort, as we have not yet developed self-control. From the next stage onwards there is gradual expression of self-control. We may compare these four stages to the state of the persons in Plato's 'parable of the cave'. The prisoners in the cave would see their own shadows and the shadows of other

1. Śaṅmukha Sivayogi : *Akhaṇḍesvara Vāsana* : Ratnākara Varqi emphasizes the impossibility of understanding Yoga without living it.

2. *Gommatasāra-jīvāṅkṣā*, 17.

3. *Ibid.* p. 22.

men and animals. And they would mistake the shadows for realities. This is the stage of *mithyātva*. If one were to be released, the glare of the light would distress him; and he would persist in maintaining the superior truth of the shadows. This is the stage of *sāsvādana*. But once he gets accustomed to the change, he will be able to see things, and gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heavens. And once he gets the clear vision, he will realize the folly of his fellow prisoners and pity them.¹

Deśāvirata-samyagdr̥ṣṭi is the next higher stage of spiritual development, in which we get partial efforts for self-control in addition to the possession of the knowledge of truth. There is a partial destruction of Karmic matter which produces passions.² Full practice of virtues would not be possible, because there is the possibility of the influence of passions.

In the next stage, the moral effort takes a more definite shape, although it is not always successful. A person has a more or less steady glimpse of the truth; and he tries to develop self-control and the obstacles to the practice of virtues are overcome in the sixth stage. But even here, the moral life and the spiritual struggle are not fully successful, because their full expression is vitiated by moral and spiritual inertia. This inertia is called *pramāda*. And *pramāda* is overcome in the seventh stage of *āpramatta-sāmyata*. Efforts to reach moral excellence take definite shape. The operation of Karma preventing perfect conduct is very feeble; and minor passions called *kaṣāyas* are also subdued. We can now practise the five great vows and the twenty-four virtues. The process of *adhakpravṛtti-karaṇa*, by which the soul on a lower level can rise higher, begins to operate in this stage.³

The eighth stage is called *apūrvakaraṇa*. It leads to greater and more definite self-control. The self attains special purification and is capable of reducing the intensity and duration of Karma. The *Gommaṣasāra* gives a detailed description of the process of *apūrvakaraṇa* operating in this stage. In this stage, one is affected

1. Plato, the *Republic*. VII.

2. *Gommaṣasāra-Jīvakāṇḍa*, 30 and Commentary.

3. *Ibid.* 48, 49.

only by the mild affective states. It is possible to develop a stoic attitude. In the stage of development called *anivṛti-bādhara-samparāya*, it is possible to overcome even the milder emotional disturbances with greater confidence and ease. We have, here, established ourselves as moral and spiritual individuals, although sometimes slight emotional afflictions are possible. In the tenth stage of *sūkṣmasamparāya*, only greed disturbs us, and that too slightly. Except for this disturbance, one is passionless and calm. This subtle greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment to the body even in souls which have achieved great spiritual advancement.¹ But one is free from even the slightest passions in the eleventh *Gupasthāna*, of *upaśāntamoha*. Still the affections are not altogether eliminated. They are only suppressed through the pressure of moral effort. We are mostly free from the baneful influence of the Karma, except the deluding Karma (*mohaniya-karman*). This state is called *chadmastha*. It is also called *vitarāga*, as one is able to remain calm and undisturbed through the suppression of Karma. In the next stage, of *upaśānta-moha*, there is annihilation of Karma and not mere suppression. And when all the passions and the four types of *Ghāti-karma* are destroyed, one reaches the thirteenth stage of spiritual development, called *sayoga-kevali*. One is free from the bondage of Karma, yet is not free from activity and bodily existence as the *āyuh-karma* is still to be exhausted. In this stage, we find omniscient beings like Tīrthanīkaras, Gaṇadhāras and the Sāmānya Kevalins. They attain enlightenment, but still live in this world preaching the truth that they have seen. This stage can be compared to the state of *Jīvanmukta*. The *Vedāntasāra* describes this state as that of the enlightened and liberated man who is yet alive in this physical world. Though he may appear to be active in this world, yet he is inactive, like the man who assists a magician in a magic show yet knows that all that is shown is illusory.² Zimmer compares the attitude of the Kevalins in this stage to the function of a lamp 'lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance

1. TATIA (N) : *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 27.

2. *Vedāntasāra* 219.

of the body, not for the pursuit of any gratification of sense or any goal.¹

The final stage of self-realization is the stage of absolute perfection. All empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions, are removed. The soul enters the third stage of *śukla-dhyāna*. This state lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables.² At the end of this period the soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. It is described as the state of Parabrahma or Nirañjana. It is not possible to give, as Radhakrishnan says, a positive description of the liberated soul.³ It is a state of freedom from action and desire, a state of utter and absolute quiescence. Zimmer shows that, in this state, the individuality, the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away like drops of rain that descend from the clear sky, tasteless and emasculate.⁴

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1. ZIMMER (H) : *Philosophies of India*—Edt. Campbell, p. 446.
 2. *Dhyānaśataka*, 82.
 3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 233.
 4. ZIMMER (H) : *Philosophies of India*, p. 260.

CHAPTER VII

IN THIS OUR LIFE

I. We have so far seen the pathway to perfection through the practice of Yoga and the stages of self-realization. But the transcendental perfection is to be rooted in the empirical life; as we cannot ignore the empirical for the transcendental. We have first to learn to live a good life in this world and then we can go higher to spiritual perfection, or else it would be like one aiming at climbing the Mount Everest without setting a foot on the base camp or without training oneself for mountaineering. Moral excellence is, therefore, as much important as spiritual perfection.

It has been alleged that the Jaina outlook, as of other ancient Indian thought, is negative. In their zeal for the other worldly ends they have ignored the things of the world; life negation and not life affirmation is the dominant spirit of their outlook; and it is throughout pessimistic. For Jainas ultimate spiritual excellence could be attained by the gradual process of getting moral excellence. The good man can reach the destiny of perfection of the soul. There is no short cut to *mokṣa*. As we have seen in the last chapter, Schweitzer maintains that the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact it was the supreme ethic, and it was an event full of significance for the thought of India. And in Indian thought category of Dharma is important. "So far as the actual ethical content is concerned, Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism are not inferior to others"¹. Suffering in the world is a fact, : *sarvaṃ duḥkham* was one of the cardinal principles of the Buddha. Misery leads to think of an escape from the bonds of this life. In this sense all philosophy is pessimistic. But, the ultimate ideal of a Jaina is perfection and life-negation is a means to an end. It is the negation of empirical values of life and not of the supreme values; and ethics leads to realization of the supreme values. In the West the Hellenic ideal was to be a good citizen, to attain excellence in this life. The Vedic Aryans aimed at happiness and good life in the world

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, (1941) p. 52.

and heaven hereafter. The Indian seers realized that we have to transcend the empirical to reach pure perfection, or else we have no lasting peace. Yet the empirical is a stepping stone for the transcendental perfection. Moral life, therefore, is important as the pathway to perfection. The ways of flesh and mind are to be channelised to the pathway to perfection giving Caesar what is due to him. Ethics for the Jainas is working in righteousness all the days of one's life. Of the triple ways to perfection enunciated by the Jainas, Samyak-cāritra is equally important. It is a way leading to *mokṣa* : without hunger and thirst for righteousness we shall not enter the kingdom of perfection. Cāritra is predominantly activist. It refers to moral and spiritual excellence. It implies willed activity, and *samyak-cāritra* (right activity) is an important step one has to adopt in the pathway to self-realisation. To attain *samyaktva* is not an easy task. One has to be ripe for it. Samyak-cāritra is possible for one who has attained Samyag-dṛṣṭi (right faith) and Samyag-jñāna (right knowledge). One who has cleared the darkness of the deluding Karma and who possesses knowledge, adopts Samyak-cāritra. It consists in avoiding the influx of Karma (*āśrava*) coming as it does from the practice of *himsā* (injury to life), *anṛta* (untruth), *steḥa* (stealing) and other forms of sense pleasures.* Samyaktva has been assimilated to the status of a *vrata* and presented with five *atīcāras* (infraction). They were enumerated as early as the *Tattvārthasūtra*, though not found in the canon.¹ Without entering into the minor discrepancies of the Digambara and Svetāmbara versions of the essential qualities of Samyaktva, we may mention the characters of Samiyaktva. Samyaktva (rightness) is characterised by i) *saṃvega* (spiritual craving), ii) *Sama* (stilling of the passion), iii) *nirveda* (disgust for sense pleasures), iv) *bhakti* (devotion), v) *anukampā* (compassion), vi) *anadā* (remorse for the evil acts of relatives and others), vii) *garvā* (repentance expressed in the form of *ālocanā* made in the presence of Guru) and viii) *vātsalya* (loving kindness to the living). Samyaktva expresses itself in *niḥśaṅkā* (freedom from doubt), *niḥkāṅkṣā* (desirelessness), *nirgūhana* (absence of repugn-

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka-Srāvakaśāstra*: pp. 47-49. Samantabhadra.

2. WILLIAMS (R.) : *Jaina Yoga* (London Oriental Series Vol. 14) 1936 p. 34.

ance), *amūḍha-dṛṣṭi* (absence of perversity of attitude).¹

The description of the nature of *Samyaktva* as shown above has a great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress. The instructive tendencies and emotions have to be channelized and directed by transformation and sublimation with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically considered the characteristics of *Samyak-cāritra* present a background and a canvas for the illumination of one's self towards the goal of attaining perfect equanimity and spiritual strength.

II. *Samyakcāritra* has been distinguished into two types: i) *sakala* (complete) and ii) *vikala* (partial). *Sakala-cāritra* is the rigorous practice of Dharma and is to be adopted by those who are initiated as monks and who have renounced this world. It is *Muni-dharma* (the way of an ascetic). But for those who have not renounced the world it is still possible to seek the truth and pursue the path of righteousness though in a convenient and lesser degree. That would be *Vikala-cāritra*, the way of the householder. There are, thus, two levels of moral life. The polarity of householder and ascetic is indeed one of the most characteristic features of the Jaina structure. The layman has the obligation to cherish his family, the monk must sever all ties with them. The monk is excessive since his life is a negation of compromise; while moderation must be the key-note of existence for the householder whose life is rooted in compromise.²

Muni-dharma aims at seeking salvation through the practice of strict moral and spiritual injunctions. Of these, the five *vratas* (vows) are important. They are 1) *ahimsā* (nonviolence); 2) *satya* (truth); 3) *asteya* (non-stealing); 4) *Brahmacarya* (celibacy); and 5) *aparigraha* (non-possession). It is difficult to translate these words in proper form. The *Vratas* have to be practised rigorously and without exception. In this sense the *Vratas* to be practised by the ascetics are called *Mahāvratas* (great vows). "The reverence towards life (Albert Schweitzer has put it) by which the realm of life was so immeasurably extended, permeates the discipline of *Mahāvira's*

1. Based on the analysis in the *Jaina Yoga* with slight modifications.

2. SCHUBRING (W.) : *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Berlin 1945 : pp. 180-186.

*Trans. Wolfgang BEULLEN (Banarasidas) 1962. pp. 298-300.

order in a way no other ethical prescription does. "We can observe it entering into the fields of other vows like truthful speech as arising out of passion. The vow of non-possession is equally important. A monk is not allowed to possess anything, in some cases including a piece of cloth. The vow of chasity has a large effective range. "The prescriptions cohering with it do not refer to normal sexuality only, but they frequently also indicate events of sexual pathology".² According to one tradition, the fifth was added by Vardhamanā Mahāvira, the twentyfourth prophet. Pārśva the twentythird Tīrthakara did not mention celibacy as a vow. In a discussion between Keśi, a desciple of Pārśva and Gautama, a desciple of Mahāvira, it was made clear that the addition of the fifth did not imply any major deviation from the teachings of the Jinas, but was an outcome of circumstance.³ It indicated a fall in the standards of monastic moral life as there was sufficient interval of time between the last two Tīrthakaras.⁴ Later it is sometimes suggested that the sixth vow *rātri-bhoyanāo veramanam* (abstaining from taking food at night) was added with the main intention of avoiding injury to life in the dark. This was primarily meant as injunction for the householder as the ascetic takes only one meal a day at midday. It is a special case of *ahimsā*. In fact the entire ethical structure of the Jains is centered round the fundamental principle of *ahimsā*. We find this expressed in the other injunctions to be followed by the ascetics. The ascetics have to practise : 1) the five mahāvratas, 2) five *samiti*, 3) the control in five senses, 4) six *avaśyakas*, other practices like i) *loca* (plucking the hair on the head with hands), ii) *acelakatva* (abstaining from the use of covering of any sort, iii) *asnāna* (abstaining from bath), iv) *Prthivīśayana*, v) *adantadhāvana* (abstaining from cleaning teeth), vi) *sthitibhojana* (taking food offered by the lay disciple, by using the palm only and by standing), viii) *ekabhukta* (taking one meal a day). The five *samitis* are : i) *īryā-samiti* (restriction on movement), ii) *bhāṣā-samiti* (restriction on speech), iii) *eṣanā-samiti* (taking pure and permissible food), iv) *ādāna-nikṣepa* (careful use

1. Ibid, p. 250.

2. Ibid, p. 302.

3. *Uttarādhyana Sūtra*, XXIII, S.B. E. Vol. XLV.

4. Ibid. Introduction JACOM (H). Footnote XXIII.(22).

movement of the necessary objects like *kamaṇḍalu*, a pot for use of water etc., and v) *pratisthāpanā-samiti* (answering the nature calls in solitary places). The practice of vows and other injunctions has to be carefully done by the ascetic without exception. The life of a monk is hard and rigorous in this sense. His object is to attain Mokṣa, and for this purpose rigorous mortification of the body has to be practised. The practice of vows is threefold : in body, mind and speech.

The infraction of the practice of vows and other injunctions has also to be threefold : i) by one self, ii) by getting others to commit violation, and iii) by acquiescing in the act of violation.

A Muni is not to cover himself with any type of clothes or decoration made of cotton, wool, bark of a tree or even grass. He is forbidden to take bath (*asnāna*). He should sleep with care on one side where there is little possibility of injury to living being including the tiniest insects. He should not clean his teeth, nails and other parts of the body nor should he decorate himself in any way (*adanta-dhāvana*). He should eat taking the food on the palm standing on a clean and purified place, and he should eat only once a day after midday. These are included in the twenty-eight basic *mūlaguṇas* of a Muni.¹ Rigorous restrictions are imposed on an ascetic; which if imposed on the layman, it would not be possible for him to practise in conformity with his responsibility of household life.

The *Daśavaikālika-sūtra* gives description of the essential qualities required of an ascetic. One who is self-controlled, who is free from passion and is non-attached is a real Muni. He saves his soul and those of others. Such self-controlled persons go to heaven (*deva-loka*), or are freed from the bonds of life according to the degree of destruction of Karma. One who goes to heaven is reborn and has to continue his struggle for the destruction of the remaining Karma ultimately to attain Mokṣa.²

A true monk should have no desires, nor attachments and should wander about as the known beggar. He should live as a model of righteousness.³ He is not to live by any profession or

1. *Mūlācāra*. 1-36.

2. *Daśavaikālika-sūtra*. 10. 1-15.

3. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* 15.1 (S.B.E. Vol. XLV).

occupation; possessed of full self-control and free from any ties, he should live the life of a homeless mendicant.

The daily routine of a monk is well regulated and regimented. He has to be severely solemn and is obliged to behave in a strictly reserved and inobtrusive manner. He cannot indulge in singing, dancing, laughing or any other form of merry-making. He has to devote much of his time to meditation, study, and in the third part of the day he has to go only for food and drink.¹

The *Acārāṅgasūtra* and *Daśavaikālika* present a detailed picture of the strict rules for taking a midday meal. He has to be modest in behaviour and give precedence to other receivers and even to animals.² And such a monk practising the rigours of an ascetic for the sake of a fuller and more perfect life here and hereafter is superior to all others, like a trained 'Kāmboja steed' whom no noise frightens, like a strong irresistible elephant, like a strong bull and a proud lion.³

Four things of supreme value are difficult to obtain in this world: 1) human birth, 2) instruction in the Law (*dharma*), 3) belief in the *Dharma*, and 4) energy in self-control.⁴ We must, therefore, make the most of what we have not because tomorrow we die but because we become immortal and perfect. The attainment of perfection is in the hands of man; and knowing this, we should avoid sense-pleasures which are short-lived and apparently sweet yet fraught with the danger of losing all that we have, as a man lost his kingdom by eating a mango fruit which was strictly forbidden by his physician⁵ and as 'forbidden fruit whose mortal taste brought death into this world and all our woe'. Asceticism is the primary step for the monks on their way to self-realization. External asceticism consists in dropping one's meals, in restricting oneself to a few objects and in begging for food. These are meant for preparing one's mind for self-purification. The internal asceticism is mainly mental and it aims at purification in the final form. It includes the control of the senses, subjection to confession and

1. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* 30, 19 and 26.

2. *Acārāṅga sūtra*, I 44; II.59, 25, 52.

3. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* XI.17-20.

4. *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*, III.1-4

5. *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* VII.11.

atonement, readiness to spiritual service, study and the practice of *dhyāna* in gradual stages. And one who has given up all worldly ties, is well-versed in the Dharma, who practises all codes of ascetic life, is the Śramaṇa, a *bhikkhu*. A monk complies with the rules of *yati* as regards postures, lying down, sitting down, and is thoroughly acquainted with the *saṃitis* and *guptis*.¹

There have been conflicting opinions as to how the ascetic practice and the monastic vows originated. Buchler held that most of the special directions for the discipline of the Jain ascetic are copies, and often exaggerated copies, of the Brahminical rules for penitents. The outward marks of the order closely resemble those of a Sanyāsin'.² Jacobi seems to support this view when he said 'Monastic order of the Jains and the Buddhists though copied from Brāhmaṇa were chiefly and originally intended for Kshatriyas.'³ This view was presented in the early stages of Indological research but it is difficult to be accepted. What we call Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the Śramaṇa and the Brāhmaṇa currents of thought. The Śramaṇa cult which was primarily ascetic in nature was pre-Aryan. And "we should no more assess the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Buddhist and Ajīvaka tenets as mere perverted continuation of stray thoughts selected at random from the Upaniṣadic bed of Aryan thought currents".⁴ Dr. Upadhye calls this Pre-Aryan current of thought as 'Magadhan religion.'

All cannot renounce the world, nor is it desirable. Most men have to live in this world and work for their spiritual salvation, while engaged in daily routine of empirical life. They are the householders (*śrāvakas*). They cannot practise rigorous discipline of an ascetic. They have to practise the vows with less rigour, as far as possible, still without sacrificing the fundamental spirit of the Vratas. The ethical code for the layman is twelve-fold consisting of 1) five Vratas which are common for the ascetic and the householder, except for the fact they have to be practised

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* : Bk. I.14, 16. (S. B. E. XLV).

2. BUCHLER : *On the Indian Sect. of the Jains* : (1901) p. 15.

3. JACOBI (H) : SBE Vol. XXII-Int. p. xxxii.

4. UPADHYE (A.N.) : *Bhāṭṭakathakośa* . Int. *Pravacanasāra* . 1943. Preface pp. 12-13.

with less rigour without sacrificing the spirit of righteousness and the main goal of self-realization. Great physical and moral advantages accrue from the observation of vows. It keeps the body and mind healthy and leads one in the direction of maintaining moral strength, ultimately to lead to *mokṣa*. The vows practised by the layman are the *aṇuvratas* (lesser vows). In addition to 1) five *aṇuvratas*, he has to practise 2) three *gṇāvratas* and 3) four *kikṣāvratas*.

We may mention some of the *aticāras* (infractions) of the *aṇuvratas*. Some of the *aticārās* of *vrata* are :

1. *Ahiṃsā* : i) *bandha* tying up, keeping in captivity men and beasts. However, the restraining of cattle by means of ropes and restriction on our children for corrections may be permitted.¹ So may a thief be bound. ii) *vadha* (beating) : It refers to wanton and merciless whipping of animals out of anger and aroused by other passions, although some exceptions like mild beating, pulling the ears or slapping for correction are permissible. iii) *chaviccheda* : This applies to acts of injury to the body with sword or sharp instrument. Operations by a physician would be exceptions.² iv) *atibhārūropana* : It refers to heavy and merciless loading of beasts by a burden greater than they can bear. Certain types of occupations have been tabooed for a Jaina layman. v) *bhaktapāna-vyavaccheda* : It refers to making the animal suffer from hunger and thirst for no reason out of anger or negligence. The context and the implications of *ahiṃsā vrata* are much wider than the *aticāras* indicate. We have, therefore, added in the end a critique of *ahiṃsā* in the light of its philosophical justification.

2. *Satya-vrata* (truth-speaking) has also a wide connotation. It has been interpreted as abstention from 'untruth spoken' out of passion, and even from truth if it leads to the destruction of the living being.³ We may mention some of the infraction of this Vrata . i) *Sahasābhyākhyāna* : It consists in casually or intentionally imputing false charges against a person as : 'he is a thief, or an adulterer'. Friends of Othello committed this grievous crime

1. *Yogaśāstra* : Hemacandra, iii, 90.

2. *Ibid.*, III, 90.

3. *Śrāvahācara* . Vasubandhi, Edt. HIRALAL JAIN : 209.

and sin against Desdemona even if it were in jest. ii) *Svadāra-mantra bheda* : It consists in divulging to others what has been said by one's wife in confidence under special circumstances.¹ iii) *Mṛṣopadeśa* . It refers to perverse teaching and advice leading to evil consequences. iv) *Kūṭalekhakaraṇa* is preparing a false document like forgery etc.

3. *Asteya-vrata* forbids us to commit theft or even to take others' articles not specifically meant for us. It forbids us from i) accepting stolen articles at cheaper rates, ii) instigating others to steal, iii) acquiring property in a country which is hostile to our own. Even grass or wood obtained under such circumstances must be regarded as stolen.² Even transgressing the frontiers forbidden by the State is an infraction of this vow³. Black market is covered under this *aticāra*. iv) *kūṭa-tulā-kūṭa-māna* : using false weights and measures and taking exorbitant interest on loans is an infraction of this vow.

These Aticāras are mainly concerned as a warning to the community in which individuals and groups are likely to violate the five vows here and there. Similar infractions of this Vrata have been mentioned with reference to officials as well in the State. Corrupt officials are also to be considered as thieves.⁴

4. *Brahma-vrata* is important in Jaina ethics. It has been considered from the points of view of personal efforts for salvation and of social health. Detailed classification of the vows and their infractions have been worked out. In their analysis we find psychological acumen. The Vrata has negative and positive aspects. In the negative aspect a householder has to abstain from sexual contact with other's wife (*aparādārā-gamana*), and positively he has to be satisfied with his own wife. He cannot even arrange marriages of other women, except in the case of his own children. He should avoid sex literature and sex brooding. The *aticāras* of this Vrata cover most aspects of sexual deviation including that

1. *Āvaśyakaśūtra* : with commentary, Haribhadra 821.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra* : with commentary, Siddhasēna, vii. 22.

3. *Śrāvaka-dharma Pañcālaka* (Devachanda Lalbhai No. 102) 1952.

14.

4. Ibid.

with the lower animals and even with inanimate objects like the figures of women. From the earliest days of Jainism, the horror of incest has been constantly felt, as described by Haribhadra¹ while mentioning the disastrous consequences of the violation of this.

5. *Aparigraha-vrata* (the vow of non-possession) is perhaps the most important of the Vratas in the present context of society. As a Mahāvratā it is required of a Muni to give up every thing that leads to attachment, except perhaps, in some cases, a piece of cloth, a *kamandalu* and a bunch of feathers. He must avoid both external (*bāhya*) and internal (*antara*) possessions (*parigraha*). As an Anuvratā, it emphasises non-attachment. One who accumulates property more than required for him, transgresses this Vratā. Parigraha (possession) is something explained as a sort of the fascination for material possession. It is the expression of acquisitive instinct which needs to be curbed or else it feeds in what it gets. A son's greed for material possessions will lead to ignore his father; and countless evil consequences will follow.² If only we know the importance of this Vratā, in the Socratic sense of the word 'know', we would solve most of the problems of social evil. The Guṇavratas and the Śikṣāvratas have been mentioned with variations. The Guṇavratas are : i) *digvrata*, ii) *bhogopabhogoparimāṇa* and iii) *anarthadandavratā*. Digvrata restricts the movements in different directions. The purpose is to reduce the possibility of committing violence, and this is to be achieved by circumscribing the area in which injury to the living can be committed. For example, one is forbidden to climb a mountain or atop of a tree, descend into a well or underground storage of a village, to travel beyond a stipulated limit prescribed by the Acāryas, and to move at random. There would be infractions of the vow. In the *Ratnakaraṇḍaka*, Digvrata is defined as the resolve to desist from injury by circumscribing one's range of movement. As to the limits of time, it is to be practised until death.³ The Bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa-vratā forbids or limits one in the use of 'consumable' goods like food and durable goods like

1. *Āvaśyaka-sūtra* with Comm. by Haribhadra (Agamodaya. Samit Saṅgraha 823 b.

2. *Tattvārtha sūtra* : Comm. by Siddhasena, vii, 22.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvākācāra* of Samantabhadra . iii, 22, 23.

furniture in the house. The Anarthadanda-vrata restricts an individual from certain activities, from harmful professions and trades because they would lead to harmful activities which serve no purpose. Four types of Anarthadanda are mentioned in the Śvetāmbara texts, while Digambaras have five. We have tried to avoid the discrepancies in the presentation of the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara writers on the different problems as they are largely concerned with minor details. The five types of Anarthadanda are : i) *īlapadhyāna* (evil concentration like *ārta-dhyāna* and *raudra-dhyāna*; ii) *pramādacāritra* (negligent mischief or addiction to vices like alcoholism and gambling). It also includes witnessing dancing, sex displays, cock-fighting and other combats of animals. It may include many others bringing about incitement of excessive instinctive activity; iii) *himsā-pradāna* (encouraging injury to life in any form). It forbids us from supplying poison, weapons, fire, rope, swords and other articles for destruction of life.¹ iv) *pāpopadeśa* (sinful advice) like instruction in evil trade. It is also mentioned that sometimes such advice, like giving instructions to the farmer to plough when the rains are on, cannot be avoided when a question of being helpful is involved, but it should never be given out of mere garrulity.² v) *duḥśruti* (bad reading); it consists in reading *kāma-sāstra*, sex and spicy literature including yellow journalism and listening to the faults of others. It is the study of works that disturb and spoil the minds with harmful thoughts, worldly attachments, perverse attitude and excitement of passions.³

Coming to the Śikṣāvrata, the Śrāvaka has to practise four of them : i) *sāmāyika*, ii) *deśāvakāśika*, iii) *proṣadhopavāsa*, and iv) *atithi-samvibhāga*. Sāmāyika is one of the important practices for the layman; and it is one of the six *āvaiyakas* (necessities) for the layman and also for the ascetic for whom it has to be practised lifelong. It consists in the attainment of equanimity and tranquility of mind.⁴ It is a process of becoming one (*ekatva-*

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvaka-cāra* of Sementabhadrā, iii.31.

2. *Ibid.*, 30.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvaka-cāra*. 33 also refer *Sāgdradharmāṃṛta* of Āśādhara. Bombay ed. 1917, v. 3.

4. *Tattovārthasūtra* with Siddhasena's comm. vii-16.

gamana), of fusion of body and mind and speech with the Ātman.¹ Sāmāyika may be performed in one's own house or in a temple, in the presence of Guru or in a specially built hall, according to the needs of the time and individual. Sometimes a distinction is made between the ordinary laymen, affluent men, and men of official status. Special procedure for Sāmāyika is laid down with the intention of increasing the prestige of the Jaina community by emphasising the fact that he has adhered to the sacred doctrine.² In performing the Sāmāyika one should observe the five Samitis and three Guptis and avoid all harmful speech. He should recite *pratyākhyāna* avoiding harmful actions and *pratikramana* expressing remorse for past deeds and pray (*ālocana*) that whatever acts in speech, mind and body made by him in the past may be atoned for. It is to seek forgiveness for what has been done so far. During the period of *sāmāyika* the layman becomes like an ascetic³. Samantabhadra shows that a layman performing *sāmāyika* is like an ascetic draped in clothes,⁴ although this likeness is only apparent like the description of a woman as *candramukhi*.⁵ Sāmāyika has to be performed at regular intervals of the day. The object of this practice is to gain mental equanimity surcharged with righteousness. Deśavakāsikavrata is a modified version of Digvrata. It restricts the movement of an individual to a house or village or a part thereof for a period varying from a *muhūrta* (about 45 minutes) to a few days or even a couple of months.⁶ The basic idea in such restriction of movement seems to be that it would create mental preparedness for the practice of Vratas more rigorously almost leading to the Mahāvrata temporarily in the state of an ascetic. Proṣadhopavāsa-vrata enjoins one to fast at regular intervals in the month, say on the eighth (*aṣṭamī*) and fourteenth day (*caturdaśī*).⁷ One should avoid

1. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* with Pūjyapāda's *Sarvāthasiddhi* vii, 2.

2. WILLIAMS (R.) . *Jaina Yoga* vi. 132.

3. *Āvaśyaka-sūtra* with Hemacandra's commentary, (1916).

4. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvahācāra*, iv. 12.

5. *Āvaśyaka-sūtra* with Haribhadra's commentary p. 833.

6. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvahācāra*, iv. 3-4.

7. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, vii. 16 and *Bhāṣya* of Siddhasena.

adornment of the body including use of garlands, perfumes etc. One should abstain from engaging one-self in worldly duties. This is an important step in the direction of mental purification.

Dānavrata covers the most important single element in the practice of religion, for without alms-giving by the laity, there could be no ascetics; and Dharma could not easily be preserved and continued.¹ It is also termed as *atithi-samvibhāga-vrata* or paying due respects to the guest. Specific injunctions have been given regarding the qualifications of an *atithi* and the mode of giving alms. Varied interpretations have been possible, the Sādhu or monk being accepted as the best *atithi* as he is charged with imparting religious instruction. In giving alms one should consider the following five factors: i) *pātra* (the recipient), ii) *dātṛ* (giver), iii) *dātavya* (the object given), iv) *dāna-vidhi* (the manner of giving), and v) *dāna-phala* (the result of giving alms).² We should consider the place and time while giving alms. Due respect should be given to the recipient and the giver should be free from any taints of passions. He should give with full faith in the act of giving. Act of charity has no ethical value, if it is to be done with questionable motives. If it is to be done out of anger or filled with maudlin sentiments of pity, it would not be considered to be of usual significance. Nor is it possible to justify the act of charity if it were not to produce any tangible welcome result. Thus the ends and means must justify each other. The Jaines present a synthetic picture of the problem of motive and intention in the act of righteousness. The spirit of Anekānta forbids us to take a partial view emphasising either the motive of action or merely the consequences. However, in early days, *dāna* to ascetics formed an important duty of laymen. Food and shelter and books are to be supplied to the monks, so that they can devote themselves to study and meditation. Concentration (*dhyāna*) is not possible without the minimum necessary physical comfort. In addition to *dāna* to the ascetics it is good to do charity to the distressed, strangers from other lands, to the lowliest and the lost.

1. WILLIAMS (R.). *Jaina Yoga*, p. 149.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, vii. 39 with commentary by Pūjyapāda.

This is *karuṇā-dāna*. Above all *dāna* nullifies greed and acquisitiveness, and acquisitiveness is a manifestation of *himsā*. And *dāna* gives its unfailing fruits. Paradoxically enough the layman charges himself with restrictions exceeding in number than those accepted by the monk. This is due to the large diversity of the evil life in which the layman still stands.¹

So far, we have briefly mentioned the twelve conditions of a layman if he is to be a pious Śrāvaka and a good citizen. To these twelve may be added *Samlekhanā* as Vrata which is sometimes included as one of the Śikṣāvratas. It is not restricted to the ascetics only. The lay followers of religion may take *Samlekhanā* in the higher stages of their spiritual development. In fact it is regarded as the normal conclusion of one's life except where death makes it impossible to take this vow.² With a view to giving a philosophical justification of *Samlekhanā* we add in the end a note on *Samlekhanā*.

A layman who is desirous of attaining the higher stage in the upward path to Mokṣa will have to go through the eleven stages of moral and spiritual practice resulting from the careful observations of the twelve vows mentioned so far. They are the Pratiṃś, stages of spiritual progress; and Schüring says "Horizontally expanded as it were, these obligations are projected in the vertical by the ladder of the 11 *uvāsaga-padīmā*".³ The eleven Pratiṃś are the injunctions or the ways of conduct progressively leading towards the development of ideal personality. They present a ladder (*sopāna-mārga*) for the layman.

The eleven Pratiṃś are:—1) *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* (right attitude), 2) *vrata* (practice of vows), 3) *sāmāyika* (equanimity which helps in the practice of vows), 4) *proṣadha* (fasting on certain days of the month), 5) *sacitta-tyāga* (giving up certain types of food like roots etc.), 6) *rātrihojana-tyāga* (giving up eating at night),

1. SCHÜRRING (W.) : *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, p. 297 (English translation, (Motilal Banarsidas) 1962).

2. *Sāgāra-dharmāmṛta* : (Manikchanda-granthamālā Bombay 1917) vii

3. *The Doctrine of the Jainas* by WALTHER SCHÜRRING, Translated from the revised German edition by WOLFGANG BEURLIN, Motilal Banarsidas, 1962, p. 285.

7) *bramacarya* (celibacy), 8) *ārambha-tyāga* (giving up certain types of occupations like agriculture involving injury to living beings.), 9) *parigraha-tyāga* (giving up all possessions except clothes), 10) *anumati-tyāga* (non-participation in the household responsibilities), and 11) *uddiṣṭa-tyāga*. In this stage the Śrāvaka accepts only the minimum of cloth like the loin cloth (*kaupīna*).¹ There are minor variations in the list of practices presented by the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, and they are not relevant for our discussion. Suffice it to say that in the progressive realization of these Pratimās a pious layman is led step by step towards the attainment of *saṁnyāsa*, i.e., a life of renunciation. There is, in this, a psychological presentation of the principle of *varṇāśrama* prevailing in the Hindu way of life, because a householder steadily and surely proceeds towards renunciation. This transformation is much truer to human nature as there is no sudden transformation which needs acute psychological orientation. When one moves from Gṛhasthāśrama to Vānaprasthāśrama and then to *saṁnyāsa*, one cannot just walk into *saṁnyāsa* unless one is a prophet, but one has to prepare oneself for the gradual transformation. Sudden change from one life into the other may create psychological problems as the repressions would accumulate into the dung-heap of the Unconscious. The conception of *pratimās* is, therefore, psychologically sound. This can be easily shown from the fact that the first two Pratimās are mental preparations for the practice of rigorous moral life. Moral control, like continence is always linked with fasting and the control of nourishment. Rich food and clothing have to be avoided as they lead to an easy universe of desires. In the ninth and tenth stages one has to break away from the household attachments still living with family and friends. He is detached and spends most of the time in contemplation in the temple.² He does not take part in the affairs of the house nor does he advise the family members in household affairs even if his advice is sought.³ In the eleventh stage he is on the verge of being an ascetic. He has to wear a minimum dress like the loin cloth (*kaupīna*). In the eleventh Pratimā two divisions

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvakāsāra*, v. 25-28.

2. *Saṅgrahadharmāmṛta*, vii. 31-35.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakāsāra*, v. 25, 26.

have sometimes been mentioned : i) *kyullaka* and ii) *ailaka*. In the former there is only provisional ordination which does not bind the ordained to the monastic life if he has not the vocation. The second is the quasi-ascetic, the ascetic on probation. Still, in this Pratinā certain features of monk's life are forbidden for the layman. He is not allowed to study the mysteries of the sacred texts. He may not go round for alms as a monk does, nor practise *trikāla yoga*, the form of asceticism which emphasises meditation on a hill-top in the hot season, under a tree during rains and by a river bank in winter. They are to wish others as a layman would.¹ The Pratinās are, thus, a means to achieve spiritual development which will, in the end, lead the devotee to take a Sanilekhanā. As a result of the conquest by Moslems who disapproved of nudity and for other reasons layman in the 11th Pratinā came, to a larger extent, to take the place of monks.² Today social conditions have considerably changed, and we are becoming more secular-minded. It would be necessary to reorientate our values so as to emphasise the spiritual levels of householder's life in the practice of Vrata and the eleven stages of spiritual development.

The Jaina has a conception of an ideal layman and an ideal monk. A layman develops twenty one qualities which distinguish him as a perfect gentleman. He will be serious in demeanour, good tempered, merciful, straight-forward, wise and modest. He is sociable, yet careful in speech, reverent both to old age and old customs. A true ascetic should possess twentyeight qualities, for he must keep the five vows, control his five senses, renounce greed, practise forgiveness and possess high ideals. He must be self-denying and endure hardships, always aiming at the highest ideal of perfection.

In the present survey of the ethics of Jainas we can see the spirit of Anekānta pervading the two levels of moral life—the ascetic and the householder. They are not opposed to each other, nor do they present any degree of comparison. The distinction between the *śrāvaka-dharma* and *muni-dharma* is only to show that there is a continuity in the spiritual efforts of man. Hunger

1. *Sāgārādharmaṅga*, vii, 31-35.

2. WILLIAMS (R.) ; *Jaina Yoga*, p. 181.

and thirst for righteousness flowers into perfection only gradually if watered with slow and steady flow of moral and spiritual practice. The lay estate was initially admitted in deference to human frailty and was regarded in theory as a stage of preparation for the ascetic life. Later it gained importance as the foundation for spiritual ends. Layman's ethics was always considered with reference to the prevailing social and religious conditions. Local usage or customary law, the *deśācāra*, though accorded no mandatory force, has always been admitted as a guide, wherever there is no conflict with the Jain doctrine and more particularly in the modern period it has been increasingly incorporated in the *Śrāvakācāra*.¹

The pervasion of the spirit of Anekānta can be demonstrated by the theory and practice of Ahimsā as the cardinal ethical principle of Jains. It is considered as the fundamental principle of this religion, *ahimsā paramo dharmah*. We may, therefore, aptly add a critique of Ahimsā.

The five Vratas have been important for the Jain way of life. They have undergone modifications as to their application in the practice by householders as and when necessary according to the need of the social structure. And 'changelessness of Jainism is no more than a myth'. Had Jainism become a majority religion in Southern India 'something akin to Digambara Mahāyāna might have emerged'. Whilst the dogma remains strikingly firm the ritual changes and assumes an astonishing complexity and richness of symbolism.² For instance, Dānavrata has widened its field from feeding the ascetics to religious endowments, and Yātrā ceases to be a mere promenading of the idols through city on a festival day and comes to denote an organised convoy going on a pilgrimage to distant sacred places. And all the time more and more stress is being laid on the individual's duty to the community.³

Jainism is a *vīrtha*, a way of progress through life, and whilst the *yatyācāra* teaches the individual how to organise his own salvation, the aim of *śrāvakācāra* is to ensure that an environ-

1. Ibid. p. XVII.

2. Ibid. p. XX.

3. Ibid. XXI P.

ment is created in which the ascetic may be able to travel the road of Mokṣa.¹ The emphasis has also to be on the community as well as the individual. This is clear from modifications of the practices and assimilation of the prevailing ritual and practices in Hindu society, as for instance, in the adoption of the right of Upanayana and marriage rites.

The importance of *śrāvakācāra* has been enhanced by the fact that it has wide-spread application to the community, and moral ideas of the lay followers have been suited to the needs of the society for good and perfect social order. They are still useful in the perfect social order. They are still useful in the daily life of man, whether he be a Jain or non-Jain. A perfect social order would be possible if we follow the Vratas carefully. The Aṇuvrata movement started by Muni Tulsiji is a welcome crusade against the evils in society, and the most useful effort towards establishing a coherent, healthy and moral social order. The supreme importance of the lay ethics as given by the Jains has been clear by the *aticāras* (infractions) elaborately mentioned by the Ācāryas.

The ethical ideal of a Jain is not mere pleasure of the senses nor gratification of the body. Pleasures of the senses are insatiable. More we get them the more we want and the more pained we are. There is glue as it were in pleasure : those who are not given to pleasure are not soiled by it; those who love pleasure must wander about in Saṃsāra, those who do not will be liberated. Like the two clods of clay, one wet and the other dry, flung at the wall, those who love pleasure get clogged to the influx of Karma, but the passionless are free.² Not the pleasures of the moment nor even the greatest happiness of the greatest number are attractions to the truly pious, for, their ultimate end is to attain perfection and to lead other men to the path of righteousness. Yet the Jain does not say that pleasures of the senses are to be completely avoided, specially for the lay disciple. And mortification of the body is equally one-sided. Rigorous asceticism for a monk is a means to an end and not an end in itself. For a lay follower, he may continue his occupation, earn money, live a family life and enjoy normal

1. *Jaina Yoga* p. XX

2. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, XXV. 41-43 (S. B. E. Vol. XLV.)

acceptable pleasures of life in good spirit according to the needs and status of an individual in society.

Jainism aims at self-realization, and the self to be realised is the transcendental and pure self. The empirical self is to be cared for and its energy is to be channelised in the direction of the attainment of the highest ideal of Mokṣa.

SAMLEKHANĀ: In the present political life of our country, fasting unto death for specific ends has been very common. The *Manu Smṛti* mentions some traditional methods of fasting unto death in order to get back the loan that was once given. The *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* refers to the Brahmins resorting to fast in order to obtain justice or protest against the abuses. Religious suicide is occasionally commended by the Hindus. With a vow to some deity they starve themselves to death, enter fire and throw themselves down a precipice.¹

The Jainas were opposed to such forms of death. They called such death as unwise (*bāla-maraṇa*). It has no moral justification. The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* condemns such practices and states that those who use weapons, throw themselves into the fire and water, and use things not prescribed by the rules of conduct, are liable to be caught in the wheel of *samsāra*. Such persons are caught in the *moha-dharma*.² Fasting unto death for specific purposes has an element of coercion which is against the spirit of non-violence.

However, the Jainas have commended fasting as an important means to self-realization. Among the austerities, fasting is the most conspicuous; the Jainas have developed it into a kind of art. They have reached a remarkable proficiency in it.³ The Jaina monks and the laymen have to fast at regular intervals for their spiritual progress. More important is fasting unto death. It is called *Samlekhanā*. The Jainas have worked out a scientific analysis of *Samlekhanā*.⁴

1. *The Manu Smṛti*. VIII. 49.

2. JACOBI (H.) : E. R. R. Vol. IV p. 484. *Death and the Disposal of the Dead*.

3. *Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra* XXXVI, (260).

4. JACOBI (H.) : *Studies in Jainism*, p. 84.

5. *Ib'id.*

Fasting unto death for specific purposes has raised moral problems. The question whether it would be a suicide and as such unjustifiable has been persistently asked with no relevant answer. The Jaina theory of *Samlekhanā* has raised similar problems. It is a much misunderstood doctrine, both in its theory and practice. Radhakrishnan makes mention of it as a form of suicide.¹ The Rev. Dr. A. C. Bouquet Trinity College, Cambridge, states that the attitude of the Stoic towards his own death seems to be curious. He claims that one is entitled to do whatever one likes with one's own life. Perhaps the Jaina, 'if interrogated, might say the same thing'.² He gives an instance of Zeno who is said to have suffocated himself to death in his old age because he had damaged one of his hands. It can only be said that a better understanding of the Jaina theory of *Samlekhanā* would dispel the misgivings about it as a form of suicide and as an act of disregard for life. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse the theory and practice of *Samlekhanā* as the Jainas presented.

According to Jainas, the individual souls are pure and perfect in their real nature. They are substances distinct from matter. Through the incessant activity, the souls get infected with matter. The Karma, which is of eight types and which is material in nature accumulates and vitiates the soul from its purity. The souls get entangled in the wheel of *Samsāra*. This is beginningless, though it has an end. The end to be achieved is the freedom from the bonds of this empirical life. It is to be achieved through the three 'jewels'—right intuition, right knowledge and right action.³ The way to Mokṣa, which is the final end, is long *arduous*. The moral codes of religious practices, which are rigorous, gradually lead to self-realization. In the final phase of self-realisation, as also in emergencies, the Jaina devotee, a monk or a householder (*śrāvaka*) is enjoined to abstain from food and drink gradually and fast unto death. Death is not the final end and destruction of self. It is only casting off the body, freedom from the bonds of life. We are

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) . *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 327.

2. BOUQUET A. C. (Rev. : Stoics and Buddhists paper read at 35th Session : Indian Philosophical Congress. Waltair, 1960. Journal Selected papers p. 16.

3. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*. I.

asked to accept a quiet death, as far as possible, within the limits of our capacity. This is *Samlekhanā*.

Samlekhanā is a step towards self-realization. It is meant to free oneself from the bonds of the body, which is no longer useful. It is described as the process of self-control by which senses, pleasures and passions are purged off and destroyed. It is called *samādhi-marāṇa* or *saṁnyāsa-marāṇa*. For a Jaina, the final emancipation by *Samlekhanā* is the ideal end to be devoutly to be wished for. If a pious man, self-controlled throughout his life were to die a common death, all his efforts at a spiritual progress would be wasted. He will not be free from the wheel of *Samsāra*, because *Samlekhanā* is the highest form of *tapas*.¹

But *Samlekhanā* is not to be taken lightly. It is not to be universally practised without distinguishing individual capacity and motivation. Certain specific conditions are laid down, which are to be strictly followed if one is to practise such fast unto death. *Samlekhanā* is to be adopted in two cases : a) in cases of emergencies and b) as the end of a regular religious career. The two forms of *Samlekhanā* are equally applicable to the monks and laymen.

a) As an emergency measure, we are to fast unto death only when we are faced with terrible famine, when overpowered by foreign domination, at the time of spiritual calamities when it would be impossible for us to live a pious life and to do the duties as a good citizen.² The same should be practised when we are in the grip of an incurable disease and when we are too old as not to be able to live normal righteous life. In these cases we have to depend on others. We become a burden to society without any possibility of reciprocating the good either for one-self or for others. Under such circumstances only should we decide to end this life by fasting unto death. If a monk falls ill and it is not possible for him to continue the practice of his vows and to lead the ascetic life, he should decide to take *Samlekhanā*.³ In all these cases, however,

1. *Ratnakarandaka-Śrāvakācāra*, 123.

2. *Bhagavati Arādhana*, 15.

3. JACOB (H) : 'Death and the Disposal of the Dead' ERE, Vol. IV, p. 484.

one has perforce to take the permission of the teacher who will give permission to practise Samlekhanā only after examining the capacity of the individual. One who has not the strength of will is forbidden to take Samlekhanā.

b) Samlekhanā forms a regular religious career both for ascetics and householders. A householder (*śrāvaka*) has to go through a regular religious career through the gradual practice of eleven *pratimās* (stages of conduct). In the last stage, he becomes practically a monk. At the end of the period, he abstains from food and drink and devotes himself to self-mortification. He continues his fast, patiently waiting for death. In the case of the monk, the practice of Samlekhanā may last twelve years. For the householder who has practically become a monk it would take twelve months. Firm faith in Jainism, observance of Vratas (vows) and Samlekhanā according to rules at the time of death, constitute the duties of the householder.¹ A Jaina monk must prepare himself by a course of graduated fasting lasting as long as twelve years. If, however, he is sick and is unable to maintain the course of rigid self-discipline to which he is vowed he may fast unto death without any preliminary preparation². The Jaina tradition looks at Samlekhanā as the highest end to be achieved in the course of the spiritual struggle, and finds there no cause for tears.³ But it has to be noted that even at this stage, such a course of death has to be adopted only with the permission of the teacher. The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* exhorts the monks to practise this great penance as the final end of the religious course to reach the triumphant end of spiritual struggle.⁴ In the *Manu Smṛti* we get a similar instruction to the ascetics. They are asked to walk straight, fully determined in the north-easterly direction, subsisting on water and air, until the body sinks to rest.⁵ This is the great journey (*mahāvrasthāna*) which ends in death. When the ascetic is incurably diseased or meets with a great misfortune he should accept voluntary death. It is taught in the Śāstras; it is not opposed to

1. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, II. Introduction, pp. 69-70.

2. *Sources of Indian Tradition*, Part II, A. L. BASU p. 69.

3. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, I, 7, 6.

4. *Ibid.* 17, 6.

5. *The Manu Smṛti*. (SPE Vol. XXV) VI, 11.

the Vedic rules which forbid suicide.¹ Bühler remarks that voluntary death by starvation was considered at that time to be a befitting conclusion of a hermit life. The antiquity and the general prevalence of the practice may be inferred from the fact that the Jaina ascetics too consider it particularly meritorious.² Among the Mahārāstra mystics we mention the name of Jñāneśvara who gave up his life voluntarily, though it cannot be compared to the Jain vow of Samlekhanā.³ It is necessary to note that, according to the Jāinas, Samlekhanā is to be practised only when ordinarily death is felt imminent.

At the proper time, having taken the permission of Guru, one must prepare oneself for the practice of this type of end. It needs physical and mental preparation. Gradual development of self-control is to be effected; the passions have to be conquered, emotions subdued and the urges to be controlled and channelised to the fulfilment of the desired end. One should contemplate on the importance of virtues. Having called relatives and friends, one should seek their forgiveness for any transgressions in conduct—‘should forgiveness give and take.’ With malice towards none and charity for all one should start the practice of Samlekhanā. In the *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvaka-cāra*, we get the description of mental preparation for the fast, we should conquer all emotional excitement, like fear, anger and grief. We should overcome love, attachment and hatred, with a peace of mind which is not possible by craving for anything empirical, we should reach the mental dignity and calm which is rarely possible in the turmoil of this world.⁴

The gradual process of self-mortification is psychologically significant. It is not to be a slow death, nor is it meant to intensify the rigour of mortification. The primary motive is to make the person physically and mentally prepared to accept the inevitable end to lighten the burden of pain. It is very important to note that we are told not to desire for death nor for life during the

1. *The Manu Smṛiti*, comment.

2. *Ibid*, commentary Bühler.

3. *Nāmadeva Gāthā* (Poona 1924) *Samādhi Prakaraṇa*.

4. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvaka-cāra*, 126.

practice of *Samlekhanā*.¹ We are not to be ruffled or agitated with hopes for life or fear of death. We have to be free from the memories of the friendly attachment and the anxiety for the heavenly bliss. Quickly reducing the flesh by increasing the pace of fasting may give rise to emotional excitement and morbid thoughts, which are harmful to the undisturbed spiritual end.²

Fasting has, therefore, to be gradual without in any way disturbing the physical and the moral poise. We should first give up solid food and take liquid food like milk and butter milk. Then we should start taking only warm water. In the last stage, even the water has to be given up. We should wait for the end, reciting hymns (*pañcanamāskāra-māntṛa*). All this has to be done gradually and keeping in mind the capacity of the individual.

The analysis of the process of *Samlekhanā* shows that it has two primary stages, which are sometimes referred to as of two types. The first requisite is the mental discipline and then comes the mortification of the body by fasting. Accordingly, a distinction has been made in the practice of *Samlekhanā* as a) the mental discipline (*kaṣāya-samlekhanā*) which consists in the control of the passions and the attainment of the perfect equanimity of mind; b) practice of fasting gradually which leads to the gradual mortification of the body (*kāya-samlekhanā*).³ The two are complementaries to each other, although the mental discipline is a necessary condition of the fast unto death.

A fundamental question whether *Samlekhanā* is not to be described as a form of suicide and as such unjustifiable, has been raised by some. We referred to this doubt earlier. But, from the analysis of the theory and practice of *Samlekhanā* so far given it can be said that *Samlekhanā* cannot be described as suicide. It does not contain the elements to make it suicide. It cannot be called suicide because :

1. *Eatnakaraṇḍaka*, 126, 127

2. *Abhidhāna Rājendra*, Vol. VII, p. 214

3. *Ibid.*

a) Destruction of life may be described as of three types : i) self-destruction (*ātmavādha*); ii) destruction of others (*pāra-vādha*); and iii) destruction of both (*ubhaya-vādha*).

But *Samlekhanā* is neither of these. It is not motivated by any desire for killing. It is not filled with attachment or aversion. No passions envelop the person. It is free from any form of craving. Such is not the case in suicide or homicide.¹ *Pūjyapāda* mentions that *Samlekhanā* cannot be called suicide because there is no *rāga* (excitement of passions) in it. He compares the layman taking *Samlekhanā* to a householder who has stored goods in a ware-house. If there is danger he will try to save the whole building, but if that becomes impossible he does his best to preserve at least the goods. The ware-house is the body and the goods are the *Vratas*.²

b) One who practises *Samlekhanā* must not be agitated by the desire for life nor for death. He should not, for a moment, feel that he would live for some more time; nor should he feel over-powered by the agony of the fast; he should get speedy death to free himself from the pain.³ Desire for life, fear of death, memories of the days that we spent, attachment to the relatives and friends and craving for the glories of the future happiness as a consequence of the practice of *Samlekhanā* are transgressions of the vow of *Samlekhanā*. They are to be avoided at any cost.

c) It may also be noted that, according to the Jainas, the body is not to be considered as merely a prison-house to be discarded at the earliest possible moment. It is a means, a vehicle of attaining the highest end of perfection. We are reminded that it is rare to get a human life; it is rarer still that we get an opportunity of the possibility of spiritual progress. We should not wantonly cast away the human body that we have got, without making use of it for the struggle to reach the stages of self-realisation. This is possible by the control of mind and body for spiritual culture.

1. *Abhidhāna Rājendra*, Vol. VII, p. 214.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, viii. 22, with commentary by *Pūjyapāda*. Also refer to *Puruṣārtha-Siddhyupāya* of *Aṃṭacandra*, 175.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍāka Śrāvakaśāstra*, 129 Commentary.

d) Above all, the Jainas are the greatest champions of non-violence. Ahimsā is the creed of the Jaina religion. It is the first Mahāvratā (the great vow). It would be inconsistent to believe that those who considered life as sacred and those who condemned *himsā* (injury of any type) should have no regard for life and preach self-destruction.

e) It is for this reason that the Jaina considered wanton self-destruction by other methods like taking poison and falling down a precipice as a suicide *bāta-marāṇa* and as such unjustifiable.¹

The word suicide as employed includes all cases of self-destruction, irrespective of the mental conditions of the person committing the act. In its technical and legal sense, it means self-destruction by a sane person or voluntary and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of sound mind, the further qualification being added by some definitions that he must have attained years of discretion.² In this sense Samlekhanā would not be suicide, as it is not self-destruction at all. There is gradual mortification of the flesh without causing any appreciable physical and mental disturbance. The self is to be freed from the bonds of the body. From the ultimate point of view (*niścaya-naya*), the self is pure and indestructible. The practice of Samlekhanā is compared to cutting or operating a boil on the body, which cannot be called destruction of the body.³ In this sense Samlekhanā is described as the final freedom of the soul from the bonds of life.

Whatever else may be the legal implications of suicide, we have to remember that Samlekhanā is to be looked at from the spiritual point of view.

We are in a world where spiritual values have declined. The flesh is too much with us. We cannot look beyond and pine for what is not. Samlekhanā is to be looked at as physical mortification, self-culture and spiritual salvation.

1. (i) *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* XXXVI (266). (ii) JACOB, *Death and the disposal of the Dead*—ERE. IV, p. 484. (iii) DESO S. B., *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 461.

2. *Corpus Juris*, Vol. LX, (1932) Edt. Mack. W. p. 395.

3. *Abhidhāna Rājendra*, Vol. VII, p. 220

II. A CRITIQUE OF AHIMSĀ: *Ahimsā*, non-violence, has been an important principle in the history of human civilization. As a moral injunction it was universally applicable in the religious sphere. Jesus has asked us to love our neighbour as ourselves. It has been accepted as a moral principle in Indian thought and religion. Gandhiji has extended the principle of non-violence to the social and political fields. For him non-violence was a creed. He developed a method and a technique of non-violence for attaining social and political justice. Zimmer says that *Ahimsā*, non-violence or non-killing is the first principle in the Dharma of saints or sages by which they lift themselves out of the range of the normal human action.

In the history of Indian thought *Ahimsā* arose out of the needs of resisting the excesses of violence performed in the name of religion and for the sake of salvation at the time of sacrifices. Animal sacrifice was prevalent in the Vedic and to some extent in Upaniṣadic periods. However, a gradual awareness of undesirability of animal sacrifice was being felt at the time of Upaniṣads. In the Upaniṣads we get passages where the virtues of non-violence have been upheld. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* life is described as a great festival in which qualities like *tapas*, self-renunciation and *Ahimsā* (non-violence) are expressed.¹

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* we are asked to meditate on horse sacrifice.² Self-discipline, generosity, straight-forwardness and *ahimsā* are the qualities that one should develop.³ Radhakrishnan writes that the authors of the Upaniṣads had a sufficient sense of the historic to know that their protest would become ineffective if it should demand a revolution in things.⁴ In the *Bhagavadgītā* we get a description of the qualities that we should possess in order to be perfect.⁵ Absolute non-injury is prescribed by the Yoga system.⁶ *Himsā* is the root of all evil. It should be

1. *Chān. Up.* iii, 16.

2. *Bṛh. Up.* i. 1, 2.

3. *Chān. Up.* iii.

4. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 148 Allen & Unwin 1941.

5. *Bhagavadgītā*. Canto, 16.

6. *Yoga Sūtra* ii, 30 and *Bhāṣya*.

avoided by all means. Non-injury is the root of all negative and positive virtues. The Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, Buddhism and Jainism agree on this point.

The protests against animal sacrifice were more pronounced and vehement from the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddha was against animal sacrifice and the rituals. He described the priests as 'tricksters' and using holy words for pay. In the *Mahāvagga* we get a description of the instructions the Buddha gave to the disciples regarding the acceptance of food.¹ He asked his disciples not to injure any animal on a purpose or for sport.² In Aśoka's edicts we get regulations for the protection of animals and birds; forests were not to be burnt, not even chaff containing living things. However, the protests from the Jainas were more vehement and explicit. In fact non-violence is the cardinal principle of Jainism : *Ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ*. It has now been clear that non-violence has been preached by the Jainas much earlier than Mahāvira. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* gives the description of the meeting of Keśi, a disciple of Pārśva, and Gautama, a disciple of Vardhamāna, for a discussion regarding the agreement in the doctrines of the two Prophets.³ Pārśva was the twenty-third Tirthamkara who lived about two hundred and fifty years before Vardhamāna. He preached four moral injunctions or Vratas. Ahiṃsā was one of them. Vardhamāna carried the traditions of Pārśva and added one more Vrata.⁴ It appears that *ahiṃsā* as a moral injunction must have been a pre-Aryan principle which was later assimilated in the Aryan way of life. The Jainas made non-violence the most fundamental principle of their religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principle, almost to the point of making it a science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to *ahiṃsā*.

The Jaina theory of *ahiṃsā* has influenced the way of Indian thought for centuries. Gandhiji's *satyāgraha* has been built up

1. Rhys D AVIDS. *Buddhist India*, p. 215.

2. *The Vinaya Texts* XVIII, p. 117.

3. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, XXIII and Comments by JACOB in S.B.E. Vol. XLV. Part II, p. 193.

4. *History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, BARUA, Ch. XXVI.

on the analysis of non-violence by the Jainas. Gandhiji was influenced by the Jaina saints. Zimmer writes that Gandhiji's programme of Satyāgraha as an expression of Ahimsā is a serious, very brave and potentially vastly powerful modern experiment in the ancient Hindu science.¹ Polak said that the first five of Gandhi's vows were the code of Jaina monks during two thousand years.² Gandhiji has himself stated that he derived much benefit from the Jaina religious works as from the scriptures of other great faiths of the world.³

But the Jaina theory and practice of *ahimsā* has often been misunderstood. Even eminent scholars have not been able to look at the practice of *ahimsā* in the right context. Some of the excesses of the practice of *ahimsā* have been mentioned with a view to showing that the principle is not self-consistent. Monier Williams, in his article on Jainism, mentioned that the Jainas outdo every other Indian sect in carrying the prohibition to the most preposterous extremes. The institution of Panjrapol, the hospital for diseased animals in Bombay, has been cited as an example. The Jainas and Vaiṣṇavas help this institution liberally.⁴ Mrs. Stevenson said that the principle of Ahimsā is scientifically impossible for a life motto, since it is contrary to the code of nature.⁵ Zimmer also mentions some of the curious excesses of the practice of non-violence by the Jainas in Bombay.⁶

It is, therefore, necessary to see the Jaina view of *ahimsā* in its full perspective and to see if it is really 'scientifically impossible' to take Ahimsā as a creed of one's life, as Gandhiji did.

The Jaina theory of Ahimsā is based on the animistic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic. All things are divided into the living and the non-living. The Jainas believe in the plurality of the Jīvas, living individuals. The Jīvas in the phenomenal

1. *Philosophies of India* by ZIMMER, p. 172.

2. *Mahatma Gandhi* by H. S. L. POLAK and others, p. 112.

3. *Letter from Gandhiji in Modern Review*, October 1916.

4. *Studies in Buddhism* (1933), Calcutta, p. 105.

5. *The Heart of Jainism* (Humphrey Milford) 1915, p. 287.

6. *Philosophies of India* by ZIMMER, p. 251.

world, *samsāri jīvas*, are classified on the basis of various principles like the status and the number of sense organs. There are the *sthāvara jīvas*, the immovable souls. This is a vegetable kingdom. There are one-sensed organisms, like earth-bodied, water-bodied and the plants. They possess the sense of touch. The animals with movements are called *trasa jīvas*. They have more than one sense and up to five senses according to the degree of development.

The Jīvas are possessed of *prāṇas*, the life forces. In the Jaina scriptures ten kinds of life forces are mentioned, like the five senses, mind, speech and body, respiration and the age force. The Jīvas possess different forces according to the degree of their perfection.

On the basis of this analysis of the living organisms and the life forces possessed by them, Ahimsā is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual or a life force of the individual by the three Yogas, activities, and three *karapas*. We are not to injure any living organism, however small it may be, or a life force of the organism directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf, or even giving consent to the act of injury caused by others. These are the three Yogas. For instance, we should not kill an animal. We should not mutilate a sense organ of the animal. We should not ourselves do this, we should not cause others to do this nor should we consent to injury caused by others. Practice of Himsā is further qualified by three Guptis they refer to three Karapas. We are asked not to injure any Jīva or *prāṇa* physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injury nor should we harbour any thought of injuring an animal.¹

The consequences of violating the principle of non-violence are misery in this world and in the next.² He who commits violence is always agitated and afflicted. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world. After death he is reborn taking a despicable life.³

1. *Tattvārtha Sātra and Commentary*, VII. 5.

2. *ibid.* and *Sarvārhasiddhi*, VII. 5-9.

3. *ibid.*

It gives a rigorous principle of Ahimsā to be practised by all. We are enjoined to abstain from Himsā very strictly, directly or indirectly, in body, mind and speech. In this sense the principle of Ahimsā would appear to be abstract and the practice impossible. Every moment we have to tread on life, however minute it may be. In the struggle for existence, complete abstinence from injury would make life itself impossible. Movement of any sort in this world would be impossible.

The Jains were aware of this difficulty. They were aware that it would be difficult to accept unqualified practice of non-violence in the sense presented so far. In fact, the Jaina scriptures did not preach the practice of such unqualified and abstract principle of Ahimsā. The principle of Ahimsā had to be fitted with the possible practice in this world. The right understanding of Ahimsā would be possible if we analyse the concept of Himsā or violence.

In the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* we read that *himsā* is injury or violence caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence, and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred.¹ In *Yasastilaka* Somadeva defines *himsā* as injury to living beings through error of judgement. He says “*yat syāt pramādayogena prāṇiṣu prāṇahāpanam*”. This definition of *himsā* has two elements : i) injury to life and ii) the motivation of causing injury. To injure another life is to cause pain to it, but mere injury may not be characterised as *himsā*. It has to be considered with reference to motive. It would be called *himsā* if it is impelled by passions and feelings like attachment, hate and prejudice, if it is due to negligence or carelessness. Such injury is contaminated with feelings. Similarly violence caused or induced with a specific and conscious purpose would be *himsā*. For instance, negligence brings sin; and the soul is defiled even though there may not be any actual injury to life. On the contrary a careful and a pious man who is not disturbed by passions and who is kind towards animals will not suffer the sin of violence even if, by accident, injury is caused to life.² We may call this motivation for violence “the mental set” for *himsā*. This

1. *Pratītyasamutpāda pramādayogopaniṣad himsā*, T.S. VII 8.

2. *Pratītyasamutpāda* by Kuṇḍakundaśāstra, 3, 17.

analysis of *himsā* gives the emphasis on the motive theory of conduct in morality although consequences are not altogether ignored. The utilitarians emphasised that rightness of an action depends on the consequence of the action and not to be determined by the motive. The Jains have, in a sense, combined the two views, from their Anekānta attitude. One of the conditions of *himsā* is physical injury to life. But more important than the physical injury is the inner motive. Speaking harsh words is *himsā*; harbouring evil thoughts is also *himsā*. However, the inner motive for injury to life does bring its own consequence in the form of accumulation of Karma and the defilement of the soul.

We are, thus, saved from the avoidable fear of defiling our souls due to violence for which we may not be really responsible nor even aware of.

The fear and the suffering due to fear of causing injury to living beings, are further reduced by the specific injunctions of the scriptures. According to the Jaina Śāstras the practice of the vow of Ahimsā is to be graded in two levels. On the higher level are the ascetics, men who have renounced the world. On the lower level are the persons who still pursue the things of this world.

The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* gives a detailed description of the rules to be followed by the homeless ascetics in the practice of the vow of non-violence. The ascetics have to practice five great vows, Mahāvratas, in all their severity. *Ahimsā* is the first among the five great vows. The ascetic must try to avoid injuring any form of life including one-sensed organisms to the best of his ability and as far as it is humanly possible. For instance, he must walk carefully along the trodden path so as to detect the presence of insects; he must use gentle form of expression; and he should be careful as to the food given to him by others. The injunctions for the practice of non-violence by the Munis are very strict and severe. But, in the case of the householder, a more liberal view is taken in giving instructions for the practice of non-violence and other Vratas. Non-violence is one of the *anuvratas*. The householder is to see that he does not injure any living being as far as possible and intentionally. In the *Ratnakiraṇḍaka śrāvukācāra*, the householder is enjoined not to cause injury himself or be an

agent for such injury knowingly, *saṃkalpāt*. He should be free from *sthūla-himsā*. In his case the prohibition of *himsā* begins with two sensed organisms, because it would be impossible for him to practise non-injury to one-sensed organisms, intentionally or unintentionally in the conduct of his daily life. He is, therefore, exempted from this restriction.¹

Even in this practice of non-violence, certain forms of injury are permitted as exceptional cases. For instance, it is recognised as a duty of Kṣatriya, the warrior class, to defend the weak even with arms. In the *Ādipurāṇa*² there is a description that Rṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara, gave training to his subjects in agriculture, in trade and in the use of arms. However, the householders are strictly forbidden to cause injury even in the lowest animals wantonly and on purpose. *Himsā* caused to animals while doing his duty, accidentally and unintentionally and while in the pursuit of just cause is not considered to be a sin. In the *Yasastilaka*, Somadeva forbids the Kṣatriya to indulge in indiscreet killing even in battle.

We are here reminded of Gandhiji's words when he said that violence is preferred to cowardice. He exhorted the Indian women to resist the attacks of the gundas even with violence, if necessary. He said 'I do believe that where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. Hence it was that I took part in the Boer War, so called Zulu Rebellion and the late War.'³ But Gandhiji said that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence. Forgiveness adorns the soldier. For the Jainas also, non-violence is not the policy of the weak. It needs self-control. A self-controlled man is free from fear, fear of doing injury or injustice. The bases of Ahimsā must be self-confidence and peace of mind. A coward has no moral strength to observe non-violence. One who stands courageous and undisturbed in the face of violence is a true follower of *ahimsā*. He looks at the enemy as a friend. Gandhiji said that a mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows

1. *Cāritrādhipikāro*, 53.

2. *Ādipurāṇa*, 16.

3. *Young India*, August 11, 1920, Doctrine of the Sword.

itself to be torn to pieces by her.' He said non-violence is the law of our species, while violence is the law of the brute.

Non-violence is not mere non-injury in the negative sense. It has also a positive content. It implies the presence of cultivated and noble sentiments, like kindness and compassion for all living creatures. It also implies self-sacrifice. The Buddha renounced the pleasures of the world out of compassion for all living creatures. Jesus was filled with compassion when he said "whoever shall smite thee in the right cheek, turn to him the other also".² He demanded self-sacrifice. In the *Yatastilaka*, Somadeva enumerates qualities that should be cultivated to realise the ideal of *ahimsā*. The qualities are 1) *maitrī*, a disposition not to cause any suffering to any living being in mind, body and speech, 2) *pramoda*, affection coupled with respect for men eminent for their virtues and religious-austerities, 3) *kārunya*, will to help the poor and 4) *mādhyasthya*, an equitable attitude. *Ahimsā* is, thus, a positive virtue and it resolves itself into *jīva-dayā*, compassion for living creatures.³

It may be noted that the practice of *ahimsā* is primarily meant to save our souls. *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* relate only to one's soul and not to those of others. *Ahimsā* is kindness to others, but it is kindness to the extent that we save others from the sin of violence. If we give pain to anyone we lower ourselves. Self-culture is the main problem in the practice of *Ahimsā*. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* it is said that if a person causes violence out of greed or if he supports such violence of others, he increases the enemies of his own soul.⁴

In the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* we are asked to consider ourselves to be in the position of the persons or animals to whom we want to cause injury.⁵ Gandhiji said, "I believe in loving my enemies, I believe

1. *Young India*, August 11, 1920.

2. *Mathew*, 5, 39-42.

3. *Yatastilaka*, 334-337.

4. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I.1.

5. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, v.1

in non-violence as the only remedy open to Hindus and Muslims. I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart'.¹

This is the content of the Jaina theory of *ahimsā*. It is possible to say that the doctrine of *Ahimsā* is not abstract nor inconsistent with the laws of nature. The practice of *Ahimsā* is not also impossible. It is true that there have been some excesses in the practice of *ahimsā* both in the injunctions of the *Sāstras* and in the practice by enthusiastic devotees. However, these excesses can be properly understood if they are looked at in the historical perspective. Jains developed polemic against animal sacrifice and violence caused to animals at the time of worship : their protests were vigorous. The excesses of practice were meant to overcome the difficulties and to impress on the necessity of saving the animals from the pitiless injuries caused to them. The influence of the Jaina concept of *ahimsā* has been tremendous on the history of the religious practices in India. Animal sacrifices had to be given up to satisfy the demands of the Buddhists and primarily the Jains.

That living beings live is no kindness, because they live according to their age of *āyus-karma*. That they die is no *himsā* because when the *āyus-karma* is complete beings die without any exterior cause. Natural death without any cause is not *himsā*. It is only those who kill or injure that are guilty of *himsā*, although it may be argued that the animal that is killed dies because its *āyus-karma* is complete. We should not be the cause of its death. Not to kill or injure any living being is kindness. *Ahimsā* is beneficial to all beings, to the persons who practise *ahimsā* and those who are saved by *ahimsā*. In *ahimsā* there is a force of the soul. It destroys all anxiety, disorder and cowardice. *Ahimsā* can overcome and defeat the most cruel brute force. Gandhiji has shown this by the Satyāgraha movement against the mighty British Empire. Zimmer said that Gandhiji's Satyāgraha confronted great Britain's untruth with Indian truth. This is the battle waged on the colossal modern scale, and according to the principles from the text books not of the Royal Military College but of Brahman.² The *Praśna Vyākaraṇa Sūtra* gives sixty names ascribed to

1. 'Love and Hate' 1922. *Young India*, December 1920.

2. *Philosophies of India*, ZIMMER, p. 172.

ahimsā and states that *ahimsā* does good to all.¹ Gandhiji said when Motilal Nehru and others were arrested that victory is complete if non-violence reigns supreme in spite of the arrest; we are out to be killed without killing; by non-violence, non-co-operation we seek to conquer the English administrators and their supporters.²

It is the sacred duty of every Indian to fight for the nation in this hour of difficulty. On this depends our honour and integrity. This is a war, if it may be called so, not for the sake of war but for the sake of vindicating our right of existence as a free nation. Violence in self-defence is not to be considered as unjustified as long as we live and take interest in the activities of this life. And live we must; we must also take due share of the responsibility in social and political life in our country, although the consummation of the ideal would be renunciation. But universal renunciation is equally unjustified from the point of view of social good, unless one is a 'heaven-born prophet' or an ascetic.

However, even in performing the duties of a citizen in defending our country we should see that we use the minimum of violence and sparingly. This is in keeping with the tradition of our country.

Still, this does not mean we have given up the significance of non-violence as a supreme principle of life and spirituality. We are now only to be aware of our imperfection and to adjust ourselves as best as we can in this imperfect life. We pursue the ends of this life, and moving on the wheel of life we have to see that our duty to others is also important in its own way. Considered from the perspective of history and the present conditions of our society, it would appear strange that, we, in India, steeped in spirituality, should be disillusioned and now affirm the primacy of material progress; stranger still, that with our firm faith in non-violence, we should prepare ourselves for the inevitable war. But analysis of non-violence so far given shows that non-violence as preached by the Jainas would dispel our illusions about the impossibility of the practice of non-violence. We have tried to justify the ways of man

1. *Prajñā Vyākaraṇa Sūtra*, Ch. I, Sūtra II.

2. The Doctrine of the Sword. *Young India*, Aug. 11, 1920.

to man in our preparedness for national defence, specially when we are threatened by the enemies at our frontiers.

Thus, the principle of non-violence is important in the context of the present political situation of the world. That will save the world from the fear of distress and war. Non-violence, as Gandhiji said, is not meant only for saints. It is meant for the common people as well.

Romain Rolland said that the *Rsis* who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence were greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington. He said, with Gandhiji, that non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.¹ Non-violence would be a panacea for the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace on earth.

1. *Mahatma Gandhi* by Romain Rolland, p. 48.

CHAPTER VIII

MEN OR GODS

I. NATURE OF DIVINITY IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY : Religion as a way of life and not merely as an institution, has been natural to man. It is man's reaction to the totality of things as he apprehends it. It implies an interpretation of nature and the meaning of the universe. It seeks to go beyond the veil of visible things and finds an inexhaustible fund of spiritual power to help him in life's struggle. And the 'presence' of god gave strength for man in his struggles in this life. The ways of god to man and man to god have been rich and varied. It may be, as Prof. Leuba pointed out, that fear was the first of the emotions to become organised in human life, and out of this fear God was born. Perhaps love and gratitude are just as natural, as much integral parts of the constitution of man, as fear; and gods were friendly beings. It is still possible that men have looked at gods with a living sense of kinship and not with the vague fear of the unknown powers.¹ We do not know. But one thing is certain that in higher religions fear is sublimated by love into an adoring reverence.² From the fear of the Lord in *The Old Testament* to the worship of God 'with godly fear and awe' is not a far cry.

In the Vedic period, we find a movement of thought from polytheism to monotheism and then to monism. The poetic souls contemplated the beauties of nature and the Indo-Iranian gods, like Deus, Varuna, Uśas and Mitra were products of this age. Other gods like Indra were created to meet the needs of the social and political adjustments. Many gods were created; many gods were worshipped. Then a weariness towards the many gods began to be felt as they did not know to what god they should offer oblations. Then a theistic conception of God as a creator of the universe was developed out of this struggle for the search for a divine being. In ancient Greece, Xenophanes was against the

1. SMITH (U. R.) : *Religion of the Semites*, p. 55.

2. D. MIALI-EDWARDS : *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 61.

polytheism of his time. Socrates had to drink hemlock as he was charged of denying the national gods. He distinguished between many gods and the one God who is the creator of the universe.

2. THE JAINA ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOD: But the Jainas were against gods in general and even the God as creator. They presented several arguments against the theistic conception of God. They deny the existence of a Creator God and refute the theistic arguments of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyika argument that the world is of the nature of an effect created by an intelligent agent who is God (Īśvara) cannot be accepted because:

- i) It is difficult to understand the nature of the world as an effect:
 - a) if effect is to mean that which is made of parts(*sāvayava*) then even space is to be regarded as effect;
 - b) if it means coherence of a cause of a thing which was previously nonexistent, in that case one cannot speak of the world as effect as atoms are eternal;
 - c) if it means that which is liable to change, then God would also be liable to change; and he would need a creator to create him and another and so on ad infinitum. This leads to infinite regress.
- ii) Even supposing that the world as a whole is an effect and needs a cause, the cause need not be an intelligent one as God because:
 - a) if he is intelligent as the human being is, then he would be full of imperfections, as human intelligence is not perfect;
 - b) if his intelligence is not of the type of human intelligence but similar to it, then it would not guarantee inference of the existence of God on similarity, as we cannot infer the existence of fire on the ground of seeing steam which is similar to smoke;
 - c) we are led to a vicious circle of argument if we can say that the world is such that we have a sense that some one

* Guṇaratna, *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*.

made it, as we have to infer the sense from the fact of being created by God.

iii) If an agent had created the world, he must have a body. For, we have never seen an intelligent agent without a body. If a god is to produce an intelligence and will, this is also not possible without embodied intelligence.¹

iv) Even supposing a non-embodied being were to create the world by his intelligence, will and activity, there must be some motivation :

a) if the motive is just a personal whim, then there would be no natural law or order in the world;

b) if it is according to the moral actions of men, then he is governed by moral order and is not independent;

c) if it is through mercy, there should have been a perfect world full of happiness;

d) if men are to suffer by the effects of past actions (*adṛṣṭa*) then the *adṛṣṭa* would take the place of God.

But, if God were to create the world without any motive but only for sport it would be 'motiveless malignity'.²

v) God's omnipresence and omniscience cannot also be accepted, because :

a) if he is everywhere, he absorbs into himself everything into his own self, leaving nothing to exist outside him;

b) his omniscience would make him experience hell, as he would know everything and his knowledge would be direct experience.³

vi) It is not possible to accept the Naiyāyika contention that without the supposition of God, the variety of the world would be inexplicable, because we can very well posit other alternatives like (i) the existence of the natural order and (ii) a society of gods to explain the universe.

1. *Syādvādamamājarī* of Malliṣeṇa on Hemacandra's *Anyayoga-Vyavachhedha-Dvātrīṃśikā*. Edt. DHRUVA A. B. Introduction.

2. *ibid*, 6.

3. Guṇaratne, *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*.

But if a society of gods were to quarrel and fall out as it is sometimes contended, then the nature of gods would be quite so unreliable, if not vicious, that we cannot expect elementary co-operation that we find in ants and bees.

The best way, therefore, is to dispense with God altogether.

We find similar objections against the acceptance of a theistic God, in Buddhism also.¹ The Buddha was opposed to the conception of *Īśvara* as a creator of the universe. If the world were to be thus created, there should be no change nor destruction, nor sorrow nor calamity.

If *Īśvara* were to act with a purpose, he would not be perfect, that would limit his perfection. But if he were to act without a purpose his actions would be meaningless like a child's play.

There is nothing superior to the law of Karma. The sufferings of the world are intelligible only on the basis of the law of Karma. Though the Buddha admits the existence of the gods like Indra and Varuṇa, they are also involved in the wheel of *Samsāra*.

We have, so far, seen that the Jainas, as also the Buddhists, were against the theistic conception of God. God as a creator is not necessary to explain the universe. We have not to seek God there in the world outside, nor is God to be found 'in the dark lonely corner of a temple with doors all shut.' He is there within us. He is there with the tiller tilling the ground and the 'path-maker breaking stones', in the sense that each individual soul is to be considered as God, as he is essentially divine in nature. Each soul when it is perfect is god.

3. The Jainas sought the divine in man and established the essential divinity of man. This conception has been developed in specific directions in Jaina philosophy.

As we have seen, the existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs we can say that all the *pramāṇas* can establish the existence of the soul. It is described from the phenomenal and the

1. Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* gives a detailed description of the topic. Dialogues of Buddha. Also refer to *Syādvāda-mañjarī* for similar view.

2. Ibid.

noumenal points of view. From the phenomenal point of view, it possesses *prāṇas*, is the lord (*arabha*), doer (*kartā*), enjoyer (*bhoktā*), limited to his body (*dehamātra*), still incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma.¹ From the noumenal point of view, soul is described in its pure form. It is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and no other than itself. The joys and sorrows that the soul experiences are due to the fruits of Karma which it accumulates due to the continuous activity that it is having. This entanglement is beginningless, but it has an end. The deliverance of the soul from the wheel of *samsāra* is possible by voluntary means. By the moral and spiritual efforts involving *samvārā* and *nirjarā*, the Karma accumulated in the soul is removed. When all Karma is removed, the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of Samsāra. Being free, with its upward motion it attains liberation or Mokṣa. There is nothing other which is as perfect. There is no other God. The freed souls are divine in nature, as they are perfect and omniscient.

For the Jaina it is not necessary to surrender to any higher being, nor to ask for any divine favour for the individual to reach the highest goal of perfection. There is no place for divine grace, nor is one to depend on the capricious whims of a superior deity for the sake of attaining the highest ideal. There is emphasis on individual efforts in the moral and spiritual struggle for self-realization. One has to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual development before one reaches the final goal in the *ayogakevalī* stage.

However, the struggle for perfection is long and arduous. Few reached perfection; and perhaps, as tradition would say, none would become perfect in this age. Among those who have reached omniscience and perfection are the Tirthaṅkaras, the prophets, who have been the beacon lights of Jaina religion and culture. They have preached the truth and have helped men to cross the ocean of this worldly existence. They led men, like kindly light, to the path of spiritual progress.

Therefore, they need to be worshipped. The Jainas worship the Tirthaṅkaras not because they are gods, nor because they are powerful in any other way, but because they are human, and yet

1. *Pañcāstikāyaśāra*, 27 & *Samayasāra*, 124.

divine, as every one is divine, in his essential nature. The worship of the Tirthakaras is to remind us that they are to be kept as ideals before us in our journey to self-realization. No favours are to be sought by means of worship, nor are they competent to bestow favours on the devotees. The main motive of worship of the Tirthakaras, therefore, is to emulate the example of the perfect beings, if possible, at least to remind us that the way to perfection lies in the way they have shown us. Even this worship of Tirthankaras arose out of the exigencies of social and religious existence and survival and possibly as a psychological necessity. We find a few temples of Gandhiji today; perhaps, there would be many more. The Buddha has been deified.

Apart from the worship of Tirthakaras, we find a pantheon of gods who are worshipped and from whom favours are sought. The cult of the Yakṣiṇī worship and of other attendant gods may be cited as examples. This type of worship is often attended by the occult practices and the tantric and mantric ceremonialism. Dr. P. B. Desai shows that in Tamilnad Yakṣiṇī was allotted an independent status and raised to a superior position which was almost equal to that of the Jina. In some instances the worship of Yakṣiṇī appears to have superseded even that of Jina.¹ Padmāvatī, Yakṣiṇī of Pārśvanātha, has been elevated to the status of a superior deity with all the ceremonial worship, in Pombuccapura in Mysore area. These forms of worship must have arisen out of the contact with other competing faiths and with the purpose of popularising the Jaina faith in the context of the social and religious competition. The cult of Jvālāmālīnī with its Tantric accompaniments may be mentioned as another example of this form of worship. The promulgator of this cult was, perhaps, Helācārya of Ponnur. According to the prevailing belief at that time, mastery over spells or Mantravidyā was considered as a qualification for superiority. The Jaina Ācāryas claimed to be master Mantravadins.² Jainism had to compete with the other Hindu creeds. Yakṣi form of worship must have been introduced

1. DESAI (P. B.) : *Jainism in South India* (1957) p. 72.

2. Ibid, p. 74.

in order to attract the common men towards Jainism, by appealing to the popular forms of worship.

However, such forms of worship are foreign to the Jaina religion. They do not form an organic and constituent features of the Jaina worship. These tendencies have been absorbed and assimilated, in the struggle for existence and survival. We may, here, refer to the inconceivable changes the Buddhist forms of worship have undergone in the various countries of the world, like the Tantric forms of worship in Tibetan Lamaism.

We have still some gods in Jaina cosmogony. They are the *devas*, the gods living in heavens like the *Lhavanavāsi*, *Vyantaravāsi*, *Jyotiṣka*, and *Kalpavāsi*. But they are a part of the *Samsāra* and not really gods in the sense of superior divine beings. They are just more fortunate beings than men because of their accumulated good Karma. They enjoy better empirical existence than men. But we, humans, can pride ourselves in that the 'gods' in these worlds cannot reach *mokṣa* unless they are reborn as human beings. They are not objects of worship. It is, therefore, necessary for us to know the true nature of man and his place in society in which he lives, moves and has his being.

NATURE OF MAN

1. Dignity and freedom of the human individual has been a common principle for all philosophies and faiths, except perhaps for Nietzsche. Marx emphasised the potentiality of man by denying God. Kant exhorted us to treat every human individual as an end in himself and never as a means. Democracies are based on the equality and dignity of every human individual. In the *Mahābhārata* we are told that there is nothing higher than man.¹ According to the Jainas, the individual soul, in its pure form is itself divine, and man can attain divinity by his own efforts.

2. In India, the aim of philosophy was *ātma vidyā*. *ātmānam viddhi* was the cardinal injunction of the Upaniṣads. Yājñyavalkya explains that all worldly objects are of no value apart from the

1. *Na mānuṣāt tresthataram hi kimait.*

self.¹ Today we have a new Humanism where we are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of man in this world. Philosophical interest has shifted from nature to God and from God to man. Even the claim of absolute value for science is being questioned. Man and his values are primary, their primacy has to be acknowledged by any philosophy.²

But with all these philosophical interests, the real nature of man has been eluding us. Attempts have been made to know him. But there has not been an agreed conception of man easily to be understood and accepted by the common man.

There were philosophers like Protagoras who reduced man to mere sensations. The *Theaetetus* describes the Sophist conception of the individual as a complex of changes interacting with other forces, and seeking to satisfy the desires.³ In English empiricism, Hume denied everything including the human soul, except impressions and ideas. The Human tendency was recently revived by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Perennial problems of philosophy including the conceptions of soul were dismissed as non-sense. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in *The Republic* the empiricists refused to see beyond what they would like to affirm. In ancient Indian thought, Cārvākas led us to similar conclusions. It is said that the Buddhists denied a permanent soul. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. His disciples analysed soul as an aggregate of matter, feelings and sensations. Man is a psychological personality, and when it is analysed away *Śūnya* is realised.

However, soul of man has emerged as a permanent and eternal principle imperishable in nature. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle accepted soul as a pure eternal and imperishable principle. Plato talked of the immortality of the soul. In India, the outlook in the *Rgveda* is empirical. The gods were invoked to give cows and prosperity in this world. The idea of a permanent soul has

1. *Bṛho Up.* 2.4.50.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN and Biju : *The Concept of Man*. Introduction, p. 18.

3. PLATO : *Theaetetus*, p. 152.

yet to be evolved. In the Upaniṣads the conception of a permanent soul gained predominance. In the Dialogue between Prajāpati and Indra we get a progressive development of the definition of the soul in four stages - as i) bodily, ii) empirical, iii) transcendental and iv) the absolute.¹ The next step was to identify the self with the Absolute. As Radhakrishnan says, we may not understand the truth of the saying 'that thou art' *tat tvam asi*, but that does not give us a sufficient right to deny it.²

The idea of the self has been a fundamental conception in Jaina philosophy. The existence of the soul is a presupposition. The soul is described from the phenomenal and the noumenal points of view. All things in this world are divided into living and non-living. From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is described as possessing empirical qualities. It is possessed of four *prāṇas*. It is the lord, the doer, and the enjoyer of the fruit of Karma. As a potter considers himself a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so the mundane soul is the doer of things and the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. From the noumenal point of view, soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. Man is the *jīva* bound by matter and it assumes gross physical body. Through the operation of Karma the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Saṃsāra. When it is embodied, it is affected by the environment - physical, social and spiritual in different ways. Then it identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or the 'me', the empirical ego, and the self as knower or the I. On the same basis, distinction between the states of the soul as Bahirātman, Antarātman and Paramātman has been made.

3. Apart from the real nature of man it would be necessary to know him as an individual in his physical and social environment. As an empirical individual man lives in this life and is influenced by the environment. To some extent he is a product of the environment, at the same time shaping the other selves.

1. *Chān. Up.* VIII 3-12.

2. RADHAKRISHNAN (S) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 150.

Man cannot be separated from nature. He is a part and parcel of the interacting forces in nature. In this sense, individual men including the heaven born prophets are products of environment and social heritage. They also contribute to the development of the social life. This universe is a vale of soul making'. There is a cosmic purpose in the incessant struggle of the individuals in this world. The purpose, as translated in human efforts, is the perfection of men.

We have seen that for the attainment of this end we need not depend on higher entity called God. Efforts of individual men are more important than the forces that work outside man. This brings us to the problem of the human ideals.

4. As a social being, development of man depends on the ends that he places before himself and the means used for the attainment for those ends. The Greeks, as also the Vedic Aryans, were full of zeal for life and its beauties. The consummation of life's end was to perfect life. Truth, beauty and goodness were the highest human values. Subjectivism of Protagoras would have led him to ethical relativism. What is good for one man may not be the same for the other. But Protagoras was a teacher of virtues and was accepted as a wise man. Still the earlier Sophists expressed nihilistic views. Polus, a disciple of Gorgias, admired political power in a tyrant, though evil it may be. Thrasyarchus sneered at conventional justice as mere obedience to the wishes of those in power. 'The tyrant is the happiest man.' So was the philosopher Nietzsche fascinated by power. He preached the philosophy of power. There were others, like Aristippus, who aimed at pleasures as the highest end in life. Pleasure was to be sought by the Carvākas in ancient Indian thought. Greatest happiness of the greatest number was a modified version of this end.

However from pleasure to virtue is a long way. Socratic formula that virtue is knowledge expressed the basic insight into the synthesis of theory and practice. Plato mentioned four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, justice and wisdom. Aristotle distinguished virtues into the practical and the intellectual virtues. Both are necessary for the development of man.

1. PLATO: *Republic* 346-355, C.

In ancient Indian thought, four cardinal human values have been mentioned. *Artha*, *Kāma*, *Dharma* and *Mokṣa* are to be realised by man. They represent a hierarchy of human values. The ultimate ideal is Mokṣa. It is freedom from the bonds of life. Mokṣa as a release from the wheel of Saṃsāra and in its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest was becoming gradually clear in the Upaniṣads. The state of perfection need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jīvanmukti has played an important part in the ancient thought. Śaṅkara admits the possibility of Kramamukti. Apart from the highest ideal of mokṣa, other ideals are to be progressively realised at various levels of life. Over emphasis of one ideal will lead to a partial development of civilization. All the values are true and need each other. This is the synoptic point of view.

5. In this age of scientific development, we are giving exclusive emphasis on the material ends of life. *Artha* and *Kāma* have become important. Exclusive importance on one or the other of the human values is likely to lead to a partial development of human personality. We may either go the way of mechanising the human or divinising the man. Western civilization has advanced in scientific development through the democracy of intellect. Life in India has gone the way of overspiritualising the human, and we lost footing on earth. It is true that the ideal of life is Mokṣa, but it is also true that few of us can attain it in this life. We have, therefore, to reorientate our moral concepts so as to lead us to perfection through the progressive realization of the ideal of emancipation in the context of human life and limitations.

We have seen the Jainas have given gradations of moral practice for the realisation of the end of perfection. There are two levels of ethical codes: i) one for the layman (*śrāvaka dharma*) and ii) the other for the spiritually advanced who have given up the attachment of Saṃsāra. It is the *muni-dharma*. The moral practice for them is more rigorous than for the common man. It would be worth analysing these gradations of moral life in the context of the moral structure of present day society.

I think it would be possible to work out a synthesis of 'the way of all flesh and spirit' and find out a proper place for man in this universe. We can only say that with the advancement of science and technology for the sake of man, in our struggle to find out man we have lost him.

6. And to find out man we have to reassert the ideal of spiritual perfection without in any way disparaging the aims of empirical life. This is the Anekānta attitude. All have aimed at Mokṣa, but few have attained it. Yet it is imperative on the part of us, humans, to know the real nature of the highest perfection as presented in the ideal of Mokṣa.

III. MOKṢA AS AN IDEAL. 1. The idea of release of the soul from the wheel of Saṃsāra was common in Indian philosophy except with the Cārvāka. Philosophy was not merely an academic pursuit but it had a practical aim of the attainment of Mokṣa. The ancient Indians did not stop at the discovery of truth but strove to realize it in their own experiences. They followed up *tattvajñāna* by strenuous efforts to attain Mokṣa or liberation.'

But the conception of Mokṣa was not in the spirit of the Vedic Aryans, as they were profoundly interested in the happiness in this life. The *Rgveda* : arṃhitā largely presents the invocations of the gods for the promotion of happiness in this life. Awareness of emancipation as such is not present in the earliest recorded expressions in the Vedas. Mokṣa as a release from the wheel of Saṃsāra and its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest, was becoming gradually clear in the Upaniṣadas. In the *Chhândogya Upaniṣad*, it is still not clear. The *Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describes the release as freedom from death day or night of waxing and waning of the moon.² In the later *Upaniṣads* like the *Maṭrâyaṇī* we find new ideas 'jolting against old ones'.³

It is therefore possible to say that the conception of mokṣa or release from the bonds of empirical life is primarily pre Āryan.

1. HIRIYANNA : *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, p. 18.

2. *Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III.1.3.

3. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 8, p. 770.

It was prevalent in India before the Āryans settled here. Indian philosophy is the synthesis of two currents of thought – the Aryan and the pre-Āryan. The Jaina and the Buddhist thoughts were original and pre-Āryan. They were assimilated in the subsequent Hindu philosophy through the Upaniṣads. The Dravidian contribution to the development of Indian philosophy was no less important. The influence of forest life, the emergence of female gods and the conception of Avatāra were largely due to the Dravidian influence.¹ And so was the conception of Mokṣa brought from the pre-Āryan thought and developed in the Upaniṣads and subsequent philosophy.

Jaina religion is very ancient and pre-Āryan. It prevailed even before 1ārśva and Vardhamāna, the last two Tīrthakaras. The *Yajurveda* mentions Ṛṣabha, Ajita and Ariṣtanemi as Tīrthakaras. Jainism reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Āryan upper class of North-Eastern India.² Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive current of metaphysical speculation.³

2. For a Jaina, the highest ideal is Mokṣa, freedom from the wheel of saṃsāra. It is to be attained through right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.⁴

Due to the activity, the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Saṃsāra. This process of entanglement is beginningless but has an end. The soul gets entangled in the Saṃsāra and embodied through the operation of karma. It gets various forms due to the materially caused conditions (*upādhi*), and is involved in the cycle of birth and death.

But the Jaines believe in the inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization. The deliverance of the soul from this wheel of Saṃsāra is possible by voluntary efforts on the part of the individuals. The veil of Karma has to be removed. This is possible when the individual soul makes efforts to stop the influx of

1. *History of Philosophy (Eastern)*; ed. RADHAKRISHNAN, Ch. I.

2. ZIMMER (H.): *Philosophies of India*, Vol. I, p. 287.

3. JACOBI (HEERMANN): *Studies in Jainism*.

4. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I.1.

Karma by *saṁvara* and remove the accumulated Karma by *Nirjarā*. When all the obstacles are removed the soul becomes pure and perfect and free from the wheel *Samsāra*. Being free, with its upward motion, it attains liberation or *Mokṣa*.

However, the journey of the soul to freedom is long and arduous, because the removal of Karma involves a long moral and spiritual discipline. The journey has to be through fourteen stages of self-realization called *Gupasthāna*. The soul has gradually to remove the five conditions of bondage - *mithyātvā* (perversity), *aviran* (lack of control), *pramāda* (spiritual inertia), *kaṣāya* (passion) and *triyoga* (threefold activity of body, speech and mind). In the highest stage of spiritual realization, the soul reaches the stage of perfection and omniscience. This is the consummation of the struggle.

Radhakrishnan says that it is not possible to give a positive description of the liberated soul. The state of perfection is passively described as freedom from action and desires, a stage of utter and absolute quiescence.¹ It is a state of unaffected peace since energy of past Karma is extinguished. In this state, the soul is 'itself' and no other. It is the perfect liberation. Zimmer says that, after its pilgrimage of innumerable existence in the various inferior stratifications, the life monad rises to the cranial zone of the microscopic being, purged of the weight of the subtle Karmic particles that formerly held it down. Nothing can happen to it any more, for it has put aside the traits of ignorance, those heavy veils of individuality that are the conditioning causes of biographical events. 'In the higher stage of perfection, the individuality, the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away. "Sterilized of colouring, flavour and weight, the sublime crystals now are absolutely pure-like the drops of rain that descend from a clear sky, tasteless and emasculate."²

This state is the *Siddha* state. The liberated soul has no empirical adjuncts. It is neither long nor small, nor black nor

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.) : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 333.

2. ZIMMER (H.O.) : *Philosophies of India*, p. 260.

blue, nor bitter nor pungent. It is without body and without rebirth. He perceives and he knows all. There is no analogy to describe the condition of the liberated soul. It is difficult to give a positive description of the freed soul. It is the state in which there is freedom from action and desire, a state of rest, a passionless ineffable peace. However in terms of positive description, we are told that the liberated state has infinite consciousness, pure understanding, absolute freedom and eternal bliss.¹ It lives in this state of eternity. The freed soul has beginning but no end, while the soul in the Samsāra has no beginning but an end of that state in its freedom. From the noumenal point of view the freed soul is the absolutely unconditioned.² It is beyond the causality.⁴

It is difficult to give a clear and graphic description of the liberated soul as language is an inadequate instrument for such description. Attempts have, therefore, been made in various ways to present a picture of the state of Mokṣa in different systems in Indian philosophy. The Buddhist have been inclined to give a negative description as the extinction of every trace of individuality. It is a state of nothingness. But, some Buddhists have repudiated the negative conception of the liberated state, Nirvāṇa. The Mādhyamikas consider this stage as inexpressible. Nirvāṇa is not an end (*bhāva*) or *abhāva* (noness). It is abandonment of all such considerations of the real. The Mādhyamika conception of Nirvāṇa comes very close to the Advaita notion of *mukti* as Brahmanbhāva. Nirvāṇa is the transcendent life of the spirit.³ But Mokṣa, according to the Advaita, is the absolutely unconditioned and is characterised by infinite bliss. But for Mādhyamika, Nirvāṇa is inexpressible and cannot be identified with the Good or Bliss. According to the Naiyāyikas, Mokṣa is a state of pure existence to which a liberated soul attains and is compared to a dreamless sleep. The critic feels that the Mokṣa of the Naiyāyikas is a word without meaning. Sleep without dream

1. S. B. E. xxii. p. 54.

2. *Pañcāstikāyaśāro*, 36.

3. *Ibid.* p. 176.

4. *Dravyasamgraha*, 39-40.

5. MURTI (T. R. V.) : *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 275.

is a state of torpor, and we may as well say that a stone is enjoying supreme felicity in a sound sleep without disturbing dreams.¹ For the Sāṃkhya, salvation is phenomenal as bondage does not belong to the Puruṣa. When Puruṣa is free from the defilement of Prakṛti, it passes beyond the bondage of the Guṇas and shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss nor happiness in the state of Mukti as all feeling belongs to Prakṛti. Jaimini and Sabara did not face the problem of ultimate release. For Prabhākara, Mokṣa is a state in which there is absolute cessation of all dreams. It is a simple natural form of the soul. Kumārila states that it is a state of Ātman in itself free from all pain. Some refer it as a bliss of Ātman. For Śaṅkara Mokṣa is a state of direct realization of something which existed from eternity. When the limitations are removed the soul is liberated. It is the state of absolute peace and eternal bliss. When Avidyā vanishes, the true soul stands self-revealed, free from the impurities, as the star shines in a cloudless night.² The nature of the liberated soul is a state of oneness with Brahman. Mokṣa³ is described negatively, as the state of freedom where there is neither day nor night, where the stream of time has stopped and where the sun and the stars are no longer seen.⁴

The state of perfection of Mokṣa need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jīvanmukta has, therefore, played an important part in the ancient thought. Śaṅkara admits the possibility *kramamukti* (gradual liberation). He says that the meditation of 'Om' leads one to the Brahmaloka where one gradually attains perfect knowledge.⁵ He also admits the possibility of perfection and freedom from pain even in this life. As the potter's wheel continues for a time to revolve even after the vessel has been completed, so also life continues even after libera-

1. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.) *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 152.

2. *Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya*, I.i.4 and I, 3.19.

3. *Ibid.* 1, 1-19.

4. *Ibid.* 1.39.

5. *Ibid.* 1.39; 2.13.

tion for some time. In this stage the perfect being does not acquire new Karma. The Buddhists have also made a distinction between *upādhīṣaṇ-nirvāṇa* and *anupādhīṣaṇ-nirvāṇa*. The former comes nearer to the conception of Jīvanmukti. Similarly the distinction corresponds to *nirvāṇa* and *parinirvāṇa*. In the state of *upādhīṣaṇ-nirvāṇa*, there is the total cessation of ignorance and of passions, though the body and the mind continue to function but without passions.¹ This state corresponds to the Jīvanmukti of Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta. The Buddha after his enlightenment is a representative example. The Mahāyānists added one more type of Nirvāṇa in *apratiṣṭhita nirvāṇa*, the state of Bodhisattva who does not accept the final release although he is entitled for it. He decides to serve humanity out of compassion.

According to the Jains, in the thirteenth stage of Gaṇasthāna called *sayoga-kevali* all the passions and the four types of Ghāti Karmas are destroyed. One is free from the bondage of *mithyāṭea*, *pramāda* and passions. However, it is not free from yoga and empirical activity and is still not free from embodied existence, as the four types of non-obscuring Karma, like *vedanīya* which produces feeling, *āyu* which determines the span of life, *nāṇa* determining the physical structure and the *gotra* responsible for one's status in life are still operating. One is not free from bodily existence, because the *āyu* karma is still to be exhausted. But there is no influx of karma. In this stage we find omniscient beings like the Tirthakaras, the Gaṇadhāras and the Sāmānya-kevalins. They attain the enlightenment, but still live in this world, preaching the truth that they have seen. This stage may be compared to the Jīvanmukti described by the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta systems of thought. It is like the *upādhīṣaṇ-nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists. It may also be likened to the *apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* of the Mahāyānists. Such a perfect being may appear to be active in this world in many ways, yet at root, he is inactive. He is like a man assisting a magician in a magical show, knowing that all that is shown is merely an illusion of the senses. He is unaffected by all that happens.² When Gautama, the Buddha,

1. *Mādhyamika Kārikā Vṛtti*, p. 519.

2. *Vedāntasara*, 219.

attained enlightenment, he wanted his enlightenment not to be known to others. But Brahmā inspired the Buddha to be the teacher of mankind. This is the stage of *sayoga kevalin* or *jivan mukta*. So did the Tirthakaras, Ganadhara and Sāmānya-kevalins preach the sublime knowledge to the people of this world. Zimmer compares this attitude of the Kevalins to the function of a lamp. Just as the lamp lights the room and still remains unconcerned with the what is going on in the room, so the self enacts the rôle of 'lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for pursuit of any good, any gratification of the sense nor any kindly goal'.

In the fourteenth stage of Gunasthāna called Ayoga-Kevali, the self has attained peaceful perfection. The influx of Karma is completely stopped and the self is freed from all Karmic dust.¹ This state lasts only for a period of time required to pronounce five syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains disembodied liberation. Being now free, with its upward motion the soul attains the liberation or Mokṣa.

The liberated souls live in perfect peace and purity in *siddhaśilā* which is the abode of the omniscient souls. In the *Tiloyarannapti* we get the description of the *siddhaśilā*, which is also called the *mokṣasthāna* or *nirvāṇasthāna*. These freed souls enjoy 'a kind of interpenetrating existence on account of their oneness of status.' Their soul substance has a special power by which an infinity of souls could exist without mutual exclusion. The identity of the saved is determined by the living rhythm retaining the form of the last physical life and by the knowledge of the past.² The conception of the liberated soul and the abode of the souls in *siddhaśilā* where they live with all their individuality, is a logical possibility and psychologically significant.

ÉPILOGUE 1. We may not attain Mokṣa; we do not need to. We can still keep the ideal of perfection before us and

1. ZIMMER (H.) : *Philosophies of India*, p. 446.

2. Gommatendra : *Tīrthāṇḍa*.

3. RADHAKRISHNAN (S.) *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 333.

look to the perfect souls, as ideals to guide us, like the kindly light in this life.

2. Struggle for perfection is a necessary factor in life. Sorrow and imperfection are a flavour to the sauce. They are necessary for onward journey in the spiritual struggle. The efforts for self-realization will have meaning only when this world becomes a vale of the soul making, and the life a real fight in which something is eternally gained.¹ Life is to be considered as a struggle towards perfection, and not merely an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes. We should realise that 'man is not complete, he is yet to be' in what he is, he is small. He is hungering for something which is more than what he can get. In this struggle for perfection man need not depend on God or any superior being for favours, for He "rolls as impotently as you or I". Man has to depend on his own self-effort. The Jaina attitude is melioristic.

3. The synoptic view is the very foundation of Jaina out-look. A Jaina looks at the soul from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. It is simple, perfect, eternal from the noumenal point of view, but not eternal from the empirical point of view. Space is incorporeal and formless; yet divisible, and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Reality is complex like a many coloured dome and can be predicated from many points of view. In the analysis of knowledge Jainas admit levels of experience. Sense experience is empirical in nature and content and cannot yield the noumenal reality, although the phenomena can be apprehended by it. Supersensuous experience including omniscience is direct and gives a synoptic picture of noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. Dravya-karma and the Ehāva-karma are two aspects of the after effects of our action. Above all in their analysis of the way of life Jainas have emphasised the synoptic outlook by introducing the gradations of moral codes as *muni-dharma* and *śrāvaka-dharma*. This distinction is unique in Indian thought and it substantially contributes to the understanding of human nature and its capabilities for the attainment of perfection. The analysis in this sense is psychologically important. Jainas have neither

1. WILLIAM JAMES : *The Will to Believe* (1889) p. 61.

denied the reality of empirical world nor have they given exclusive emphasis on this world and our life. In understanding life and experience we have to see everything with reference to its i) substance (*dravya*), ii) nature (*rūpa*), iii) place (*deśa*) and iv) time (*kāla*). What is true of a thing in specific conditions at a specific time may not be true if it were in a different context, and to ignore this is to commit the fallacy of *hasty*. This is the spirit of Anekānta. It expresses a catholic outlook, the spirit of intellectual non-violence.

The conditions of society in the present-day world demand that we adopt such a catholic outlook or else we perish. We are in the midst of a life where hatred, injustice and intolerance reign supreme. A new orientation of values would be necessary for us to destroy the inverted values and then 'rebuild to our heart's desire'. What we need today is love and sympathy and not prejudice and pomp. We need understanding and a sense of fellowship between the peoples of the world. And Anekānta would give us a 'Weltanschauung' and a scientific interpretation of things. We will then learn to love our neighbours as ourselves. "And we can still cherish the hope when power becomes ashamed to occupy its throne" and, "when the morning comes cleansing the blood-stained steps of the nation",¹ we shall be called upon to bring the spirit of Anekānta to sweeten the purity of human destiny.

1. TAGORE : *Nationalism*.

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